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A POWERLESS JUDICIARY? THE NORTH CAROLINA
COURTS' PERCEPTIONS OF REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
CHARLES MARKHAM*
The acts of administrative or executive officers are not to be set at
nought by recourse to the courts. Nor are courts charged with the duty
or vested with the authority to supervise administrative and executive
agencies of our government. However, a court of competent jurisdic-
tion may determine in a proper proceeding whether a public official has
acted capriciously or arbitrarily or in bad faith or in disregard of the
law. Pue v. Hood, Comr. of Banks. . . . And it may compel action in
good faith in accord with the law. But when the jurisdiction of a court
is properly invoked to review the action of a public official to determine
whether he, in choosing one of two or more courses of action, abused
his discretion, the court may not direct any particular course of action.
It only decides whether the action of the public official was contrary to
law or so patently in bad faith as to evidence arbitrary abuse of his
right of choice. If the officer acted within the law and in good faith in
the exercise of his best judgment, the court must decline to interfere
even though it is convinced the official chose the wrong course of ac-
tion. The right to err is one of the rights-and perhaps one of the
weaknesses--of our democratic form of government. In any event, we
operate under the philosophy of the separation of powers, and the
courts were not created or vested with authority to act as supervisory
agencies to control and direct the action of executive and administra-
tive agencies or officials. So long as officers act in good faith and in
accord with the law, the courts are powerless to act-and rightly so.
Barnhill, C.J., in Burton v. City of
Reidsville'
Twenty-five years have passed since the late Chief Justice Barnhill
described (as succinctly as any member of the Supreme Court of North
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1. 243 N.C. 405, 407-08, 90 S.E.2d 700, 702-03 (1956).
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Carolina has ever done2 ) a widely perceived tradition of judicial re-
straint toward administrative action. Even as he wrote, the provisions
for Judicial Review of Decisions of Certain Administrative Agencies,
enacted in 1953, 3 lay as yet uninterpreted in the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes4 although the General Assembly for the first time had pro-
vided comprehensive means by which certain administrative acts could
indeed be "set at nought" on the suit of aggrieved persons.' The cover-
age and scope of the judicial review statute (and of the Administrative
Procedure Act, enacted in 1974,6 which generally incorporated its pro-
visions) are limited, however. For example, judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act applies only to a "final agency decision
in a contested case ' 7 and "agencies" do not include local government
bodies.8 Thus, those responsible for perhaps the great majority of ad-
ministrative decisions made, or actions proposed, in North Carolina
remain free from substantial threats of judicial interference with their
conduct.9
2. On March 25, 1966, on the occasion of the presentation to the North Carolina Supreme
Court of a portrait of the late Chief Justice M.V. Barnhill, his former colleague on the court,
United States Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., said:
It is fitting that our tribute to Chief Justice Maurice Victor Barnhill should be simple, and
direct, as befits the man, for in his lifetime he shunned rhetoric and hyperbole as he abhorred
publicity and sham. Gifted with a precise, highly developed intellect, he used it in his life as
in the law, to pare away the irrelevant, the non-essential and the valueless to reveal swiftly
and meaningfully the hard core of truth ....
He possessed a remarkable ability to express himself clearly and understandingly [sic] in an
opinion ....
266 N.C. 792, 800 (1966).
3. 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1094. The law became effective July 1, 1953.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (Supp. 1955), repealed, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch.
1331, § 2.
5. As early as 1937, a practicing attorney, Ralph M. Hoyt, addressing a meeting of the
North Carolina State Bar, noted that with limited exceptions there was no right of judicial review
of administrative action and called for a "fairly uniform, just and scientific method of judicial
review for all these administrative activities. It is certainly an orderly and lawyer-like thing to do
and we all know that occasions do, and will in the future, arise when the lack of adequate review
results in serious injustice." Hoyt, Shaping Judicial Review o/Administrative Tribunals, 16 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (1937). The General Assembly was not to heed Hoyt's plea for 16 years. On the
inadequacy of judicial review procedures prior to 1953, see also Note, Administrative Law--Evi-
dence Before North Carolina Tribunals, 19 N.C.L. REV. 568, 576 (1941); A Survey of Statutory
Changes in North Carolina. Administrative Law, Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review, 19
N.C.L. REV. 435, 435-36 (1941); REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO STUDY PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES BEFORE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 20-24 (1953).
6. 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1331, § I. Although enacted in 1974, the Act appears in the
1973 Session Laws.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978).
8. Id § 150A-2(l). There was no specific provision excluding local government bodies from
the 1953 statute, however.
9. In 1971, Professor Hanft referred to Professor Davis' estimate (I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.02 (1958)) that the average state has more than 100 agencies with powers
of adjudication or rule-making or both, but the number of administrative agencies created by
municipalities and other units of local government in the United States may be "in the tens of
thousands." Hanft, Some Aspects ofEvidence in Adjudication by Administrative Agencies in North
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The supreme court continues to express and enforce the conventional
wisdom about the role of the courts as proclaimed by Chief Justice
Barnhill."° Yet in the last twenty-five years we have experienced a
proliferation of statutes I" providing state and local agencies with tie
authority to initiate or permit intrusions upon the lives, daily affairs,
and property rights of citizens, markedly accelerating the trend of the
third of a century preceding Burton. 2 Within the past decade the
United States Supreme Court has frequently moved to limit access to
the federal courts (or to limit the right to hearings reviewable by the
Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REV. 635, 638-39 (1971). "At best, only an insignificant fraction of all admin-
istrative acts will or can ever be reviewed by the courts, or even be the subject of a request for
judicial review." Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative Process,
28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1959).
10. See, e.g., Painter v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 288 N.C. 165, 176, 180-81, 217 S.E.2d
650, 657, 659-60 (1975); Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 466, 186 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1972); Sykes
v. Belk, 278 N.C. 106, 123, 179 S.E.2d 439, 449-50 (1971); Redevelopment Comm'n v. Grimes, 277
N.C. 634, 643, 178 S.E.2d 345, 350-51 (1971); General Elec. Co. v. Turner, 275 N.C. 493, 497, 168
S.E.2d 385, 388 (1969). Indeed, after the preparation of the first draft of this article, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, in State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, included
in its opinion the excerpt from Burton v. City of Reidsville quoted at the beginning of this article.
300 N.C. 381, 403, 269 S.E.2d 547, 563 (1980).
11. E.g., North Carolina Minimum Wage Act, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 475; Water Safety
Act, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1064, § 1; North Carolina Pesticide Control Law of 1971, 1971 N.C.
Sess. Laws, ch. 832, § 1; Water and Air Resources Management and Pollution Control Act of
1971, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1167, § 2; North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, 1971
N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1203, § 1; Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina, 1973 N.C.
Sess. Laws, ch. 295, § 1, ch. 476, § 128; Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 1973, 1973 N.C.
Sess. Laws, ch. 392, § 1; Coastal Area Management Act of 1974, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1284,
§ 1; Land Policy Act of 1974, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1306, § 1; Equal Employment Practices
Act, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 726, § 1; North Carolina Balanced Growth Policy Act, 1979 N.C.
Sess. Laws, ch. 412, § 1.
12. E.g., Zoning Act, 1923 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 250, § 1; The North Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 120, § 1; Housing Authorities Law, 1935 N.C. Sess.
Laws, ch. 456, § 1; Unemployment Compensation Law, 1936 Ex. Sess., ch. 1, § 1; Maximum Hour
Law, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 409, § 1; Model Airport Zoning Act, 1941 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch.
250; Urban Redevelopment Law, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1095, § 1.
In his address to the North Carolina State Bar in 1937, Hoyt was moved to say:
The serious thing about this avalanche of regulatory activity is not, of course, its effect on
the practicing attorney, who must increasingly shift his attention from the common law courts
to the boards and commissions, but the tendency to place the rights, privileges and even the
liberties of the citizen in the hands of non-judicial bodies, politically appointed and often
politically controlled.
Hoyt counted 46 state administrative agencies functioning in North Carolina in 1937. See Hoyt,
supra note 5, at 1-2. By 1973, Professor Daye found more than 100 agencies listed in the North
Carolina Manual. Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act.- An Interpretive
Analysis, 53 N.C.L. REV. 833, 836 (1975).
In 1965, Professor Cooper referred to the "strange neglect" of state administrative agencies, in
marked contrast to the "incandescent glare of investigation and debate, which since 1941 has been
focused on the functions of federal administrative agencies. The personal privileges and property
rights of most persons are more frequently and vitally affected by the rules and orders of state
agencies than by the actions of federal agencies." I F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1
(1965). The neglect referred to by Professor Cooper persisted for at least another decade. In fact,
said Professor Schotland, "the situation has gotten worse." See Schotland, JudicialReview of State
Administrative Action, 26 ADM. L. REV. 93, 94 (1974).
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courts) for relief against administrative conduct, 3 underscoring the
need for the judiciaries of the states to take a broader view of their
powers' 4 if citizens are to sustain their faith that governmental institu-
tions are just and responsive.' 5
13. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) & Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (limiting the power of the courts to impose
procedural requirements on administrative agencies beyond those minimally required by statute);
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), &
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due process right to evidentiary hearing); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity).
14. See, e.g., Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Bishop P. Wood
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of person-
nel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that
numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our affairs.
The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review
for every such error. In the absence of any claim that the public employer was motivated by a
desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights,
we must presume that official action was regular and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in
other ways. The [dlue [pirocess (cilause of the [flourteenth [almendment is not a guarantee
against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.
426 U.S. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
In Paul v. Davis, respondent was left to his remedies under state defamation law rather than
under the Constitution. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156 (1978), reflects a commendable willingness
by the court to broaden state remedies. There North Carolina joined a number of other states in
holding that actions against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would be entertained in the state
court.
15. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Paul v. Davis, said: "I have always thought that one of this
Court's most important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark against governmental violations
of the constitutional safeguards securing in our free society the legitimate expectations of every
person to innate human dignity and sense of worth." 424 U.S. 693, 734-35 (1976).
Other judges and commentators have emphasized the importance of responding to citizens'
expectations, and of increasing citizen participation in and understanding of decisions that affect
one's life and affairs. See, e.g., Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 586 (1972):
We have recently seen enough evidence of what happens when a substantial number of
people come to believe that major decisions have been made without their consent. If the
social fabric is to survive, the politics of manipulation and delegation simply must be re-
placed by a politics of informed consent.
Professor Kramer stated:
The existence of judicial review is a constant reminder to the official that excessive actions
risk judicial inquiry and reversal. It is a constant source of assurance and security to the
individual citizen that he has this method of vindicating his rights against the state before an
independent tribunal . . . . [Properly limited and exercised, judicial review is] an actual
source of strength to the administrative process. Public confidence in government is in-
creased . ...
Kramer, supra note 9, at 9.
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS, No-
MOS XVIII 128 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) observed:
One familiar notion of due process is that of an obligation on the part of those who make
decisions about the concerns of other individuals to engage in explanatory procedures-pro-
cedures in which agents state reasons for their decisions and affected individuals are allowed
to examine and contest the proffered reasons. . . . [A] participatory opportunity may also be
psychologically important to the individual: to have played a part in, to have made one's apt
contribution to, decisions which are about oneself may be counted important even though the
decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable and one's efforts have not
proved influential.
4
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For these reasons-and for the further reasons that the appellate
courts of North Carolina, as recently as State ex rel Commissioner of
Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau6 and for several years there-
tofore, have displayed an uncharacteristic willingness to "control and
direct" the operations of at least one state officer and agency (the Com-
missioner and Department of Insurance), 7 and have on some occa-
sions liberally interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act in ways
congenial to the interests of complaining parties' -- it is appropriate
now to determine whether there is a valid legal and philosophical basis
for the limited view of judicial power expressed by Chief Justice Barn-
hill, and whether these largely self-imposed restrictions on the author-
ity of the courts are still observed. If so, the question remains whether
such limitations are suitable for a society far more complex than that in
which they developed and flourished.' 9 It is appropriate also to ex-
amine the forms for seeking, and the availability and scope of judicial
review under present North Carolina case and statutory law, and to
consider whether the law is adequate for the times.
It is my conviction that the courts of North Carolina have never
been, are not, and need not be (to borrow from Richard M. Nixon's
Vietnam War rhetoric) the "pitiful, helpless giants" imagined in the
reveries of Chief Justice Barahill and of kindred spirits who came
before and after him to the supreme court of this state. To employ a
To the extent that the federal courts find themselves constitutionally incapable of affording such
guarantees to a disaffected individual, the state courts provide, as they must, the only alternative.
16. 41 N.C. App. 310, 255 S.E.2d 557 (1979), a'd in part & rev'd in part, 300 N.C. 381, 269
S.E.2d 547 (1980).
17. See State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C.
60, 241 S.E.2d 324 (1978); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin.
Office, 293 N.C. 365, 239 S.E.2d 48 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins.
Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 471, 234 S.E.2d 720 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Caro-
lina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 231 S.E.2d 882 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v.
North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1, 231 S.E.2d 867 (1977); State ex rel.
Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 291 N.C. 55, 229 S.E.2d 268 (1976);
State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192, 214
S.E.2d 98 (1975); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 44 N.C. App. 191,
261 S.E.2d 671 (1979), modified& aft'd, 300 N.C. 485, 269 S.E.2d 602 (1980); State ex rel. Comm'r
of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 44 N.C. App. 75, 259 S.E.2d 926 (1979), modfied& af'd,
300 N.C. 474, 269 S.E.2d 595 (1980); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau,
43 N.C. App. 715, 259 S.E.2d 922 (1979); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate
Bureau, 40 N.C. App. 85, 252 S.E.2d 811 (1979); North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office v.
Ingram, 35 N.C. App. 578, 242 S.E.2d 205 (1978); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C.
App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 460 (1977); American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 32 N.C. App. 552,
233 S.E.2d 398 (1977).
18. See, e.g., Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 620, 265
S.E.2d 379 (1980); In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 253 S.E.2d 912 (1979); Thompson v. Wake County
Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen,
284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974); Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879
(1963).
19. See text accompanying notes 163-81 infra.
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Biblical"° metaphor, while we cannot expect and assuredly would not
want our courts to be neighborly Samaritans, they must not be Priests
and Levites content to "pass by on the other side" when the rights and
interests of citizens-individual, corporate, or collectively-are
threatened, jeopardized, or invaded by governmental action.2'
A Prefatory Note
For purposes of this article, the term "administrative action" and
similar expressions include conduct of, or action taken by, the gov-
erning bodies of counties, cities, and towns, even when they act in a
legislative capacity. Our law is clear that such entities are administra-
tive agencies of the state.22 Moreover, in this state, the common law
governing what are popularly known as administrative agencies-bod-
ies either operating independently of, or attached to, the executive de-
partment-is largely derived, as we shall see, from decisions made by
our courts in nineteenth century cases involving locally elected (often
legislative) officials, and arising before the development of the modern
administrative state. It was not until 1950 that the phrase "Administra-
tive Law" first appeared in the Analytical Index found in the official
reports of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.23 The primary con-
cern here is with judicial review of so-called "discretionary action"-
20. Luke 10: 25-37 (King James).
2 1. As a result of widespread criticism of the administrative process during the New Deal
era, in 1939 President Roosevelt established the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, whose recommendations in its 1941 Report were reflected to some extent in the Fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1976)). For background on this legislation, see S. BREYER & R. STEW-
ART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 29-30 (1979). What the Committee said
about public expectations from judicial review of administrative action in the federal courts 40
years ago is no less appropriate for North Carolina today:
First, we expect judicial review to check-not to supplant-administrative action . . . . We
may expect judicial review to continue its historic function as a brake on excursion by the
administrative body beyond its lawfully delegated atithority and on the excessive assumption
of power by the executive . . . . We may expect judicial review, in the performance of this
function of control, to speak the final word on interpretation of law, both constitutional and
statutory . . . . Judicial review may also be expected to require from the administrative
branch fair consideration in its adjudications. . . . Finally, judicial review may be expected
to check extremes of arbitrariness or incompetence in administrative adjudications ....
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 75-79 (1941).
22. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 257 N.C. 367, 371, 126 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1962); Deloatch v.
Beamon, 252 N.C. 754, 757, 114 S.E.2d 711, 713-14 (1960); Smith v. City of Winston-Salem, 247
N.C. 349, 354, 100 S.E.2d 835, 838-39 (1957); Southern Ry. v. Mecklenburg County, 231 N.C. 148,
150, 56 S.E.2d 438, 439-40 (1949); Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N.C. 472, 479, 20 S.E.2d 825,
830 (1942); Town of Saluda v. Polk County, 207 N.C. 180, 186, 176 S.E. 298, 301-02 (1934); Cabe
v. Board of Aldermen, 185 N.C. 158, 160, 116 S.E. 419, 420 (1923); Board of Trustees v. Webb, 155
N.C. 379, 383-84, 71 S.E. 520, 521-22 (1911); Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N.C. 489, 493-95 (1883).
23. 230 N.C. 796 (1950) (Analytical Index to North Carolina Reports). The term "Adminis-
trative Law and Procedure" first appeared in the previous year at 229 N.C. 837. The term "Ad-
ministrative Law" was first included as a title in the Fifth Decennial Digest (1947) of the West Key
Reporter System. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7, at 19 (1976).
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that is, as Chief Justice Barnhill suggested above, situations where a
public official or agency is confronted with a choice between two or
more courses of action. As the supreme court said in North Carolina
State Highway Commission v. Young,24 "It is hard to see how any ad-
ministrative body can function without exercising discretion ... ."I' In
general, actions involving damages sought from governmental bodies
or officials-as in the case of eminent domain proceedings, negligence,
or nuisance, and the related issues of governmental or officer immu-
nity-are beyond the scope of the discussion here; nor are we con-
cerned with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal law
enforcement.
The reader should be aware that the author's interest in and views on
the subject of judicial review of discretionary administrative action de-
veloped from his participation as a party, counsel, and research assis-
tant in cases where such review was sought (sometimes unsuccessfully).
Some of these cases are cited and discussed herein.
24. 200 N.C. 603, 607, 158 S.E. 91, 93-94 (1931).
25. "The exercise of adequate discretion for dealing with the problems of a complex society
and the simultaneous provision of sufficient safeguards against the abuse of discretion are the two
clearest needs of modern democratic government." Fuchs, An Approach to Administrative Law, 18
N.C.L. REV. 183, 194 (1940). Emphasizing that "[clontrol of discretion is crucial to effective judi-
cial review," Professor Schwartz states:
Review of discretion is an essential feature of a system which purports to be governed by
the rule of law. "Law has reached its finest moments," Justice Douglas has affirmed, "when it
has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler, some . . . official, some bureau-
crat . . . . Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than
any of man's other inventions."
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 216, at 607. See also I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
208 (2d ed. 1978); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 26 (1965): "[lt is
precisely the role of judicial review to curb and correct administrative distortion. Professor
Jaffe further says:
The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logi-
cally, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid
' [Tihe availability of judicial review is, in our system and under our tradition, the
necessary premise of legal validity.
• '. [ TIhere is in our society a profound, tradition-taught reliance on the courts as the ulti-
mate guardian and assurance of the limits set upon executive power by the constitutions and
legislatures.
Id. at 320-21.
Thus, while provision of discretionary powers to administrative officers and agencies may be
necessary to the efficient functioning of government, it seems widely recognized, except possibly to
adherents of Burton v. City of Reidsville, that the corollary must be an "activist" point of view
among the judiciary. Most state courts seem to acknowledge this principle. As Cooper points out:
Where provisions for judicial review permit the courts to exercise a large measure of superin-
tending control over the agency, the courts are more easily persuaded that a broad measure of
discretion should be sustained, for the courts feel confident that if unfair procedures be im-
posed, or arbitrary decisions made, they could be corrected on appeal to the courts.
1 F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 81.
7
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS LIMITING THE
JUDICIARY OF NORTH CAROLINA
Under the Constitution of North Carolina, 26 all political power is
derived from the people and the sovereign power of the people is
supreme. It has been described as axiomatic that a law enacted
through their chosen representatives in the General Assembly "may
not be set aside by the courts unless it contravenes some prohibition or
mandate of the [c]onstitution by which the people of the State have
elected to be limited and restrained, or unless it violates some provision
of the granted powers contained in the Constitution of the United
States. ' 2 Under the North Carolina Constitution, the legislative, exec-
utive, and supreme judicial powers of the state "shall be forever sepa-
rate and distinct from each other. '2 8 The supreme court's jurisdiction
is "to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, upon any
matter of law or legal inference.1 29 It is well settled that the limitation
to consideration of "matters of law or legal inference" does not apply
where the appeal is from the granting or denial of preliminary injunc-
tive relief; in that case the reviewing court is free to make its own find-
ings of fact.3" The constitution authorizes the General Assembly to
provide for the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals,3 ' and the
statute limits review to "matters of law or legal inference."32 With cer-
tain statutory exceptions (for example, appeals from the Utilities Com-
mission or the Industrial Commission which are heard initially in the
court of appeals3 3 ), the superior court is normally the court where judi-
cial review of administrative action is first sought.34
II. DISCRETIONARY ACTION: DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF
THE "POWERLESS JUDICIARY" THEORY
From the beginning, the North Carolina courts have displayed a ro-
bust confidence in their capacity to curb governmental excesses-pro-
vided there were clear violations of constitutional or statutory authority
presented to them. Justice Clarkson twice proudly mentioned the
26. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 2. The constitution is found in volume 4A N.C. GEN. STAT. (1970).
27. State v. Warren, 211 N.C. 75, 80, 189 S.E. 108, 111 (1937) (Devin, J., dissenting).
28. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
29. Id. art. IV, § 12(l).
30. See Saff Bros., Inc. v. Bank of N.C., 289 N.C. 198, 204, 221 S.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1976);
Pruitt v. Williams, 288 N.C. 368, 373, 218 S.E.2d 348, 351-52 (1975); Register v. Griffin, 6 N.C.
App. 572, 574, 170 S.E.2d 520, 521-22 (1969); Cablevision of Winston-Salem, Inc. v. City of Win-
ston-Salem, 3 N.C. App. 252, 258, 164 S.E.2d 737, 740-41 (1968).
31. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(2).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-26 (1969).
33. 1d § 7A-29 (Supp. 1979).
34. Id §§ 7A-245, -247, -250 (1969).
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claim3 5 that in 1787 "this state was the first in the United States to
declare an act of the General Assembly unconstitutional."36 In 1817,
the supreme court held void on both substantive and procedural
grounds an ordinance of the Town Commissioners of Fayetteville di-
recting the constable to seize and sell all hogs found running at large in
the streets.37 The court said:
The laws of the land . ..allow to every person the opportunity of
defending his property before it is condemned, and in no case leave it
to the mercy of a mere ministerial officer to seize it at will, which seizure
is to be lawful or not, according to his own will and pleasure. The ordi-
nance, therefore, on that account, was unauthorized and consequently
void. And as to the other question, that seems equally clear. By the
mode of proceeding directed by the ordinance, the owner of the prop-
erty seized had no opportunity allowed him of appealing to the county
court of Cumberland, and on that account, also, the ordinance was
void.38
In an early case involving another type of administrative body, a school
board was found to have acted ultra vires in employing a teacher be-
yond the time when the board's term expired.39 In 1844 the supreme
court held that the justices of the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions
of Guilford County did not have the "arbitrary discretion" to refuse to
issue any retail liquor licenses because an act of the General Assembly
had authorized them to be granted to persons who met the character
and other requirements specified in the statute.4 °
However, by the mid-nineteenth century the supreme court had ac-
cepted, along with other familiar concepts of administrative law em-
bedded deep in our legal history,4 the principles of judicial deference
to the executive branch when acting within the scope of its powers,42 to
the independence of local officers,43 and to the superior knowledge of
35. The justice was referring to Bayard v. Singleton, I N.C. (I Mart.) 5 (1787). See also
Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 58 (1805); Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2
Mur.) 391 (1818). Bayard v. Singleton preceded by 16 years the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
36. Glenn v. Board of Educ., 210 N.C. 525, 530, 187 S.E. 781, 784 (1936); Hill v. Board of
Comm'rs, 209 N.C. 4, 6, 182 S.E. 709, 710 (1935) (Clarkson, J., dissenting).
37. Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N.C. (Term) 591 (1817). See also State v. Moore, 46 N.C. (I Jones)
276 (1854) (liquor license granted by county court without written recommendation of town com-
missioners held invalid); Commissioners of the Town of Asheville v. Means, 29 N.C. (7 Ired.) 406
(1846) (tax imposed by town commissioners held invalid).
38. Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N.C. (Term) 591, 592 (1817) (emphasis added).
39. Taylor v. School Comm. No. 17, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 98 (1857).
40. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Gillespie v. Justices of Guilford County, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 315, 321
(1844).
41. For example, due process requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard: Jennings v.
Stafford, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 404 (1841); Hamilton v. Adams, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 161 (1812). Delegation
doctrine: Thompson v. Floyd, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 313, 315-16 (1855).
42. See Exparte Moore, 64 N.C. 802, 807 (1870).
43. See Nixon v. Harrell, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 76 (1857).
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local bodies about conditions in their communities." In 1833, in Hoke
v. Henderson,45 the court, through Chief Justice Ruffin, issued a classic
opinion restricting the power of the General Assembly to abolish an
office it had created. While this point was overruled seventy years
later,4 6 Chief Justice Ruffin's observation that a court cannot question
the "sound discretion" of the legislature,4" and his discourse upon the
relationship of the judicial and lawmaking branches, have been
echoed4 8 in North Carolina jurisprudence almost to this day:
It is the province of the [c]ourt to expound their [the legislature's] words
so as to attain to the meaning; and to that end consequences and policy
may be looked to. But when its meaning is discovered, the act as really
intended, is obligatory upon the mind, the will and the conscience of
the [jiudge, however mischievous the policy, harsh and oppressive in its
enactments on individuals, or tyrannous on the citizens generally.
Those are political considerations, fit to be weighed by and to influence
the legislators; but if disregarded by them, their responsibility is to their
constituents, not to the courts of justice. To a [c]ourt, the impolicy, the
injustice, the unreasonableness, the severity, the cruelty of a statute by
themselves merely, are and ought to be urged in vain. The judicial
function is not adequate to the application of those principles, and is
not conferred for that purpose ....
The question is, whether [the] legislative intention . . . is valid and
efficacious, as being within the powers of the [1]egislature in the consti-
tutions of the country; or is null, as being contrary to and inconsistent
with the provisions of those instruments. To the determination of this
question, the judicial function is competent. It involves no collateral
considerations of abstract justice or political expediency. . . . Legisla-
tive representatives may order and enact what to them may seem meet
and useful, upon all subjects and in all methods, except those on which
their action is restrained by the [clonstitution ....
44. See Atkinson v. Foreman, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 55, 58 (1811).
45. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
46. Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 46 S.E. 961 (1903). Referring to the holding in Hoke v.
Henderson that an office created by the General Assembly was property, Chief Justice Clark. in
his History of the Supreme Court ofNorth Carolina, wrote that the Hoke decision "gave infinite
trouble till, after seventy years, it was overruled . . . . During its existence as authority no case
ever caused more inconvenience in the administration of our State Government than this." 177
N.C. 617, 622-23 (1919).
47. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 20 (1833).
48. See. e.g., Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 41, 175 S.E.2d 665, 671
(1970); Keziah v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 272 N.C. 299, 310, 158 S.E.2d 539, 547 (1968); Clark's
Greenville, Inc. v. West, 268 N.C. 527, 531, 151 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1966). But see In re Certificate of
Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973), noted in Comment,
Hospital Regulation After Aston Park: Substantive Due Process in North Carolina, 52 N.C.L. REV.
763 (1974).
49. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 6-7 (1833).
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Six years later the court said:
The interpreters of a law have not the right to judge of its policy, and
when they undertake to find out the policy contemplated by the makers
of the law there is a great danger of mistaking their own opinions on
that subject, for the opinions of those who had alone the right to judge
of matters of policy.'
These few traces of judicial conservatism concerning actions of the
executive and legislative branches (except where clear violations of le-
gal authority were shown) are insufficient to justify the conclusion that
the view expressed by Chief Justice Barnhill in Burton v. City of Reids-
ville5' has significant historic roots antedating adoption of the North
Carolina Constitution of 1868. There was no substantial body of law
governing the conduct of administrative agencies--even in the broad
sense of the phrase used here---during the first 100 years of our state's
existence." It is to the post-Civil War period that we must turn to find
a common law foundation for the principle of judicial impotence.
A. Brodnax v. Groom.- The Beginning
If there is any case from which the theory of a powerless judiciary in
North Carolina can be traced, it is Brodnax v. Groom,53 decided in 1870
by a unanimous supreme court under Chief Justice Richmond M. Pear-
son, whose doctrine of judicial restraint was still being cited, with an
erroneously attributed quotation, nearly 100 years later.
54
In Brodnax, plaintiffs brought a taxpayers' action against the Rock-
ingham County Commissioners to challenge the validity of a statute
authorizing the Commissioners to levy a tax for repairing and building
bridges. Among the grounds raised for objection was the constitutional
provision55 requiring a vote of the majority of qualified voters for the
levy or collection of any tax "except for the necessary expenses" of the
county. The tax involved had not been so approved, and plaintiffs con-
50. Roberts v. Cannon, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 398, 409-10 (1839).
51. See quote in text accompanying note I supra.
52. Justice Adams listed some of "the influences which shaped the decisions of the [slupreme
[clourt" beginning in 1818 and through its first half-century. He made no reference to any theo-
ries or doctrines of judicial restraint vis-a-vis other branches of government, under separation of
powers or otherwise. Adams, Evolution of Law in North Carolina, 2 N.C.L. REV. 133 (1924). The
highest North Carolina court prior to 1818 was a court of conference, consisting of the superior
court judges and known as the "Supreme Court" beginning in 1805. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina was created by a legislative enactment in November, 1818, which went into effect Janu-
ary 1, 1819. The court had no constitutional status and existed at the will of the General Assembly
until adoption of the Constitution of 1868. Stacy, Brief Review of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, 4 N.C.L. REV. 115, 115 (1926). See also Clark, History of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, 177 N.C. 617, 620 (1919); State v. Furmage, 250 N.C. 616, 624-25, 109 S.E.2d 563, 569
(1959).
53. 64 N.C. 244 (1870).
54. Clark's Greenville, Inc. v. West, 268 N.C. 527, 531, 151 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1966). See note &
text accompanying note 60 infra.
55. N.C. CONST. of 1868 art. VII, § 7.
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tended that repairing and building bridges was not a necessary expense.
The court advanced what appears to be an ineptly phrased suggestion
that county commissioners, rather than courts, were entitled to interpret
the words "necessary expenses" found in the constitution,56 an observa-
tion subsequently clarified by the supreme court on numerous occa-
sions.57  Chief Justice Pearson-disavowing the court's capacity for
determining which bridges needed repairs, whether the bridges should
have stone pillars rather than wooden posts, and the like-concluded:
In short, this [clourt is not capable of controlling the exercise of
power on the part of the General Assembly, or of the county authori-
ties, and it cannot assume to do so, without putting itself in antagonism
as well to the General Assembly, as to the county authorities, and erect-
ing a despotism offive men; which is opposed to the fundamental princi-
ples of our government and the usages of all times past.
For the exercise of powers conferred by the [c]onstitution the people
must rely upon the honesty of the members of the General Assembly
and of the persons elected to fill places of trust in the several counties.
This [clourt has no power, and is not capable if it had the power, of
controlling the exercise of power conferred by the [clonstitution upon
the legislative department of the government or upon the county au-
thorities.
Brodnax lingers on in a substantial body of supreme court opinions59
whose authors have relied on it erroneously as authority for what is,
aside from total abstention, the narrowest conceivable view of judicial
power to control administrative and executive officers' discretion: that
the courts will not interfere with their acts "unless so clearly unreasona-
ble as to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion,"6°
56. "Who is to decide what are the necessary expenses of a county? The County Commis-
sioners, to whom are confided the trust of regulating all county matters." Brodnax v. Groom, 64
N.C. 244, 249 (1870).
57. "The courts determine whether a given project is a necessary expense of the municipality,
but the governing authorities of the municipality determine in their discretion whether such given
project is necessary or needed in the designated locality." Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 458, 50
S.E.2d 545, 550 (1948), quoting Starmount Co. v. Town of Hamilton Lakes, 205 N.C. 514, 520, 171
S.E. 909, 912 (1933). See also Purser v. Ledbetter, 227 N.C. I, 4, 40 S.E.2d 702, 705 (1946);
Starmount Co. v. Town of Hamilton Lakes, 205 N.C. 514, 520, 171 S.E. 909, 912 (1933), citing
Henderson v. City of Wilmington, 191 N.C. 269, 132 S.E. 25 (1926); Storm v. Town of Wrights-
ville Beach, 189 N.C. 679, 128 S.E. 17 (1925); Fawcett v. Town of Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E.
1029 (1903).
58. 64 N.C. 244, 250 (1833).
59. See, e.g., Messer v. Smathers, 213 N.C. 183, 189, 195 S.E. 376, 379 (1938); Crabtree v.
Board of Educ., 199 N.C. 645, 650, 155 S.E. 550, 553 (1930); Hayes v. Benton, 193 N.C. 379, 383,
137 S.E. 169, 170 (1927); Carlyle v. State Highway Comm'n, 193 N.C. 36, 60, 136 S.E. 612, 626
(1927) (Stacy, C.J., dissenting); Newton v. State Highway Comm'n, 192 N.C. 54, 60, 133 S.E. 522,
525 (1926); Lassiter v. Board of Comm'rs, 188 N.C. 379, 383, 124 S.E. 738, 740 (1924); Parks v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N.C. 490, 498, 120 S.E. 46, 50 (1923); Lee v. Town of Waynesville,
184 N.C. 565, 568, 115 S.E. 51, 53 (1922); Dula v. Board of School Trustees, 177 N.C. 426, 431, 99
S.E. 193, 195 (1919); Newton v. School Comm., 158 N.C. 186, 188, 73 S.E. 886, 887 (1912).
60. The phrase quoted in the text and in the cases cited in note 59 supra does not appear in
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and similar ornate phrases typical of the rhetoric of the turn-of-the-
century era during which they were crafted. Never mind that in Brod-
nax Chief Justice Pearson made no reference whatever to "oppressive"
or "manifest" abuse; never mind that some might view the true source
of "despotism" not as the justices of the supreme court, but the admin-
istrator whose fiat goes unrestrained by a reluctant judiciary. Brodnax
is the wellspring for at least one of three identifiable streams of judicial
thought on this subject in North Carolina-streams that meander in
their separate beds, merge awhile, branch off at unexpected places, and
join again, leaving their tributaries to flow on, in other directions. The
aimless judicial wanderings of a century leave the legal navigator no
fixed point of reference and no sure course through the thickets.
B. The Clearly Unreasonable, Oppressive, and Manifest Abuse of
Discretion Test
This grandiose standard first crept into the jurisprudence of North
Carolina with the direct imprimatur of the supreme court in 1908 in the
case of Rosenthal v. City of Goldsboro,6' where the plaintiff, Eva Rosen-
thal, sought unsuccessfully to restrain the city from cutting down shade
trees along her sidewalk. The city contended that their roots obstructed
Brodnax; nor was Brodnax cited as authority for it prior to the supreme court's opinion in Rosen-
thal v. City of Goldsboro, 149 N.C. 128, 134, 62 S.E. 905, 908 (1908). Indeed, in State v. Hill,
Justice Douglas observed that the Brodnax court's "half-humorous and half-sarcastic" language
about wooden posts and stone pillars on the bridges involved "was surely never intended to apply
to the constitutional rights of the citizen which are not held at the pleasure of a board of aldermen,
or even of a [llegislature." 126 N.C. 1140, 1147, 36 S.E. 326, 328 (1900) (emphasis the court's). In
Rosenthal, the court relied extensively on Tate v. City of Greensboro, 114 N.C. 392, 19 S.E. 767
(1894). The Tate court, however, did not even refer to Brodnax; it did cite and quote from Chase
P. City of Oshkosh, where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said with respect to local decisions as
to street improvements, "Courts can interfere only in cases of fraud or oppression, constituting
manifest abuse of discretion." 81 Wis. 313, 313, 51 N.W. 560, 561 (1892). Thus, for the 38 years
prior to Rosenthal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had not considered Brodnax as author-
ity for anything beyond the principle that local authorities generally have discretion beyond the
reach of the courts as to the location and construction of necessary public works. For 38 years it
had passed up the opportunity to read into Brodnax a rule that the courts were powerless to inter-
fere unless that discretion were "clearly unreasonably, oppressively and manifestly" abused. The
court did not begin to cite Brodnax for that rule until the Rosenthal court invented it-without
any discernible basis for doing so, or for using Brodnax as authority for such a rule. The Rosen-
thal court, moreover, rephrased and enlarged upon the Chase rule, using it as second to Brodnax
in a "three-string" citation. The third citation, to Smith, Municipal Corporations § 1311, as in the
case of Brodnax, did not include the "oppressive and manifest abuse" phrase.
It appears that Brodnax acquired its assumed authenticity on this point, and the flavor and
aroma of Chase as well, by its close proximity to Chase in the Rosenthal opinion--by osmosis, as
it were. The conclusion, as suggested in the text discussion of Rosenthal infra, is that cheese was
not the only import from Wisconsin enjoyed by North Carolinians in and after 1908, when Rosen-
thal was decided. One is impelled to wonder how often a structure of bad law is erected by sheer
judicial rote on such flimsy foundations as the distortions of Brodnax and Chase by Justice Hoke
in his Rosenthal opinion.
61. 149 N.C. 128, 62 S.E. 905 (1908).
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and threatened the safety of the city sewerage system. Justice Hoke
wrote for the court:
[Ilt may now be considered as established with us, that our courts will
always be most reluctant to interfere with these municipal governments
in the exercise of discretionary powers, conferred upon them for the
public weal, and will never do so unless their action should be so clearly
unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of their
discretion. This position is, we think, supported by the better reason,
and is in accord with the decided weight of authority.62
The only North Carolina case cited for this "decided weight of au-
thority," however, was Brodnax v. Groom, which, of course, directly
stands for no such proposition.63
Nevertheless, the Rosenthal rule has been quoted, almost exactly as
stated, in at least ten cases which deal with subject matters far afield
from the fact situation there involved.' The Rosenthal progeny them-
selves have been cited for the same general standard in at least forty-six
additional cases in the North Carolina courts,65 so that the contagion of
Brodnax, and of the Rosenthal court's erroneous reliance on it, has
spread unchecked into numerous areas of North Carolina administra-
tive law. The endless variations on the basic Rosenthal theme, describ-
ing the type of conduct required for a court to bestir itself to intervene,
include administrative actions inflicting "palpable oppression"; 66 those
"manifestly unreasonable and oppressive";6 7 "manifestly fraudulent"; 68
62. Id at 134, 62 S.E. at 908 (emphasis added).
63. See note 60 supra.
64. In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938) (city's refusal to permit
erection of wall on corner lot); Hayes v. Benton, 193 N.C. 379, 383-84, 137 S.E. 169, 170 (1927)
(school board's refusal to provide bus transportation for a crippled child); Harden v. City of Ra-
leigh, 192 N.C. 395, 397-98, 135 S.E. 151, 152-53 (1926) (city's refusal to issue permit for erection
of filling station); Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N.C. 490, 498, 120 S.E. 46, 50 (1923)
(relocation of highway); Lee v. Town of Waynesville, 184 N.C. 565, 568, 115 S.E. 51, 53 (1922)
(widening of streets); Dula v. Board of School Trustees, 177 N.C. 426, 431, 99 S.E. 193, 195 (1919)
(action to compel continuation beyond term of school closed during influenza epidemic); Newton
v. School Comm., 158 N.C. 186, 188, 73 S.E. 886, 887 (1912) (selection of school site); State v.
Staples, 157 N.C. 637, 638, 73 S.E. 112, 112-13 (1911) (validity of ordinance regulating billboards);
Jones v. Town of N. Wilkesboro, 150 N.C. 646, 650, 64 S.E. 866, 868 (1909) (selection by munici-
pality of unsafe watershed as source of water supply; Rosenthal distinguished); Board of Educ. v.
Commissioners of Cherokee County, 150 N.C. 116, 125, 63 S.E. 724, 728 (1909) (alleged failure to
maintain statutory four-month term for public schools).
65. These cases are too numerous to permit citation. The computation was made by refer-
ence to the appropriate volumes of Shepard's North Carolina Citations.
66. State v. Lawing, 164 N.C. 492, 494, 80 S.E. 69, 70 (1913) (validity of ordinance establish-
ing a fire district and barring erection and repair of wooden structures therein).
67. State v. Stowe, 190 N.C. 79, 81, 128 S.E. 481,482 (1925) (validity of ordinance regulating
the keeping of cows in city limits).
68. Long v. Commissioners of Richmond County, 76 N.C. 273, 279 (1877) (injunction against
collection of tax levied to pay for courthouse repairs).
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"[in] palpable abuse of discretion";69 in "malicious or wanton disregard
of . . . rights";7" acts executed "dishonestly, or so extravagantly or
recklessly as to amount to an abuse of. . .authority";7 and those es-
tablished as constituting "fraud, corruption and oppression,"72 "op-
pression or bad faith,""3 "fraud or oppression constituting a manifest
abuse of discretion,"74 or "manifest abuse of power."75
Not the least of the difficulties created by this imposing litany of
wrongdoing is the suggestion that official culprits must be caught either
red-handed on Main Street with much of the city treasury in their
hands, or subjecting citizens to the rack and screw, before a North Car-
olina court need move to restrain them. Attorneys perusing the
volumes of Strong's North Carolina Index or the annotations to the
North Carolina General Statutes, and coming upon such gems of judi-
cial insight, can easily persuade themselves that clients seeking to test
some governmental decision or threatened act will bear an impossible
burden of proof. Trial judges with similar research habits will question
their authority to deal with any form of discretionary administrative or
executive action that is one whit short of outrageous. Appellate courts
will continue to find it tempting to stitch together a few Brodnax-Rosen-
thal aphorisms rather than wrestle with the fundamental issues and
factual backgrounds involved in the cases before them-should the liti-
gant be bold enough to pursue the matter that far.
The fact is that the extreme view of Rosenthal, solemnly enunciated
in the supreme court opinions as recently as 1966,76 sharply conflicts
with a somewhat more moderate tradition that developed contempora-
neously with the case law flowing from Brodnax and Rosenthal. The
standard-"whether a public official has acted capriciously or arbitrar-
ily or in bad faith or in disregard of law" 77-is that referred to in the
introductory quote from Chief Justice Barnhill in Burton, citing his
69. Mullen v. Town of Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 60, 33 S.E.2d 484, 488-89 (1945) (sale of
municipal property).
70. Newton v. School Comm., 158 N.C. 186, 188, 73 S.E. 886, 887 (1912) (selection of school
site).
71. Commissioners of Yancey County v. Road Comm'rs, 165 N.C. 632, 636, 81 S.E. 1001,
1003 (1914) (validity of statute authorizing appointment of road commissioners).
72. Davenport v. Commissioners of Pitt County, 163 N.C. 147, 149, 79 S.E. 423, 424 (1913)
(replacing a public ferry with a bridge).
73. Cameron v. State Highway Comm'n, 188 N.C. 84, 88, 123 S.E. 465, 467 (1924) (routing of
a highway).
74. Sanders v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 216 N.C. 312, 315, 4 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1939) (closing
of streets).
75. Board of Educ. v. Board of Comm'rs, 150 N.C. 116, 125, 63 S.E. 724, 728 (1909) (manner
of levying taxes to support four-month school term).
76. Clark's of Greenville, Inc. v. West, 268 N.C. 527, 531, 151 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1966) (the last case
in which the supreme court has cited both Brodnax and Rosenthal).
77. Burton v. City of Reidsville, 243 N.C. 405, 407, 90 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1956).
15
Markham: A Powerless Judiciary - The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980
36 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
own opinion in Pue v. Hood."8 Even that test, as stated, is subject to
challenge, among other grounds, on the basis of its completeness, accu-
racy, clarity, and social and legal utility.
C. The Capricious, Arbitrary, Bad Faith, or Disregard of Law Test
Chief Justice Barnhill's statement in Burton is derived from his 1942
opinion in Pue v. Hood and from his 1945 opinion in Jarrell v. Snow.7 9
In Pue he said: "When an officer acts capriciously, in bad faith, or
disregard of law, and such actions affect personal or property rights, the
courts will not hesitate to afford prompt and adequate relief.""0 In Jar-
rell, the Barnhill opinion stated:
If the statute under which defendants acted is valid, they acted in the
exercise of a discretionary power in adopting the ordinance. It is
not the function of the [c]ourt to reverse or direct the reversal of deci-
sions made by administrative officers in the exercise of discretionary
powers ....
Nor will review of their decisions, once made, be compelled by judi-
cial mandate. 8 '
The test emerging in Burton from these two opinions is free of the ver-
bal embroidery found in Brodnax, Rosenthal, and their lineal and col-
lateral heirs, and indeed reflects earlier opinions of the court imposing
more realistic restraints on official action. Administrative officers had
long been cautioned to avoid "abuse of power to the public injury"8 2
and "capricious and arbitrary ' exercise of their powers, and to exer-
cise their "limited legal discretion"8 4 and "sound judgment and discre-
tion."85
There are at least five major flaws, however, in the formulation
found in the excerpt from Burton quoted at the beginning of this arti-
cle:
(1) The supreme court, before and after Burton, has indicated that
courts might well "interfere" even though the administrators' conduct
under challenge is not specifically alleged to be arbitrary, capricious, in
78. 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896 (1942).
79. 225 N.C. 430, 35 S.E.2d 273 (1945). Jarrell also discussed, in a particularly unfortunate
contribution to North Carolina administrative law, equity's lack of power to deal with enforce-
ment of an invalid ordinance. See text accompanying notes 265-71.
80. 222 N.C. 310, 315, 22 S.E.2d 896, 900 (1942).
81. 225 N.C. 430, 433, 35 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1945).
82. Campbell v. Wolfenden, 74 N.C. 103, 104 (1876).
83. McIntyre v. Murphy, 177 N.C. 300, 302, 98 S.E. 820, 821 (1919).
84. State v. Vanhook, 182 N.C. 831, 834, 109 S.E. 65, 67 (1921); Board of Comm'rs v. Smith,
110 N.C. 417, 419, 14 S.E. 972, 973 (1892); Muller & Co. v. Commissioners of Buncombe County,
89 N.C. 171, 178 (1883). Cf Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N.C. 143, 160, 53 S.E. 524, 530 (1906)
("[t]he discretion conferred upon the defendants... must be used as directed and required by the
[c]onstitution .... ").
85. Hightower v. City of Raleigh, 150 N.C. 569, 572, 65 S.E. 279, 281 (1909).
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bad faith, or in disregard of law.8 6 Apparently the court is not, in its
own view, "powerless to act" beyond Chief Justice Barnhill's carefully
defined limits.
(2) Presumably realizing that to concede the existence in our admin-
istrative law of a concept known as "abuse of discretion" would have
undermined his position that courts cannot control adminstrative dis-
cretion, Chief Justice Barnhill chose to ignore the phrase as such, al-
though it had long been clear that this term is synonymous with
"arbitrary" and "capricious. '"87
(3) He seemed to limit "arbitrary abuse of [the public official's] right
of choice" to conduct "patently in bad faith." Conduct that is "arbi-
trary" may well include conduct that is in "bad faith," but it may also
include other proscribed acts of a different nature and scope. 88
(4) In perpetuating the Pue court's use of the disjunctive "or disre-
gard of law" in the references to "capricious," "arbitrary," or "bad
faith" action, the author of Burton overlooked the principle dating at
least to 181789 that such action in itself is illegal. As unlawful conduct,
arbitrary conduct is within the courts' constitutional powers to remedy
and within their scope of review. To imply that an act in excess of
constitutional or statutory authority is "in disregard of law," while con-
duct that is "arbitrary" somehow is not, is merely to reinforce the per-
ception of judicial impotence in face of the latter, in certain
circumstances. 90
86. See Jones v. Town of N. Wilkesboro, 150 N.C. 646, 64 S.E. 866 (1909). Cf Barbour v.
Carteret County, 255 N.C. 177, 182, 120 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1961) (complaint alleging waste of public
funds held sufficient to withstand demurrer as stating a "bad faith" cause of action although no
personal wrongdoing alleged).
87. See 2 F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 761. See also North Carolina State Highway Comm'n
v. Young, 200 N.C. 603, 607, 158 SE. 91, 93 (1931), where the court said: "[Tihe discretion must
not be whimsical, or capricious, or arbitrary, or despotic. That such abuse of discretion may avoid
or nullify an act is elementary." (Emphasis added). See also Attorney General ex rel. Gillespie
v. Justices of Guilford County, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 315, 321 (1844). To add to the confusion about
the relationship between these terms, the court in Clark's Greenville, Inc. v. West suggested that
acts "manifestly unreasonable and oppressive" and acts in excess of "delegated or constitutional
authority" are the same. 268 N.C. 527, 531, 151 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1966).
88. See In re Housing Auth., 235 N.C. 463, 468, 70 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1952), and the defini-
tions of "arbitrary" and "capricious" contained therein. The court said: "'Arbitrary' and 'capri-
cious' in many respects are synonymous terms. When applied to discretionary acts, they
ordinarily denote abuse of discretion, though they do not signfy nor necessarily imply bad faith."
(Emphasis added). Professor Jaffe suggests that a rationale imposing only a "good faith" test on
administrative action "raises a serious question of excessive delegation of power." L. JAFFE, supra
note 25, at 182.
89. Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N.C. (Term) 591, 592 (1817).
90. If the reviewing court is confined to errors of law or legal inference in matters other than
appeal from a decision granting or denying a preliminary injunction (see text accompanying notes
29 & 32 supra), and if arbitrary conduct is not per se in disregard of law, it appears that in a given
case, the finding of fact of a lower court that an administrator's conduct was not arbitrary, would
ordinarily be binding on the reviewing court. The lower court's findings are conclusive if based on
any competent evidence, even if there was evidence to the contrary. See cases collected in I
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(5) The suggestion that good faith, honest error, or mistake is a justi-
fiable excuse for administrative conduct, or that bad faith is a necessary
element to be proved in challenging it as "arbitrary," is not uniformly
supported in supreme court opinions.9
What emerges as most troublesome about Burton, and the relatively
simple phrases employed therein, is that seldom has the supreme court
attempted to define, in the context of administrative law, what the
terms "arbitrary," "capricious," and "abuse of discretion" mean. Thus,
we know scarcely more about the proper interpretation and application
of these standards than we do about extravagantly phrased concepts
such as "palpable oppression."
D. The Reasonableness Test
The supreme court has explained these terms indirectly through
commentary beyond cryptic expressions" such as those found in Pue
STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX, Appeal and Error § 57.2 (3d ed. 1976). Thus, Chief Justice
Barnhill's use of the disjunctive in Pue and Burton, suggesting that arbitrary conduct is something
other than conduct in disregard of law, apparently would drastically limit the appellate court's
scope of review in many cases. Perhaps that was what was intended. What better syllogism could
one use to fashion a "hands off" theory of judicial review in administrative law than one in which
it is assumed as a basic premise that arbitrary conduct-doubtless the most common charge made
in challenges to administrative action-is an allegation of fact and not a matter of law? The
inevitable conclusion would be that a negative finding as to arbitrariness in a lower court is be-
yond the reach of the reviewing court. (The scope of review problem is eliminated, of course, if
one accepts the court's suggestion in Clark's Greenville, Inc. v. West that arbitrary conduct, no
matter what synonyms may be used, is per se in excess of legal authority. This is consistent with
Shaw v. Kennedy, but not with Burton v. City of Reidsville).
91. See Bazemore v. Board of Elections, 254 N.C. 398, 406, 119 S.E.2d 637, 644 (1961): "We
do not intimate that the registrar ... or the Board of Elections have in any way acted in bad faith.
But it is our opinion that the literacy test as administered by them is unreasonable and beyond the
intent of the statute." See also Southern Ry. v. City of Greensboro, 247 N.C. 321, 329-30, 101
S.E.2d 347, 355 (1957); In re Housing Auth., 235 N.C. 463, 468, 70 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1952); Attor-
ney Gen. ex rel. Gillespie v. Justices of Guilford County, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 315, 330-31 (1844);
Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen, 192 N.C. 348, 358, 135 S.E. 50, 55 (1926), where the court said:
"There is no question as to the good faith of the mayor or board of aldermen of Goldsboro--men
of character. The ordinances are far-reaching, and the law does not permit the enjoyment of one's
property to depend upon the arbitrary or despotic will of officials, however well-meaning. "
(Emphasis added). An administrative officer should not be permitted the luxury of claiming that
he was mistaken. As Justice Ervin said: "Few laws would be observed if ignorance of the law
were an acceptable excuse." State exrel. Atkins v. Fortner, 236 N.C. 264, 271, 72 S.E.2d 594, 598
(1952).
92. In Attorney Gen. ex rel. Gillespie v. Justices of Guilford County, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 315,
320-21 (1844), the court said:
The claim of the justices of an unlimited and uncontrollable [sic] power to grant or refuse a
license, is founded on the idea that the act confers on them a discretion; and then they hold
that discretion, in its nature, is the liberty of those to whom it is confined of acting according
to their personal pleasure. It is to be noted that the part of the act which relates to retailers
has not the word "discretion" in it. But for the present we will assume it to be meant; and
such is our opinion. Yet it remains to be considered what kind of discretion is conferred-a
partial, absolute, and arbitrary personal discretion to refuse all applications, or a legal, regu-
lated, and reasonable discretion to grant the applications of such persons as the [I]egislature
declares fit to possess the privilege, as far as the necessity or convenience of the public require
18
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and Burton. Recently it stated:
Agency decisions have been found arbitrary and capricious, inter
alia, when such decisions are "whimsical" because they indicate a lack
of fair and careful consideration; when they fail to indicate "any course
of reasoning and the exercise of judgment," . or when they impose
or omit procedural requirements that result in manifest unfairness in
the circumstances ...... The ultimate purpose of rulemaking review
is to insure 'reasoned decisionmaking' . . .. 93
In an earlier effort at a more complete and precise definition, the
court recognized an important dimension in evaluating administrative
action-the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the conduct in-
volved 9 4-a dimension ignored by both the Pue and Burton courts (al-
though not by the court in Rosenthal). And in an opinion that
preceded Pue and Jarrell by only one year and four years respectively,
the court said:
While it is a well recognized principle of law with us that the courts
will not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary powers conferred on
municipal corporations for the public welfare, still when the actions of
such places as accommodations allowed by the [liegislature, and beyond that to refuse them?
The very stating of the questions furnishes their proper answer. The law abhors absolute
power and arbitrary discretion, and never admits them but from overruling necessity. And
there is no arbitrary power that would be felt to be more unreasonably despotic and galling
than that under which a small body of inferior court magistracy should undertake, upon their
mere will, without any plain mandate from the lawmaking power, to set up their taste and
habits as to meat, drink, or apparel as the standard for regulating those of the people at large.
(Emphasis the court's).
Aesop's Fables ("The Wolf and the Lamb") illustrate arbitrary conduct as well as anything in
the literature of the law:
A Wolf came upon a Lamb straying from the flock, and felt some compunction about taking
the life of so helpless a creature without some plausible excuse; so he cast about for a griev-
ance and said at last, "Last year, sirrah, you, grossly insulted me." "That is impossible, sir,"
bleated the Lamb, "for I wasn't born then." "Well," retorted the Wolf, "you feed in my
pastures." "That cannot be," replied the Lamb, "for I have never yet tasted grass." "You
drink from my spring, then," continued the Wolf. "Indeed, sir," said the poor Lamb, "I have
never yet drunk anything but my mother's milk." "Well, anyhow," said the Wolf, "I'm not
going without my dinner:" and he sprang upon the Lamb and devoured it without more ado.
93. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 420, 269
S.E.2d 547, 573 (1980).
94. The court said:
"Arbitrary" means fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure. An act is arbitrary when it is
done without adequate determining principle; not done according to reason or judgment, but
depending upon the will alone,-absolute in power, tyrannical, despotic, nonrational,-im-
plying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the fundamental nature of things.
See Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary; 3 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
pp. 874 and 875; 6 C.J.S. p. 145.
"Capricious" means freakish, fickle, or arbitrary. An act is capricious when it is done with-
out reason, in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard
for the surrounding facts and settled controlling principles. See Funk & Wagnall's New Stan-
dard Dictionary, 6 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 124; 12 C.J.S. p. 1137.
In re Housing Auth., 235 N.C. 463, 468, 70 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1952) (emphasis added).
Three times in Attorney General ex rel Gillespie v. Justices of Guilford County the court empha-
sized the unreasonable conduct of the county court in refusing to give anyone in the community a
retail liquor license. 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 315, 324, 327, 328 (1844).
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such corporations become so unreasonable as to manifest an abuse of
such discretion, the courts will furnish relief to one aggrieved thereby.
The discretion vested in municipal corporations is not entirely without
limitation. It must be exercised at least in good faith and be free from
ulterior motives. It is not consonant with our conception of municipal
government that there should be no limitation upon the discretion
granted municipalities, and that no remedy is left to him who may be
injured by an abuse thereof.95
That the reasonableness of an ordinance is a proper subject for judi-
cial review was early acknowledged by the court.96 The court has held
that the North Carolina Constitution does not preclude the legislature
from making classifications and distinctions in a statute unless they are
"arbitrary and unjustifiable upon any reasonable view." 97 It is well set-
tled that in any governmental exercise of the police power, the statute,
ordinance, or regulation must meet the reasonableness test.98 In 1943,
95. Efird v. Commissioners of Forsyth County, 219 N.C. 96, 106, 12 S.E.2d 889, 896 (1941)
(emphasis added).
96. See State v. Tenant, 110 N.C. 609, 612, 14 S.E. 387, 388 (1892); Barger v. Smith, 156 N.C.
323, 324, 72 S.E. 376, 377 (1911); Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen, 192 N.C. 348, 356, 135 S.E. 50, 54
(1926), citing Small v. Councilmen of Edenton, 146 N.C. 527, 530,60 S.E. 413, 414-15 (1908), and
stating: "Any unreasonable restraint or oppressive exaction upon the use of property ... is con-
trary to the fundamental law of the land." 192 N.C. at 358, 135 S.E. at 55.
97. Motley v. Board of Barber Examiners, 228 N.C. 337, 342, 45 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1947).
98. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729
(1973) (statute requiring a certificate of need for construction of a private hospital found unrea-
sonable and unconstitutional); State v. Vestal, 281 N.C. 517, 522, 189 S.E.2d 152, 156 (1972) (ordi-
nance requiring fence along boundaries of auto wrecking yards held invalid); Horton v. Gulledge,
277 N.C. 353, 177 S.E.2d 885 (1970) (held invalid housing code provision calling for demolition of
a dwelling house unfit for habitation without compensation to owner, where cost of repairs would
exceed 60% of the value of the house); Stroupe v. Eller, 262 N.C. 573, 138 S.E.2d 240 (1964)
(ordinance providing for flouridation of water supply; complaint lacking necessary allegations of
unreasonableness, etc. dismissed for failure to state cause of action); State v. Byrd, 259 N.C. 141,
130 S.E.2d 55 (1963) (ordinance prohibiting sale of ice cream products from any mobile unit on
any street or alley held invalid); State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768 (1961) (anti-shoplift-
ing statute, providing that concealment of merchandise on store premises is prima facie evidence
of wilful concealment, held valid as bearing a real and substantial relationship to the evil the
statute sought to suppress); Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961) (stat-
ing the general rule that zoning ordinance is valid if its provisions are not arbitrary, unreasonable,
and confiscatory; on facts, held ordinance in this case would be confiscatory if lots had no reason-
able value for residential use); State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 694, 697, 114 S.E.2d 660, 664, 666-67
(1960) (statute regulating real estate brokers held to have "rational, real and substantial" relation
to the purposes for which the police power is exercised if occupation is one clothed with a substan-
tial public interest; burden on the pursuit of the occupation held not arbitrary and unreasonable);
Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960)
(affirmed lower court ruling that ordinance prohibiting maintenance of business signs over side-
walks in a designated area in the city contained an unreasonable classification); City of Winston-
Salem v. Southern Ry., 248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958) (unreasonable exercise of police power
involved in ordinance requiring railroad to construct and repair overpasses and street crossings at
its own expense); Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957) (statute requiring license to
engage in business of ceramic tile contracting held invalid as unreasonably obstructing the right of
persons to engage in ordinary and harmless occupation); State v. Towery, 239 N.C. 274, 79 S.E.2d
513 (1954) (held no arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power was involved in classi-
fication and selection of businesses to be closed on Sunday).
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prior to both Jarrell and Burton, even Justice Barnhill, writing for the
court, conceded that the unreasonableness of a school board's adminis-
trative rule is a judicial question that the courts have a right to review;
the board in question was the final authority, he said, "so long as it acts
in good faith and refrains from adopting regulations which are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable."99 In Corporation Commission v. Rail-
road,l° a 1905 case, it was said that the Commission's powers could
not be "unreasonably exercised"''I and its orders were subject to judi-
cial review for such a determination. In 1923, a municipality was
found to have reasonably exercised its discretion in condemning land
for the use of a railroad. 0 2 In a more recent case, the court stated that
it is the function of the court in proper instances to determine whether
an administrative authority acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or un-
justy, 
0 3
In Bazemore v. Bertie County Board of Elections," the court held
that a constitutionally sound literacy test required for voting was un-
reasonable as applied to a prospective voter. The voter was required to
write a section or sections of the North Carolina Constitution from the
dictation of another.
Bazemore and many of the above cases demonstrate that our courts
are perfectly capable of identifying and proscribing unreasonable con-
duct, without deeming themselves, barred from affording relief because
the conduct is not presented to them in a gaudy package of "gross and
palpable error."
Yet so broad is the spectrum between administrative actions that
might be characterized as "unjust" on the one hand, and as "clearly
unreasonable, oppressive, and constituting a gross and manifest abuse
of discretion" on the other, that not even one possessed of clairvoyant
powers could readily foretell, in light of the confusion in the adminis-
trative law of North Carolina documented under the three tests above,
99. Coggins v. Board of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 769, 28 S.E.2d 527, 531 (1944) (high school
fraternities). See Note, Administrative Law-Power of Board of Education to Abolish Fraternities,
22 N.C.L. REV. 246 (1944). Justice Barnhill observed that even complaints raising "essentially
political questions," as in Coggins, may be subject to judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of the
rule about which the complaint is raised.
100. 139 N.C. 126, 51 S.E. 793 (1905).
101. Id at 131, 51 S.E. at 795. See also Nichols, Judicial Review of the North Carolina Corpo-
ration Commission, 2 N.C.L. REV. 69, 77 (1924), where the author observed:
The powers and duties committed to the jurisdiction of the Commission are exclusive and
cannot be exercised or accomplished by the courts of the state. But, acting upon their own
independent judgment, the courts can and will set aside the Commission's order when such
order is beyond its constitutional powers or when it is unreasonable. . . . (Emphasis added).
102. Hartsfield v. City of New Bern, 186 N.C. 136, 119 S.E. 15 (1923).
103. Lithium Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Town of Bessemer City, 261 N.C. 532, 536, 135 S.E.2d 574,
577 (1964) (applying the provisions of an annexation statute).
104. 254 N.C. 398, 119 S.E.2d 637 (1961).
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what answer the courts might provide in a given case. An example
drawn from a case decided in 1979 by the supreme court (with neces-
sary factual variations) will serve to illustrate the problem.
E. Campbell v. First Baptist Church105
In March, 1972, the Redevelopment Commission of the City of Dur-
ham (hereinafter referred to as Commission), acting under the state Ur-
ban Redevelopment Law,"' acquired in a condemnation a parcel of
land in the downtown urban renewal project area containing approxi-
mately 53,000 square feet. The price paid by the Commission, as deter-
mined by the condemnation jury, was $164,300.00 ($3.09 per square
foot). About 9,000 square feet of the tract was used for widening of two
intersecting streets under the urban renewal plan, and the remainder
(44,614 square feet) was conveyed to the adjacent First Baptist Church
(hereinafter referred to as Church) in an "exchange" which had been
approved before the Commission had even acquired the land con-
veyed. In the "exchange," the Church gave up a strip of land of 2,803
square feet to the rear of its property and received in return $1,885.17
in cash, plus the 44,614-square foot tract. The disposal price for the
larger tract under the "exchange" was $.35 per square foot, about
eleven per cent of the price paid by the Commission to acquire it. Al-
though the transaction was approved by the City Council of Durham
and was advertised in the local newspaper prior to execution of the
deeds, the court of appeals, in a decision affirmed by the supreme court,
held in a taxpayers' action that the conveyance to the Church was void
for failure to comply with North Carolina General Statutes section 160-
464(e)(4), which requires public notice prior to Commission approval
of a disposition agreement and transfer at a price agreed upon by a
committee of three professional real estate appraisers.
The trial court-which held that the land value assigned in the ex-
change was reasonable and that the municipal bodies' actions in ap-
proving it were not "arbitrary, capricious and whimsical"-had before
it evidence suggesting first, that the appraiser on whom the Commis-
sion relied had mistakenly assumed that the larger tract was zoned for
residential purposes and that the Church tract was zoned for commer-
cial purposes; second, that the appraiser had not followed the proce-
dures and methods of appraisal made mandatory by guidelines of the
105. 39 N.C. App. 117, 250 S.E.2d 68 (1978), afl'd, 298 N.C. 476, 259 S.E.2d 558 (1979). All
statements included in the discussion of Campbell without citations to a footnote are based upon
the record before and the opinions of the court of appeals and the supreme court, or upon the
author's personal knowledge derived from his participation throughout the case as research
assistant to counsel for the plaintiff Campbell.
106. Then N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-454 to -474.2 (1972); now N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-500 to
-526 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
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United States Department of Housing and Urban Development for dis-
positions of urban renewal property to non-profit organizations; and
finally, that no one in an official capacity had paid any heed to a ruling
of the condemnation court that the original owners of the larger tract
were to receive a price based on the value of the land for commercial
use.
The plaintiffs evidence showed that the land, if appraised by proper
methods, was worth at least $105,000.00 instead of the $15,614.93 ($.35
per square foot) assigned it in the "exchange." Thus, the Church real-
ized a substantial "windfall."' 07
Let us assume that in a transaction identical to that involved in
Campbell v. First Baptist Church, the municipal authorities had, in fact,
complied with all statutory procedures, and that the committee of ap-
praisers had reached the same conclusion as to the land value involved
($.35 per square foot) as did the one appraiser who testified in Camp-
bell. 10 8
On these facts, the questions arise: Would the trial or appellate
courts, considering a transaction that was not "patently in bad faith"
and not "in excess of constitutional or statutory authority" (that is, not
"in disregard of law" as Chief Justice Barnhill seemed to limit it in
Burton"°9), feel themselves powerless to recoup for the taxpayers the
sum of at least $89,000.00 and possibly as much as $149,000.00? On
what case law might they rely and what standards might they apply in
deciding whether or not to interfere with these purely discretionary ac-
tions of an appointed administrative body and an elected city council?
If one could phrase a practical standard to which the courts might turn
in such cases, should it be one that will free them hereafter from the
ancient strait-jackets designed and tailored by Justices Ruffin, Pearson,
Hoke, and later Barnhill?
Our search for the answers to these questions will establish the com-
pelling need for the Supreme Court of North Carolina to lift the ad-
ministrative law of our state from the quagmire in which it is engulfed.
In this hypothetical controversy, either side could discover significant
support in North Carolina case law for their respective contentions that
107. The plaintiffs complaint had attacked the transaction (1) as a violation of the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) as arbitrary and capri-
cious, and (3) upon statutory grounds. The plaintiff ultimately prevailed on statutory violations
and neither court found it necessary to discuss the alternative grounds.
108. Let us assume further that the agreement for an "exchange" involved the Commission
and a non-profit corporation other than a church so that the first amendment issue would have
been eliminated from the case. Further, assume that there were no allegations or proof of corrup-
tion or bad faith in the sense of personal advantage enuring to the benefit of anyone who partici-
pated in the decision.
109. See introductory quote & text accompanying note 89 supra.
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the court should nullify the "exchange" or that it has no power or duty
to interfere.
A plaintiff representing the taxpayers of the municipality could es-
tablish that corruption, moral turpitude, malice, fraud, or bad faith
need not be shown to warrant judicial intervention."' With respect to
dispositions of public land, it would be possible to construct the follow-
ing theory in our fictional plaintiff's behalf: The Redevelopment Com-
mission and the City of Durham, under the Urban Redevelopment
Law, were invested with the power to dispose of Commission property;
however, they were not delegated the authority to sell the land in ques-
tion at less than a fair and adequate price."'I
It also appears that "bad faith" in an appropriate case can be
equated with a waste of public property without allegation of personal
wrongdoing, and that disregard of duty to the public by squandering of
public funds is actionable conduct. Barbour v. Carteret County,"2 in-
volving construction of a public hospital, supports judicial intervention
in the case assumed. There, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant com-
110. See In re Housing Auth., 235 N.C. 467, 468, 70 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1952); Jones v. Town of
N. Wilkesboro, 150 N.C. 646, 650, 64 S.E. 866, 868 (1909).
111. See Vaughan v. Commissioners of Forsyth County, 118 N.C. 636, 24 S.E. 425 (1896),
where the county commissioners voted to execute a deed of trust to a vacant lot, formerly the site
of the courthouse, as security for $50,000 in notes to be issued to raise funds for a new courthouse
elsewhere. On the ground that the right to sell land does not imply a right to encumber it by a
mortgage, the supreme court held that it was error for the lower court to deny an injunction
against the transfer. In drawing an analogy to disposition of land under a power of attorney, the
court cited authority to the effect that one acting in behalf of a principal with power to sell "is to
receive for the benefit of the principal a fair and adequate price for the land." Id. at 641, 24 S.E.
at 425.
In Bowles v. Fayetteville Graded Schools, 211 N.C. 36, 188 S.E. 615 (1936), the public body
defendant, a chartered school district governed by a board of I I trustees, acquired a vacant lot on
foreclosure of a deed of trust. The lot was worth "considerably more than $3,500." Id at 37, 188
S.E. at 616. The chairman of the board's property committee notified the trustees "that he had an
offer for the property, and the property committee was instructed to investigate the legality of
private sale and to consider any offers for the property not less than $3,500, 'with power to act.'"
Id at 38-39, 188 S.E. at 616. A real estate dealer was told by the property committee chairman
that if he could sell the land for $3,960 (the dealer's appraisal), he would be allowed a commission.
The dealer secured from the plaintiff Bowles an offer to buy at that price, only to discover that the
property had been sold to one of the defendants, Harrison, for $3,500.
Bowles obtained a judgment in superior court nullifying the contract of sale, the court proceed-
ing on the theory that this was not an attempted "control lof] any exercise of discretion" under the
Brodnax rule, nor a matter of actual fraud, corruption, or moral turpitude. It was a matter of
constructive fraud in that it was a "breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, ...
[tending] to the injury of another or to the bringing about of an undue and unconscientious ad-
vantage." Id at 38, 188 S.E. at 617. The trial court also held that the trustees had improperly
delegated to the property committee their responsibility, and the committee in turn had improp-
erly delegated the same to the chairman, constituting an abdication of trust. Although the lower
court was not satisfied that certain statutory provisions for a public notice and sale covered the
transaction, the supreme court upheld the trial court judgment, and went on to conclude that the
delegation to the chairman to execute a contract for the sale of the property in a manner contrary
to the method set out in the statute was invalid.
112. 255 N.C. 177, 120 S.E.2d 448 (1961).
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missioners had agreed (without having the property appraised) to pay
$75,000.00 for a tract of land-a sum "more than twice what said prop-
erty should be reasonably worth; [that] is excessive, and as such is an
unwarranted waste of the taxable revenue of Carteret County."" 3 The
supreme court held: "Such conduct does not comport with the duty
which public officials owe those they represent. It manifests bad faith,
not bona fide action. It suffices to justify court action to prevent misuse
of public funds."'"
4
On the other hand, the defendant public bodies could well argue-
and the court with more than adequate authority would be free to ac-
cept their view-that the transfer could not be judicially nullified even
if the price of approximately $15,000.00 for land worth $105,000.00 or
more were inadequate. The "name of the game" in the urban renewal
program is disposition of land at prices less than its cost to the munici-
pality, and the challenged transaction is not unusual in that respect.5
Courts which have shown a willingness to tolerate decisions of a public
body even where there were implications of fraud lurking in the back-
ground, or implications of conduct bordering on personal impropri-
ety," 6 aforiori would not be likely to regard a disposition to a non-
profit charitable or educational institution as beyond the pale. Most
113. Id. at 182, 120 S.E.2d at 451-52. The factual allegations of the complaint were admitted
by demurrer and were held sufficient to state a cause of action.
114. Id. The Barbour court also said:
County commissioners, in approving the design, the method of construction, the site for a
public building, and the amount to be paid for the site, are performing duties inherent to their
offices, expressly conferred by the [l]egislature. G.S. 153-9(8), (9). Courts have no right to
pass on the wisdom with which they act. Courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of
the county officials honestly and fairly exercised. For a court to enjoin the proposed expen-
diture, there must be allegation and proof that the county officials acted in wanton disregard
of public good. (Citations omitted).
Id at 181, 120 S.E.2d at 451.
The Barbour decision is consistent with the lower court's suggestion in Bowles that "construc-
tive fraud," as defined by the Bowles court, provides substantial grounds to set aside such a trans-
action. See note Ill supra.
115. "[Olne of the functions of urban renewal was to absorb a writedown in the land costs. It
was to sell it for less than they paid for it." Record at 270, Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 298
N.C. 476, 259 S.E.2d 558 (1979) (testimony of Raymond Green). See generally Redevelopment
Comm'n v. Security Nat'l Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960).
116. See Kistler v. Board of Educ., 233 N.C. 400, 64 S.E.2d 403 (1951) (allegation that a
member of board of education owned property in the vicinity of a site selected by the board for a
school held insufficient to support a finding of bad faith, in the absence of allegation that the
member exercised an improper or corrupt influence over the other members); White v. Lane, 153
N.C. 14, 68 S.E. 895 (1910) (clerk of court who owned land in drainage district appointed the
drainage commissioners; plaintiff challenged issue of bonds by the commissioners on grounds of
conflict of interest; court would not entertain the action because it was a collateral attack on the
judgment of the clerk); Mitchell v. Board of Comm'rs, 74 N.C. 487 (1875) (plaintiffs unsuccess-
fully sought to enjoin collection of taxes necessary to pay allegedly fraudulent, false, and
unaudited claims against the township; defendants had allowed expenses to accumulate for years
instead of levying taxes annually to pay them, but had issued certificates from time to time to
creditors, who were paid at less than the certificates' face value).
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importantly, the decisions of local instrumentalities as to policy have
been left undisturbed, even when the courts have found the policy to be
"bad" or when the action was challenged as "unwise" and "indis-
creet." ' 1
Indeed, the hypothetical case posed appears to fit the classic mold of
Chief Justice Barnhill's rule in Burton v. City of Reidsville." 8 An iso-
lated sale of one tract of urban renewal land is a decision fundamen-
tally like many others which the courts of this state have traditionally
found to involve questions of policy, and thus to be discretionary and
within the competence and exclusive powers of local bodies to make,
and ordinarily subject only to the penalty of public retribution at the
ballot box 9--the location, closing, grading, widening, and repair of
streets; 120 design, construction, and repair of public buildings;' 2 ' selec-
tion of sites for schools, jails, and other public structures; 22 the award
of municipal contracts; 23 and the selection of highway or street
routes. 124
Would the exceptions for an "oppressive and manifest abuse of dis-
117. Id at 489. See also Long v. Commissioners of Richmond County, 76 N.C. 273, 279
(1877).
118. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
119. Justice Barnhill once said for the court: "If the local board is acting contrary to the
wishes of a majority of the citizens it serves, the remedy is at the ballot box. The suggestion that
such remedy may come too late is not sufficient to justify judicial interference." Mullen v. Town
of Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 61, 33 S.E.2d 484, 489 (1945). (The issue in Mullen concerned a pro-
posed sale of diesel engines used in a municipally-owned electric lighting plant, and proposed
issuance of an electric franchise to the Carolina Power & Light Company. Plaintiffs unsuccess-
fully sought to restrain the sale). Justice.Bamhill commended to the citizenry the virtues of the
exercise of popular suffrage as a means of remedying governmental error. The case of Greens-
boro-High Point Airport Auth. v. Johnson, 226 N.C. 1, 36 S.E.2d 803 (1946) was decided but 10
months later. There the court acknowledged that the legislature has the power to authorize and
had authorized the creation of quasi-municipal bodies beyond the control of the municipal gov-
erning body. 226 N.C. at 9-10, 13, 36 S.E.2d at 809, 811. So much for the "ballot box" cure for
administrative excess.
120. Klingenberg v. City of Raleigh, 212 N.C. 549, 194 S.E. 297 (1937); Lee v. Town of
Waynesville, 184 N.C. 565, 120 S.E. 46 (1923); Crotts v. City of Winston-Salem, 170 N.C. 24, 86
S.E. 792 (1915); Hoyle v. City of Hickory, 164 N.C. 79, 80 S.E. 254 (1913); Crowell v. City of
Monroe, 152 N.C. 399, 67 S.E. 989 (1910); Trotter v. Town of Franklin, 146 N.C. 554,60 S.E. 509
(1908); City of Durham v. Rigsbee, 141 N.C. 128, 53 S.E. 531 (1906); Tate v. City of Greensboro,
114 N.C. 392, 19 S.E. 767 (1894).
121. Dilday v. Beaufort County Bd. of Educ., 267 N.C. 438, 448, 148 S.E.2d 513, 519-20
(1966); Lenoir County v. Crabtree, 158 N.C. 357, 74 S.E. 105 (1912); Hightower v. City of Raleigh,
150 N.C. 569, 65 S.E. 279 (1909); Ward v. Commissioners of Beaufort County, 146 N.C. 534, 60
S.E. 418 (1908); Vaughan v. Board of Comm'rs. 117 N.C. 429, 23 S.E. 354 (1895).
122. Painter v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 288 N.C. 165, 176, 217 S.E.2d 650, 657 (1975);
Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 466, 186 S.E.2d 400, 404 (1977); Philbrook v. Chapel Hill
Housing Auth., 269 N.C. 598, 153 S.E.2d 153 (1967); Pharr v. Garibaldi, 252 N.C. 803, 115 S.E.2d
18 (1960); Moore v. Board of Educ., 212 N.C. 499, 193 S.E. 732 (1937); Davenport v. Commission-
ers of Pitt County, 163 N.C. 147, 79 S.E. 423 (1913); Griffin v. Southern Ry., 150 N.C. 312, 64 S.E.
16 (1909); Burwell v. Board of Comm'rs, 93 N.C. 73 (1885).
123. Mullen v. Town of Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 33 S.E.2d 484 (1945).
124. Cameron v. State Highway Comm'n, 188 N.C. 84, 123 S.E. 465 (1924).
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cretion" or for "arbitrary" and "capricious" conduct apply in such a
case so that the court could properly nullify the land transfer?
The Rosenthal test would provide scant opportunity for the court to
intervene, if for no other reason than that the transfer of public prop-
erty worth $105,000.00 for some $15,000.00 is hardly "oppressive." In a
community of 95,000 people with a multi-million dollar municipal
budget, even a waste of $89,000.00 to $90,000.00 in public funds in-
volves infinitesimal fiscal damage to the public; the plaintiffs personal
stake as a taxpayer could not be more than a few dollars.
Burton v. City of Reidsville and the "arbitrary" or "capricious" stan-
dard would be no more helpful. In Campbell, one would be hard put to
say that the transaction was "arbitrary" as our courts have defined that
term. It may have been utterly foolish, but it was not "absolute in
power, tyrannic, despotic."'21 5 It was not "done without adequate de-
termining principle."1 26 The record was clear, at least from the com-
ments of the Mayor of Durham when the Council approved it, that the
municipal purpose was to "accommodate the church,"1 27 and except
for first amendment considerations, perhaps that was a desirable objec-
tive. At a time of downtown decay, the community presumably would
benefit from encouraging inner-city institutions to remain there rather
than fleeing to the suburbs, as many have.
The conveyance to the Church in Campbell was clearly not "capri-
cious" in the sense that it was precipitate or whimsical. 128 It was the
result of a plan conceived more than two years before the tract ulti-
mately conveyed to the Church was even acquired by the Commission.
It was the product of the deliberate judgment of both the Commission
and the City Council in public meetings. At the latter meeting, vigor-
ous opposition was expressed both by the public and members of the
Council. 1
29
We cannot know, of course, how a given court, confronted with two
substantial but conflicting lines of authority, would rule on the hypo-
thetical case presented. The assumption here is that the conveyance
would be upheld under Burton on the theory that it was neither arbi-
tary, capricious, in bad faith, nor in disregard of law, but rather was a
proper exercise of discretion conferred by a valid statute.
But the fact remains that the transaction posed was simply wrong-
headed. It was based substantially on the mistakes of the Commis-
sion's real estate appraiser-mistakes that were ignored in the Redevel-
125. In re Housing Auth., 235 N.C. 467, 468, 70 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1952).
126. Id.
127. Record at 152, Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 298 N.C. 476, 259 S.E.2d 558 (1979).
128. In re Housing Auth., 235 N.C. 467, 468, 70 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1952).
129. JJ MINUTES OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF DURHAM 570 (Oct. 16, 1972).
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opment Commission bureaucracy, whose decision in turn was accepted
unquestioningly by the appointed members of the Commission and by
the elected officials on the City Council. These mistakes, and their re-
sult, were not costly in the total scheme of things to the public or to the
individual citizen. The Campbell case, and the adaptation of its facts
presented here, are hardly of great importance in the law.
What is significant about Campbell is that it illustrates the process by
which public decisions, great or small, are made. In other cases where
no citizen so bold or stubborn as Mr. Campbell steps forward to mount
a challenge, administrative and executive-level mistakes of material
fact, misunderstanding of policy, or erroneous interpretations of law
and legal powers may have a profound adverse impact on the public
good and devastating consequences to the rights of individual citi-
zens. 13
0
Are we to assume that decisions emerging from such a process-par-
ticularly those made by officials who do not face the electorate, and
from whose fiat there is no recourse at the ballot box-are forever to be
immune from judicial scrutiny unless the affected citizen, seeking to
vindicate his own or a public right, can unerringly point to a constitu-
tional violation, a breach of a statutory warrant of power, a corrupt
motive, a wanton waste of public funds, or conduct which violates
some nebulous (and seldom applied) standard of "arbitrary," "capri-
cious," or "abusive of discretion"? Are we to assume that the inferior
courts, under proper guidance from the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina, will not someday be emboldened, in every case before them where
official conduct is challenged, to recall and to act in the spirit of the
words of "the great and affectionately remembered [Justice]
Brogden":' 3 t
130. In Mitchell v. Barfield, 232 N.C. 325, 59 S.E.2d 810 (1950), plaintiffs sought and obtained
a mandamus compelling the issuance of a building permit for construction of a hotel, as permitted
in an "A" residence zone of the city of Durham. The City Council had caused the permit to be
withheld because it concluded, without any basis in fact, that the plaintiffs intended to use the
proposed building as a nursing home, infirmary, or hospital, and not as the hotel indicated in their
application for a permit. The supreme court affirmed the order granting mandamus.
In Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 269, 82 S.E.2d 90, 96-97 (1954), the supreme court held,
contrary to the Board of Law Examiners' interpretation of its own Rule 5, that the word "resi-
dence" as used therein means "domicile" rather than actual physical presence. Under the Board's
interpretation, a North Carolina domiciliary who worked and lived in another state would have
been denied admission to the bar examination. One can only speculate how many persons, in the
55 years since administrative bodies emerged and regulatory statutes burgeoned, have been simi-
larly victimized by "good faith" bureaucratic error-but, unlike the Mitchells and Baker, were
dissuaded from pursuing a legal determination of their rights by Brodnax-Rosenthal-Burton dis-
plays of judicial rodomontade. (Baker won the battle, but lost the war because he failed to prove
that he had been domiciled in North Carolina. He did succeed in persuading the court to correct
the Board's interpretation of its own rules, no mean achievement).
131. Justice Seawell, writing for the court in Hill v. Moseley, 220 N.C. 485, 488, 17 S.E.2d 676,
678 (1941).
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[T]he eye of the law sinks deep into the situation and dealings between
the parties to discover the heart of the transaction. The law moves along
straight lines to ascertain, establish and enforce fundamental justice be-
tween men and does not dissipate its energies in fencing with legal
fictions, boxing with legal shadows, and wrestling with legal puppets.
32
Do our public officials, as Chief Justice Barnhill suggested, indeed
have a constitutional "right to err"? The established law of our state is
that they do not, and insofar as it has been applied to officials subject to
the popular will in an election, afortiori it must be applied to those
who are under no such restraint.
III. A RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF JUDICIAL POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES: THE RULE OF BURTON v CITY OF
REIDSVILLE REVISITED
I suggest that in an appropriate case a future supreme court could,
and should, accurately state the law of North Carolina as follows:
The policy of the courts is to review administrative decisions to in-
sure that the rights of the parties affected are protected.' 33 The acts of
public officers, whether elected or appointed, in the exercise of powers
delegated under the constitution or by statute, are subject to the control
of the courts, even in matters purely discretionary, when the courts'
jurisdiction is properly invoked, in those instances where
(1) such officials engage in conduct or action that is
(a) unreasonable 34 and either
(i) is substantially injurious to the public good 135 or
(ii) constitutes a deprivation of the legal rights of any
132. Ashley Home Corp. v. Creech, 205 N.C. 55, 63-64, 169 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1933) (emphasis
added).
133. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
134. In re Application of Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 178 S.E.2d 77 (1970) (refusal of special use
permit without any standards, rules, or regulations uniformly applicable); Horton v. Gulledge, 277
N.C. 353, 362-63, 177 S.E.2d 885, 891-92 (1970) (order of demolition of dilapidated house without
compensation); Lithium Corp. of Amer. v. Town of Bessemer City, 261 N.C. 532, 539, 135 S.E.2d
574, 579 (1964) (annexation of area partly occupied by petitioner "not within the reasonable intent
and application of the statute"); Little Pep Delmonico Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252
N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960) (unreasonable classification in ordinance prohibiting maintenance
of business signs over sidewalks in designated areas of city); In re Housing Auth., 235 N.C. 463, 70
S.E.2d 500 (1952) (attempted condemnation of portion of college campus as site for public hous-
ing project when other sites were available); Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen, 192 N.C. 348, 135 S.E.
50 (1926) (unreasonable restraint on conduct of lawful business in ordinance requiring permission
of aldermen to operate a filling station within the city limits); Attorney General ex rel. Gillespie v.
Justices of Guilford County, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 315, 324, 327, 328 (1844) (unreasonable refusal of
licensing authorities to issue retail liquor licenses to anyone, although authorized to do so in
accordance with requirements of statute).
135. See Barbour v. Carteret County, 255 N.C. 177, 120 S.E.2d 448 (1961); Bowles v. Fayette-
ville Graded Schools, 211 N.C. 36, 188 S.E. 615 (1936); Jones v. Town of N. Wilkesboro, 150 N.C.
646, 64 S.E. 866 (1909); Vaughan v. Commissioners of Forsyth County, 118 N.C. 636,24 S.E. 425
(1896).
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person; 136 or
(b) in bad faith; or
(c) in disregard of law. 137
Conduct or action, whether allegedly based on constitutional, statutory,
or other authority, is unreasonable unless it bears a real, substantial,
and rational relationship to the end sought by the authority.
38
Except as otherwise provided by statute, limitations upon the powers
of the judiciary to control or to restrain official conduct or action to
situations where the same is "arbitrary," "capricious," or representing
an "abuse of discretion," or is "so clearly unreasonable as to constitute
a gross and manifest abuse of discretion," and words of similar import,
are hereby expressly revoked; and the decisions of this court inconsis-
tent with the rule herein stated are expressly overruled for the reason
that unreasonable conduct or action as here defined is per se arbitrary,
capricious, and constitutes an abuse of discretion, etc.
The foregoing proposed opinion would break no new ground in the
law of North Carolina because it is thoroughly documented by, and
clearly within the parameters of, standing decisions of the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, some of them of ancient origin. Beyond doubt or
cavil, the re-affirmation by the supreme court of such rules would bet-
ter enable our courts to fulfill their responsibility to "enforce funda-
mental justice." It would free the judiciary either from the temptation
to "rubber stamp" an administrative decision by dismissing a challenge
to it as merely an unreachable "matter of discretion," or from the usu-
ally difficult, if not impossible, task of fitting the factual background of
a case into arcane determinations of what is "arbitrary" or "capri-
cious." It would clarify and simplify our law in a manner consistent
with the demands of modem society, one far removed from the day
when decisions of the Rockingham Commissioners about the repair of
a bridge,' 3 9 or of the town fathers of Goldsboro about Mrs. Rosenthal's
shade trees, 40 gave birth to legal principles and shibboleths that no
longer seem relevant.
136. See In re Application of Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 178 S.E.2d 77 (1970); Horton v. Gulledge,
277 N.C. 353, 362-63, 177 S.E.2d 885, 891-92 (1970); Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122
S.E.2d 817 (1961); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959); City of Winston-Salem v.
Southern Ry., 248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958); Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851
(1957); State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949); Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310,22 S.E.2d
896 (1942).
137. Burton v. City of Reidsville, 243 N.C. 405, 90 S.E.2d 700 (1956).
138. GI Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 210, 125 S.E.2d 764, 767 (1962); State v.
Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 694, 114 S.E.2d 660, 664-65 (1960); State v. Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 360, 45
S.E.2d 860, 866 (1947); Calcutt v. McGeachy, 213 N.C. 1, 7, 195 S.E. 49, 52-53 (1938), citing Reed
v. Howerton Eng'r. Co., 188 N.C. 39, 123 S.E. 479 (1924); Town of Shelby v. Cleveland Mill &
Power Co., 155 N.C. 196, 71 S.E. 218 (1911); City of Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615,
54 S.E. 453 (1906).
139. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
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Finally, from the standpoint of sound and efficient public adminis-
tration, an indication from the courts that they will no longer tolerate,
at any level of government, human error of a particularly egregious sort
resulting in an unreasonable course of conduct, would surely lead to
more careful, responsive, and perhaps more humane conduct of gov-
ernmental affairs. 141
It would be no answer to the proposed "rule of reason, '142 as a sub-
stitute for 100 years of mumbo-jumbo in this area of North Carolina
administrative law, to suggest, as some might, that the courts would
soon be flooded with the imagined grievances of countless citizens bet-
ter vented at the polls; that exercise of closer supervision of administra-
tive conduct by the judiciary would violate hallowed constitutional
traditions of the separation of powers; or that judges being human, the
adoption of a new standard would lead to subjective, if not whimsical,
restraints upon the elected representatives of the people, and thus to the
141. Assume that City X, located in County Y, needed a new city hall and County Y a new
courthouse. Xand Yeach spent $10 million for these new structures, located two blocks apart. A
joint city-county building could have been erected at savings of at least $1 million and possibly a
great deal more-not to mention avoiding the continuing duplication of operating and mainte-
nance costs. The governing bodies of both refused to consider the idea, proposed by a member of
the City Council, before construction of either building began. It is arguable, under Barbour v.
Carteret County, 255 N.C. 177, 120 S.E.2d 448 (1961), that this was a "wanton disregard of the
public good." Few would disagree that it would have been eminently reasonable at least to con-
sider the proposal. On these facts, taxpayers should have had a cause of action to challenge the
proposed expenditure, and they would have under the proposed "rule of reason"-just as would
the hypothetical plaintiff on the facts adapted from Campbell. In a situation to the author's per-
sonal knowledge not unlike that described, a plaintiff representing the residents of the City and
County of Durham sought a federal court injunction to stop the disbursement of revenue sharing
funds earmarked for a new city hall and courthouse on the ground that the official bodies had not
filed environmental statements. Plaintiff lost, but it was a worthy effort to vindicate the public
interest. See Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C.), af'dper curiam, 522 F.2d
295 (4th Cir. 1975). In a North Carolina court applying the Burton rule, one doubts that the
plaintiff would have been taken seriously. But this is the kind of public decisionmaking to which
our courts must begin to pay heed when the issue is appropriately presented.
142. See text accompanying notes 133-38 supra. Professor Schwartz confirms that the test for
determining what is arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of discretion is "a test of reasonableness."
Thus, "abuse of discretion is the rubric for discretion exercised unreasonably." Such a test has not
been changed by broad statutory grants of power or by statutory provisions for judicial review,
either in federal or state administrative law. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 217, at 609-10. Benja-
min states that the test for abuse of discretion is essentially that of the rationality of the adminis-
trative determination. R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 346 (1942). The late Raymond B. Mallard, the first chiefjudge of the North Carolina Court
of Appeals, referred to the "inherent power of the court, absent legislative enactment and constitu-
tional limitation (1) to determine and apply the 'right reason of the thing'; (2) to determine
whether the 'right reason of the thing' has been heretofore misconceived and declared; and (3) if
so, to overrule it." Mallard, Inherent Power of the Courts of North Carolina, 10 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1, 4 (1974). "Litigants attempting to persuade a reviewing court that the balance struck by
an agency among relevant factors is 'arbitrary and capricious' must be prepared to persuade the
court that the agency's decision has no rational basis whatsoever." S. BREYER & R. STEWART,
supra note 21, at 289 (emphasis added).
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"despotism" of which Chief Justice Pearson wrote of yore.143
To some of the above-stated conflicting considerations, let us now
turn.
One need not search at length in the official reports of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina for cases where the court seems to have pro-
duced unreasonable, if not unjust, results by adhering to the narrow
philosophical strictures of their predecessors in Brodnax, Rosenthal, or
Burton, rather than to the broader rule which was available to them
and is urged here. Three examples will suffice.
In 1960 the Housing Authority of the City of Wilson (hereinafter
referred to as Housing Authority) brought proceedings to condemn a
tract of land owned by Wooten, Yelverton, and their wives, for erection
of a low-income housing project. The owners resisted the condemna-
tion on the ground that ninety per cent of the property within the pro-
ject area was vacant, and neither their land nor the project area as a
whole included any unsafe dwellings; that more than 1,200 unsafe
dwellings in the city were located in other areas; that there were other
suitable sites in the city, including areas adjacent to and on all sides of
other such projects where unsafe buildings existed. These and other
allegations in respondents' amended answer were stricken by the clerk
of court and his action was affirmed by the trial court. In Housing Au-
thority of Wilson v. Wooten,"' the supreme court affirmed on the
ground that the record before it (consisting entirely of the pleadings)
did not sustain the respondents' contention that the Housing Authority
had acted "arbitrarily and capriciously amounting to a manifest abuse
of discretion." 1
45
Conceding that the respondents' pleadings may have been faulty,
that generally site selection is a matter within the discretion of the
Housing Authority, and that the Housing Authority had the option to
choose the respondents' tract in preference to one or more other sites,
one may still question whether it made sense-a mere synonym for what
is reasonable or rational-for a public body to take private land for
public use against the owners' will when other options less damaging to
respondents were apparently available. Perhaps the Housing Authority
could have been persuaded to amend the project boundaries to avoid
the use of the respondents' property. The issue seems to go far beyond
whether a desirable home may be taken without affecting the public
character of the condemnation proceeding. Under a rule of law which
permitted, encouraged, or suggested an allegation of unreasonable con-
duct, rather than of conduct arbitrary, capricious, and abusive of dis-
143. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
144. 257 N.C. 358, 126 S.E.2d 101 (1962).
145. Id at 367, 126 S.E.2d at 107.
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cretion, respondents might have had the opportunity to produce
evidence that other sites would be more beneficial to the public than
their own tract. Under the decision of the court, they were not afforded
that chance, although the issue as thus redefined would not have been
substantially different from that raised in any other case where an at-
tempted exercise of the police power is challenged on grounds of rea-
sonableness. 
146
In Pharr v. Garibaldi, 47 plaintiff, who resided in a residentially-
zoned area within one mile of the corporate limits of Raleigh and in
close proximity to Camp Polk prison, sought to enjoin members of the
State Prison Commission and the Director of Prisons from further
maintenance and operation of the prison as a "minimum security
prison" and from the construction of buildings for the enlargement
thereof. He further sought removal of the buildings theretofore con-
structed as being in violation of the city zoning ordinance. The com-
plaint alleged that the prison was in a thickly inhabited area, and part
of it lay in a residential zone within one mile of the corporate limits.
There were approximately 500 residences within a one mile radius of
the prison. A public school with 473 pupils and a college attended by
750 young ladies were located nearby.
Plaintiff further alleged that the prison was a "minimum security"
facility and that the prison inmates were not closely confined or
guarded, but were given considerable freedom. They roamed the
neighborhood at will, went on the property and into the homes of resi-
dents of the area, and threatened the lives and safety of these residents.
It was further alleged that escapees and discharged inhabitants of the
prison had committed serious crimes in the area, and that the operation
constituted a continuing nuisance. After adoption of a zoning ordi-
nance, the defendants began to enlarge the prison by erecting addi-
tional buildings of a non-residential character within the residential
district.
Defendants demurred to the complaint, which sought a permanent
injunction, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to control
the discretion of a state agency engaged in the performance of a gov-
ernmental function, that the state was the real party in interest, and that
the defendants were not subject to suit for the cause alleged.
The superior court overruled the demurrer and issued a temporary
restraining order pending final determination of the action. Defend-
ants appealed. The chief justice stayed the execution of the restraining
146. See cases cited in notes 98, 138 supra. Housing authorities, as in Wooten, were created
under the police power of the state. Wells v. Housing Auth., 213 N.C. 744, 747-48, 197 S.E. 693,
695-96 (1938).
147. 252 N.C. 803, 115 S.E.2d 18 (1960).
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order, and the supreme court issued a writ of certiorari for review of
the order. In the supreme court, the defendants contended that there
was no allegation in the complaint of irreparable or special damage to
the plaintiff or that the defendants "acted unlawfully or in palpable
abuse of their discretion."
Aside from the issues of whether plaintiff had pleaded specifically
any incident directly affecting him or his family, whether the state was
immune from suit while acting in a governmental capacity, and
whether a jail is a nuisance or not, let us examine the implications of
the case from the standpoint of the individual defendants' immunity
and liability. As the Pharr court notes, citing Schloss v. State Highway
& Public Works Commission:
148
When public officers whose duty it is to supervise and direct a [s]tate
agency attempt to ... invade or threaten to invade the personal or
property rights of a citizen in disregard of law, they are not relieved
from responsibility by the immunity of the [sitate from suit, even
though they act or assume to act under the authority and pursuant to
the directions of the [s]tate.
4 9
The court in Pharr focused on the issue of whether the facts alleged,
if true, were sufficient to show that the plaintiff's rights had been "in-
vaded or threatened by unlawful conduct on the part of the defend-
ants."' 50
On the facts alleged, it seems arguably unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances and conditions described for the defendants to operate or
to enlarge a prison, or to permit it to be so operated. The allegations, if
proved, clearly could support a conclusion that operation or enlarge-
ment of the prison as described was injurious to the public good, as
well as to the individual plaintiff. Should not the plaintiff at least have
been permitted to prove such a case at trial? That would have been the
result under the proposed "rule of reason."
The court, however, relying on Burton v. City of Reidsville, concluded
that it had no power to substitute its discretion for that of the defend-
ants, "and, in the absence of fraud, manifest abuse of discretion or con-
duct in excess of lawful authority, the court has no power to
intervene."'' So much for any cause of action against the defendants
individually, because there was no allegation of fraud or of arbitrary
conduct "in such manner as to constitute a manifest abuse of discre-
tion."5 I The allegations otherwise were found deficient with respect to
the conduct of the defendants or their personal responsibility for the
148. 230 N.C. 489, 53 S.E.2d 517 (1949).
149. 252 N.C. at 809, 115 S.E.2d at 23.
150. Id
151. Id at 811-12, 115 S.E.2d at 25.
152. Id at 812, 115 S.E.2d at 25.
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acts alleged.' 53 For these and other reasons discussed in the opinion,
the supreme court vacated the interlocutory restraining order and sus-
tained the defendants' demurrer.
In Hayes v. Benton,'54 plaintiffs were two school girls, aged six and
sixteen. The latter had been crippled since infancy and was unable to
walk to school or to attend without transportation. During the school
year 1926, the county school board provided bus transportation for cer-
tain students. One bus passed by the home of the plaintiffs and they
rode it to school until November 8, 1926. On that date the principal,
under the direction of the school board, dismissed the children from
school, allegedly for wrongfully using the bus. The excuse given was
that the children lived within two and one-half miles of the school
building by some fifty yards, and the board's rule provided only for
transportation of students who lived more than two and one-half miles
from the building.
Plaintiffs brought an action for mandamus to compel the defendants
to furnish them bus transportation to school. Defendants denied the
material allegations of the complaint, made a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action in that there was no allegation of bad
faith or any plain duty imposed upon them for which mandamus
would lie, and alleged further that they had acted within a "reasonable
and legal discretion vested in them under the law."'
55
The court, applying the principles applicable to the function of man-
damus, held that "in the absence of abuse the discretion exercised by
153. In Pharr, the court pointed to the absence of allegations of personal responsibility of the
Prison Commissioners and Director. It was not shown that the Commission adopted "any policy,
rule or regulation" permitting prisoners to roam about the neighborhood, that the Commission
failed to use all means at its disposal to punish such violations of the rules or to prevent recur-
rences of such violations, or that it failed to discipline subordinates who were overly permissive or
negligent in regulating inmate conduct. In State ex rel. Avery County v. Braswell, 215 N.C. 270,
275, 1 S.E.2d 864, 867-68 (1939), more than 20 years before Pharr, the North Carolina Supreme
Court suggested that public officials are to be held to the same standard of diligence in the per-
formance of the duties of their office as prudent and careful private citizens exercise in conducting
their own affairs. By analogy to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the law of torts, we may inquire
how the alleged acts could have occurred unless someone in official capacity had been ignoring
his, her, or their duty. One reading Pharr may well inquire, "Who was in charge there?" Further,
why should plaintiff have been compelled to specify in his complaint the precise ways in which the
individuals failed to perform their duties? It was obvious that someone had done so. If the de-
fendants in fact had made every effort to curb inmate violations or to discipline lax subordinates,
this could have been appropriately raised as a matter of defense. The vice of the Burton philoso-
phy, as particularly exemplified in Pharr, is that non-elected government officials, as a result of
such engrained judicial attitudes, may have come to feel no sense of responsibility whatever for
the harmful consequences of their conduct. An even more destructive result from the laissez-faire
attitude of the courts-particularly through resort to technical niceties in the pleadings to thwart
citizens seeking to hold public officials accountable-is to foster public disillusionment with the
processes of government.
154. 193 N.C. 379, 137 S.E. 169 (1927).
155. Id at 381, 137 S.E. at 170.
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the board in fixing the dividing line"' 5 6 for free transportation to
school, the line "cannot be set aside or controlled by the courts; ... the
rule made by the county board of education was authorized by law and
the discretion of the board in determining the line of separation is not
subject to the control of the courts."' 5 7
This result, which would have given pause even to Charles Dickens'
Mr. Bumble,'5 8 was challenged by the moving dissent' 59 of Justice
Clarkson, in which he presaged the theme here: The board's action did
not make sense. Undoubtedly, under a "rule of reason" the court
would have made short shrift of it.
When confronted with a full record in an action involving govern-
mental conduct that allegedly damages the public or a private interest,
a jurist in this state should feel free, in Justice Brogden's phrase, to sink
his or her eye "deep into the situation. . . to discover the heart of the
transaction ' 6 and should be comfortable in applying a simple test: Is
what has been done, threatened, or proposed here consistent with reason,
justice, and common sense? If he or she should find that it is not, the
156. Id at 382, 137 S.E. at 170.
157. Id at 382-83, 137 S.E. at 171.
158. Mr. Bumble is justly famous for replying, when informed that "the law supposes" his
wife acts under his direction, "If the law supposes that, the law is a ass-a idiot." I C. DICKENS,
THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS 110 (Collier's unabr. ed. 1870).
159. Law has many definitions. Blackstone says: "Law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed
by the supreme power." "Law," according to an ancient maxim, "is good sense, and what is
contrary to good sense is not good law." "Law is the enforcement of justice among men."
"Law is a mode of human action respecting society, and must be governed by the same rules
of equity which govern every private action."
There is nothing in the record to show that there was no room in the bus; in fact, Ruth had
been, up to 8 November, 1926, taken to school in the bus. We have this picture: A little
cripple child sitting by the roadside appealing to be taken with her more fortunate compan-
ions, who are not afflicted, to school. With room in the bus, defendants, board of education,
command that it shall pass her by. Of all entitled to the benefits of the school, it should be
this cripple. We can find nothing in the school law that gives any right to defendants to
refuse a cripple, where there is room in the bus, to be taken to and from school. The bad
example to the other children, as they see this cripple passed by, with room in the bus, is
contrary to all sense of humanity and justice. I think she has a clear right. We hear now as of
old the cry that drove Her to the manger "because there was no room for them in the inn."
It is admitted in the case that the father of the little cripple girl is unable to furnish trans-
portation, and there is no other public school in the county to send her to. The father is a
farmer of limited means, with a wife and nine children to support, and desires to educate his
children. This little cripple, "whom the finger of God has touched," is unable to enjoy the
sports and play of other children, but she can be educated, and the light of knowledge will
help her bear the burden of affliction. But, with room in the bus, defendants pass her by and
plead discretion. The humiliation--this cripple, naturally sensitive, being dismissed from
school solely because she could not walk but rode in the bus. The principal of the school and
the local school committee are willing, but the central body, the board of education, com-
mands dismissal of the cripple.
"Law is considered the perfection of reason and founded on justice and common sense."
In this case there is no reason, justice or common sense in the conduct of the defendants,
board of education, in regard to this cripple.
Hayes v. Benton, 193 N.C. at 384-85, 137 S.E. at 171.
160. Ashley Home Corp. v. Creech, 205 N.C. 55, 63, 169 S.E. 794, 799 (1933).
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court should be empowered to act appropriately.'61 We expect even lay
jurors to apply such standards to some of the issues before them and
there is no reason, in the field of administrative law, why judges-
equipped by training, experience, and (one would hope) instinct ,62 to
seek and proclaim a reasonable result-must be dispatched in pursuit
of a will-of-the-wisp, searching the record for a scent of wilfulness here,
a trace of whimsical conduct there, and a whiff of abused discretion
somewhere else.
It must be remembered that Brodnax, Rosenthal, and even the early
cases undergirding Burton and the philosophy of Chief Justice Barnhill
(who was born nearly 100 years ago163 ), were decided in a day when
local governmental problems and challenges were uncomplicated. The
persons acting to meet them were highly visible in most communities
and, for the most part, were elected officials directly accountable to the
people. The theory of a "powerless judiciary"--one that would not
substitute its judgment for that of administrative bodies and offi-
cials16 4-was firmly implanted in our jurisprudence by Rosenthal in
1908, when apparently the only state administrative agencies to have
become involved in litigation were the Railroad Commission and the
Corporation Commission. 165  Until 1909, which brought Hightower v.
City of Raleigh, 66 involving an appointed subordinate body, few, if
any, cases reaching the supreme court concerned units or officers of
local government other than county, town, and township commission-
ers and boards of aldermen; 167 school, road, and drainage district com-
161. The constitutional courts are the acknowledged architects and guarantors of the integ-
rity of the legal system . . . . The statute under which an agency operates is not the whole
law applicable to its operation[.] An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the
many rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The very subordination of the agency to
judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought into
harmony with the totality of the law, the law as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute
book at large, the principles and conceptions of the "common law," and the ultimate guaran-
tees associated with the Constitution.
L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 327.
162. "Some contend that over many years and after many cases, a judge develops a disciplined
instinct for right, a kind of 'finely honed' expertise in generalism, in fundamental concepts of
fairness, due process and plain common sense which must ultimately govern in even the most
complex of factual disputes." Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action. A Judge's Unbur-
dening, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 201, 208 (1970).
163. See 266 N.C. 792, 792 (1966).
164. See In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E. 706, 709 (1938).
165. See, e.g., State ex. rel. R.R. Comm'n v. Tel. Co., 113 N.C. 213, 18 S.E. 389 (1893); Corp.
Comm'n v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 127 N.C. 283, 37 S.E. 266 (1900).
166. 150 N.C. 569, 65 S.E. 279 (1909).
167. See, e.g., City of Durham v. Rigsbee, 141 N.C. 128, 53 S.E. 531 (1906) (landowner chal-
lenged necessity or desirability, from public interest, of condemning his land for street widening
purposes); Board of Comm'rs v. Smith, 110 N.C. 417, 14 S.E. 972 (1892) (town commissioners
held entitled to a review by certiorari of a county commissioners' decision to grant Smith a liquor
license).
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missioners; 168 election officials, sheriffs, and tax collectors. 69 The days
of highway, workers' and unemployment compensation commissioners;
planning and zoning boards; housing, urban redevelopment, and air-
port authorities; welfare and social services boards; and other procon-
suls of the welfare state funded substantially by federal largesse, lay in
the distant future.
Governmental action that may damage someone-or, indeed, all of
us-is no longer a matter of changing the grade of a street, assessing
and collecting a tax, providing or withholding a license for the sale of
spirituous liquors, authorizing erection of a telephone line, or operating
a sewage disposal plant or municipal abattoir too close to the refined
nostrils of the townspeople. It is no longer sufficient to say that the
courts must restrain themselves because garden-variety miscreants can
be removed at the next election. "You may throw the rascals out" is no
consolation when the rascals on whom must rest the initial responsibil-
ity for injurious public policy, and its faulty or mindless execution, are
secure in their civil service jobs, even in the unlikely event that they can
be identified.
The scope of possible public and private injury from irrational gov-
ernmental policies and decisions has expanded enormously. An urban
renewal program, poorly conceived and administered, can lay waste to
a city's heart, disrupt hundreds or thousands of homes and businesses,
and, by haphazard relocation policies and inadequate planning for re-
placement housing, create new slums where none existed before-a
stateside, peacetime perversion of the Vietnam War technique of "sav-
ing the villages by destroying them." Easy tolerance of unlimited com-
mercial development, at the expense of carefully considered master
plans, can destroy sound residential neighborhoods within a city and
accelerate downtown decline (particularly when accompanied by re-
lentless physical destruction, under urban renewal, of central business
districts). When the spreading fingers of expressways interlock with
open-handed developmental policies fostered in the suburbs, the result
may be an eroded inner city tax base rendering local government less
168. See, e.g., Sanderlin v. Luken, 152 N.C. 738, 68 S.E. 225 (1910) (action challenging valid-
ity of 1909 statute creating drainage districts); Pickler v. Board of Educ., 149 N.C. 221, 62 S.E. 902
(1908) (challenge to decision of school board to erect a new school, rather than repair the existing
school or move it to another site); Smith v. Board of Trustees, 141 N.C. 143, 53 S.E. 524 (1906)
(action to restrain school district officials from issuing bonds and levying a tax under an act of the
General Assembly); McArthur v. McEachin, 64 N.C. 480 (1870) (injunction will not lie against
opening of a public road).
169. McDonald v. Teague, 119 N.C. 604, 26 S.E. 158 (1896) (injunction against tax collector to
restrain sale of property for nonpayment of taxes denied); Bynum v. Board of County Comm'rs,
101 N.C. 412, 8 S.E. 136 (1888) (injunction to restrain commissioners from declaring the result of
an election denied); Nixon v. Harrell, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 76 (1857) (court without power to set aside
execution for abuses of a sheriff in executing its commands).
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capable of meeting its responsibility for crime and disease control, edu-
cation, and other social services-as well as the ordinary amenities
every citizen has a right to expect from his government. Site selection
of public housing projects, schools, highways, and other public works
has lasting impact on orderly community development. Thoughtless
local administrators, having been indulged by their elected supervisors
over the years, may continue to destroy, in the name of "progress,"
much of the nation's heritage of historic buildings and to deprive us of
the visual and psychic values arising from a community sense of
America's past.' Exclusionary zoning policies may confine the poor
to ghettos with all the attendant social costs. Lax inspection policies
and enforcement of building codes may hasten the deterioration of a
community's housing stock. Environmental controls may jeopardize
economic development, or the lack of them may place an acceptable
quality of life beyond the reach of many of the citizenry.
These matters are, of course, "political," and the methods of break-
ing this vicious circle of mutually supportive and destructive phenom-
ena are "discretionary" with the governing body of a municipality or its
subordinate and affiliate units. But equally political and discretionary
are decisions to enact ordinances regulating the conduct of legitimate
businesses which, if unreasonable, our courts have not hesitated to
strike down-without mention of "the right to err" or "separation of
powers." '7 1 Why should unreasonable conduct be immune to chal-
lenge in the courts when an entire community suffers irreparable harm,
perhaps for decades, from a bureaucrat's myopia or an alderman's in-
transigence?
The supreme court observed more than forty years ago: "Every pub-
lic officer. . . is bound. . . to bring to the discharge of his duties that
prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in
170. See generally Historic Preservation Symposium, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. (1980). For a discus-
sion of urban problems of the kind discussed in text, see Daye, The Race, Class and Housing
Conundrum. A Rationale and Proposal for a Legislative Policy of Suburban Inclusion, 9 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 37, 38-40 (1977), and sources cited therein.
171. See, e.g., State v. Byrd, 259 N.C. 141, 130 S.E.2d 55 (1968); Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen,
192 N.C. 348, 135 S.E. 50 (1926); State v. Tenant, 110 N.C. 609, 14 S.E. 387 (1892).
The separation of powers doctrine in North Carolina may well preclude the judiciary from
exercising administrative functions, but a court is clearly not exercising an administrative function
when it determines "whether an agency acted upon authority which could be conferred upon it
constitutionally, acted within its statutory authority, acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or in disre-
gard of law, and whether it based its decision on insufficient or incompetent evidence, or commit-
ted other errors of law." Note, Administrative Law-Judicial Review and Separation of Powers, 45
N.C.L. REV. 467, 470 (1967). The author of the note concluded that the decision in In re Varner,
266 N.C. 409, 146 S.E.2d 401 (1966), a school reassignment case, "seems inconsistent with" the
constitutional requirement of separate and distinct governmental functions and with the court's
statement in Burton v. City of Reidsville that "courts were not created or vested with authority to
act as supervisory agencies to control and direct the action of executive and administrative agen-
cies or officials." Id. at 472.
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the management of their own affairs."' 72 In matters of large import,
where the future course of a city may be significantly altered for the
worse by administrative error, who but the courts can best hold an ap-
pointive public officer to this standard?7 3 Of what value is the theory
of "checks and balances" if the courts refuse to examine that side of the
"separation of powers" coin?174
172. State ex rel. Avery County v. Braswell, 215 N.C. 270, 274, 1 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1939).
173. The guarantee of legality by an organ independent of the executive is one of the
profoundest, most pervasive premises of our system. Indeed I would venture to say that it is
the very condition which makes possible, which makes so acceptable, the wide freedom of our
administrative system, and gives it its remarkable vitality and flexibility. It is, of course, true
that the agencies make positive contributions to the riches and ambiance of our life, which
quite clearly the courts could not make. It is also true that the good public servant is devoted
to the law. But I feel that in the context these considerations are peripheral. They have to do
with the spirit in which judicial review should be exercised but not with the question whether
there shall be review. It is clear that the country looks, and looks with good reason, not to the
agencies, but to the courts for its ultimate protection against executive abuse ....
L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 324.
174. In light of his comments about the "separation of powers" doctrine in Burton, 243 N.C. at
408, 90 S.E.2d at 703, Justice Barnhill's earlier comment in State v. Scoggins is of interest:
[Clourts do not let a case turn on a constitutional question when it may be decided on other
grounds. This is a sound rule when rightly applied. It is bottomed on the philosophy of
equality between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of our government and the
system of checks and balancesprovided by ourfundamental law. While we have cited the rule
in cases involving municipal ordinances, strictly speaking, it applies only to Acts of the General
Assembly-a co-ordinate branch of the government. (Emphasis added).
236 N.C. 1, 6, 72 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1952).
Thus expressed, Justice Barnhill's own limitation would, if carried to its logical end, free the
courts from their reluctance to control and direct the action of local legislative, executive, and
administrative agencies and officials because they are not, by the Barnhill standard, members of a
"co-ordinate branch of the government." In any event, the "separation of powers" doctrine seems
outmoded inasmuch as rulemaking and quasi-judicial powers have routinely been conferred upon
and are exercised by executive agencies--standard practice in administrative law and procedure
under the delegation doctrine or otherwise. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 394-
95, 8 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1940). But see State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161
(1968), holding that the General Assembly could not confer upon the Commissioner of Insurance
the judicial power of varying, in his discretion, the amount of a civil penalty in a given case. Such
a power was not within the constitutional authorization as being "'reasonably necessary as an
incident to the accomplishment of the purpose for which' the Department of Insurance was cre-
ated." 274 N.C. at 496-97, 164 S.E.2d at 168. But granting the Commissioner judicial power to
revoke a license was held constitutional in Vines as a reasonably necessary incident to the depart-
mental purpose. See N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. IV, § 3.
For discussions of the relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and administra-
tive law, see Fuchs, supra note 25, at 186-94; 1 F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 15-29; L. JAFFE, supra
note 25, at 28-33; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 11, at 31-33; Strong, Judicial Review.- A Tri-
Dimensional Concept ofAdministrative-Constitutional Law, 69 W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1967); Parker,
The Historic Basis of Administrative Law.- Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy, 12
RUTGERS L. REV. 449 (1958).
The doctrine of separation of powers is now perceived as permitting a "'blending' of disparate
powers," I F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 1-2, but even if a major purpose of the doctrine initially
was to avoid autocracy or despotism (see J. Madison, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 51) (1788); Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 32) by
creating "checks and balances" and allocating powers and functions among the respective
branches of government, that purpose is poorly served by expressions of judicial timidity and self-
effacement such as those of Chief Justice Barnhill in Burton v. City of Reidsville. In a given case
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Moreover, it is no longer acceptable in a turbulent, industrialized,
urban society to feast on the legal fruits of a quiet, rural past, as the
supreme court did in Clark's Greenville, Inc. v. West,'75 when it noted
that the "motives, wisdom or expediency"' 76 of a local legislative body
(the city council) are "not questions for the court,""' and that "orderly
government could not survive" '7 8 the license of displeased or disgrun-
tled citizens challenging the validity of "any legislative enactment
merely by alleging bad faith and conspiracy on the part of the body
which passed it."' 17 9 We should carefully re-examine, in the light of
changing circumstances, any theory under which courts may automati-
cally slam their doors on the grievances, real or imagined, of those who
have already found legislative and executive halls barred to them. If,
as the supreme court earlier indicated in Barbour v. Carteret County,180
wanton disregard for the public good is bad faith, it is possible to pre-
dict that someday in a society that has placed on local officialdom bur-
dens ever increasing in their complexity and difficulty, orderly
government may demand that the courts review the judgments of local
administrators to prevent substantial injury to the public weal from
policies unwise in their conception, and negligent or worse in their exe-
cution. The test of reasonableness presented here will afford a discern-
ing judge that opportunity.
The supreme court should take an early opportunity to clarify, once
(e.g., Hayes v. Benton, 193 N.C. 379, 137 S.E. 169 (1927)), such restraint may become merely a
craven and callous abdication of judicial responsibility. Those of the "powerless judiciary" school
often seem content to permit exercise, if not usurpation, of judicial or legislative powers by the
executive, but have too seldom been bold, in this state, to assert the judiciary's role as a "check" or
"balance."
As Professor Fuchs suggested 40 years ago:
"[U]nder our system of government, no agency should be permitted to exercise a degree of
power, in relation to small matters or large, which renders it unduly dangerous to human
freedom. Governmental authority with respect to any subject must be divided, or its exercise
checked upon, in such a way as to minimize the danger of abuse."
Fuchs, supra note 25, at 194. It seems obvious that only a judiciary constantly alert to transgres-
sions of power by legislative and administrative officials-and consistently willing to intervene to
protect citizens' rights and interests-will truly preserve and advance the separation of powers
theory even as it was originally perceived. Otherwise, as in Burton and its progeny, the theory
becomes a shield rather than a sword, and the judiciary cannot be the balancing force the Foun-
ders intended it to be. Cooper observes, "[T]he real thrust of the separation of powers doctrine, as
now applied in the state courts, is that there must remain, either in the legislature or the courts,
effectivepower to correct any abuses resultingfron the grant of combinedpowers to a single agency."
(Emphasis added). I F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 23.
175. 268 N.C. 527, 151 S.E.2d 5 (1966).
176. Id. at 531, 151 S.E.2d at 8. The decision is sharply criticized on this point in Pollitt &
Strong, Constitutional Law-1967 Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REV. 816, 888-91
(1967).
177. 268 N.C. at 531, 151 S.E.2d at 8.
178. Id. at 531, 151 S.E.2d at 9.
179. Id.
180. 255 N.C. 177, 120 S.E.2d 448 (1961).
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and for all, the North Carolina courts' role in responding to citizens'
suits for redress of wrongs to the public or to private individuals arising
from discretionary acts of our elected and, particularly, our appointed
officials.
In an often quoted comment, Justice Brogden wrote: "The law is
. . . designed to march with the advancing battalions of life and pro-
gress and to safeguard and interpret the changing needs of a common-
wealth . "18
His thought was repeated a few years later in a dissent written by a
member of the court who had ascended to the supreme bench only four
months previously:
I conceive it to be the duty of the [clourt to interpret the law, within the
limitations of the [c]onstitution, with a view to meeting present condi-
tions and present needs .... The decisions of the [cjourt should be
mileposts marking the progress of the law, and not hitchingposts, beyond
which the law may not go.
182
The author of the dissent was Justice Maurice Victor Barnhill.
IV. FORM AND AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
In Burton v. City of Reidsville, Chief Justice Barnhill, discussing the
powers of the judiciary (as quoted at the beginning of this article), in-
cluded the obvious qualifying phrase "when the jurisdiction of a court
1"183 ais properly invoked .... a caveat also appearing in the "Restate-
ment of the Law of Judicial Powers and Responsibilities" proposed
above." 4 The basic powers of a court to act in cases involving discre-
tionary administrative action may never be clarified as proposed.
Whether they are or not, in cases to which neither the Administrative
Procedure Act nor some other statute applies, an aggrieved person may
still confront an equally "seamless web" in North Carolina law in de-
termining how he or she is to challenge the governmental decision in-
volved. What kind of review, if any, is available, and in what form
must the action be brought? Part IV is designed to summarize the vari-
181. Walker v. Town of Faison, 202 N.C. 694, 696, 163 S.E. 875, 876 (1932). In Klingenberg v.
City of Raleigh, Justice Clarkson, dissenting, wrote in a similar vein:
Time marches on, and so must the law. Old rules, born of another day, must constantly be
scrutinized in the light of a changing world .... The oasis where we pause for the night is
not the end of the pilgrimage; the Holy City which we seek always lies ahead. The unques-
tioning acceptance of the rules of the past is not an unmixed blessing. A formal logic which
reasons from precedent alone sometimes insulates the mind against the overwhelming logic of
reality.
212 N.C. 549, 556-57, 194 S.E. 297, 301-02 (1937).
182. Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N.C. 284, 289, 193 S.E. 668, 674 (1937) (emphasis ad-
ded).
183. 243 N.C. 405, 407, 90 S.E.2d 700, 702. See quote accompanying note 1 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 133-39 supra.
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ous statutory provisions that may be applicable, and to illustrate our
law's confusion in situations where no statute applies.
A. Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act 85 affords a right to judicial re-
view to a person "aggrieved by a final agency decision in a contested
case .. .who has exhausted all administrative remedies made avail-
able to him by statute or agency rule, unless adequate procedure for
judicial review is provided by some other statute, in which case the
review shall be under such other statute." 186 Any administrative action
not made reviewable under Article 4 of the statute (Judicial Review) is
reviewable through "any judicial remedy available ... under the
law." 187
The Administrative Procedure Act does not apply, and therefore Ar-
ticle 4 does not apply:
1. Where a statute makes specific provisions to the contrary.1
88
2. To the Employment Security Commission, the Industrial Com-
mission, the Occupational Health and Safety Review Board, the De-
partment of Correction, the Commission of Youth Services, and the
Utilities Commission. 89 Articles 2 and 3 (Rule-making and Adminis-
trative Hearings) do not apply either to the Department of Transporta-
tion in motor vehicle rulemaking or administrative hearings, or to the
Department of Revenue.'9 Only Article 4 (Judicial Review) applies to
the University of North Carolina and its affiliated boards, agencies,
and institutions. 19
3. To agencies in the legislative or judicial branches of the state
government. 1
92
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (1978).
186. Id. § 150A-43. Judicial review is also obtainable under §§ 150A-16 and -17, relating to
administrative rules. Judicial review of rulemaking is beyond the scope of this article. Professor
Daye has observed that "one of the major shortcomings" of the North Carolina Administrative
Procedure Act is the provision requiring resort to the judicial review provisions of another statute
if one is available and "adequate." This, he says, has a "serious adverse effect on uniformity."
Daye, supra note 12, at 899. Professor Cooper says that this approach "drastically [reduces] the
applicability and effectiveness of the administrative review act" in those states which have
adopted such an approach. 2 F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 608.
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1978).
188. Id. § 150A-l(a).
189. Id. Professor Daye states, "No logical basis for the exemption of the Industrial and Utili-
ties Commissions is apparent." He suggests that the exemptions for the Occupational Health and
Safety Review Board and the Employment Security Commission may have been based on the
extensive federal regulatory relationship and those for the Departments of Motor Vehicles and
Revenue on the sheer volume of licenses involved and the limited utility of Administrative Proce-
dure Act procedures in most cases. Daye, supra note 12, at 841.
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-l(a) (1978).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 150A-2(l).
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4. To counties, cities, towns, villages, other municipal corporations
or political subdivisions of the state or any agencies of such subdivi-
sions; county or city boards of education; other local public districts,
units, or bodies of any kind; or private corporations created by act of
the General Assembly. They are not included as "agencies" within the
meaning of the statute.193
Where the judicial review provisions of the Act apply, the form of
the action is by a petition for review filed in the Superior Court of
Wake County, except where the original determination in the matter
was made by a local agency or local board and appealed to the state
board. Then the petition may be filed in the superior court of the
county where the original determination was made.
94
B. Cases Outside The Scope of the Administrative Procedure Act
1. Organic Statutes
Many administrative agency procedures for judicial review are set
forth in the statute creating the agency, program, or activity (including
those specifically exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act).' 95
In other cases such procedures may be found in the Administrative
Code. 1
9 6
193. Id. The prior statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316, did not include a specific
exemption for local bodies.
194. Id. § 150A-45.
195. Organic statute provides for review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g.,
North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-188 (1975); Health Maintenance
Organization Act, id. § 57B-19(b) (Supp. 1979); Private Protective Services Act, id. § 74C-12;
Board of Boiler Rules and Bureau of Boiler Inspection Act, id. § 95-69.2 (1975); Occupational
Health and Safety Act, id. § 95-141; Coastal Area Management Act, id. § 113A-123(a) (1978).
Otherforms ofreview: From various decisions of the Commissioner of Insurance, petition to the
Superior Court of Wake County or to the court of appeals, id. §§ 58-9.3, -9.4, -54.8, -54.10, -241.41
( 1975); from final decisions of the Utilities Commission, review in the court of appeals, id. § 7A-29
(Supp. 1979); from decisions under the Model Airport Zoning Act, petition to the superior court,
id. § 63-34 (1975); from decisions under the N.C. Securities Act, petition to the superior court, id.
§ 78A-48 (Supp. 1979); from final workers' compensation decisions of the Industrial Commission,
review in the court of appeals, id. § 97-86; from decisions of the Employment Security Commis-
sion, appeal to the superior court, id. § 96-15(i). Although not technically judicial review of an
administrative decision, but rather review of proposed action affecting an individual, petitions of
the county Department of Social Services under the Protection of the Abused, Neglected or Ex-
ploited Disabled Adult Act are heard in the district court. Id. § 108-106.1 (1978). Appeals under
the Family Food Assistance Program are heard by petition to the superior court. Id. § 108-109.
Petitions under the annexation statutes are heard in superior court. 1d. §§ 160A-38, -50 (1976).
196. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-63 (1978 & Supp. 1979). On May 6, 1980, the court of
appeals judicially noticed that the administrative regulations required under the statute had not
been published; that over 18,000 pages of regulations existed but were available only by inspection
in the Attorney General's office; and that the regulations which had been codified were not in-
dexed by corresponding statutory references. Orange County v. Department of Transp., 46 N.C.
App. 350, 377, 265 S.E.2d 890, 914 (1980).
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2. Declaratory Judgment Act
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act' 97 has been used success-
fully to attack the validity of a statute or ordinance.' 98 However, the
Act does not authorize the adjudication of abstract or theoretical ques-
tions; a genuine controversy must presently exist between the parties. 99
Thus, efforts to use the Act as a means of testing the validity of a statute
or ordinance have failed where the complaining party did not show a
direct and adverse effect upon himself.
2°°
The Declaratory Judgment Act has been used in other controversies
involving public bodies: validity of a municipal contract;20' dedication
of land to the public as a street;202 determination whether land acquisi-
tion by condemnation was a fee or an easement;20 3 authority of the
State Board of Health to create a sanitary district;2° and determination
whether a city acquired by deed a fee in park land, or a fee upon spe-
cial limitation.20 5
On the other hand, the liability for a tax and the validity of a taxing
statute are not appropriate for determination by declaratory judg-
ment.20 6
For many years the supreme court did not clarify whether the De-
claratory Judgment Act was a suitable vehicle for challenging a zoning
ordinance. In Shuford v. Town of Waynesville, °7 Penny v. City of Dur-
ham,20' and Zopfi v. City of Wilmington,20 9 such actions appear to have
been brought under the Act, but the court did not discuss the issue in
these cases, and presumably no challenge was made to the form of the
action. In Eastern Carolina Tastee-Freez, Inc. v. City offRaleigh,'2  the
court indicated that it remained an open question whether one who had
not violated an ordinance could use the Act to have it determined that
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1969 & Supp. 1979). See Van Hecke, The North Caro-
lina Declaratory Judgment Act, 10 N.C.L. REV. 1 (1931).
198. See, e.g., Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Auth., 237 N.C. 52, 74
S.E.2d 310 (1953) (statute); Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972) (ordi-
nance).
199. City of Raleigh v. Norfolk So. Ry., 275 N.C. 454, 168 S.E.2d 389 (1969); Angell v. City of
Raleigh, 267 N.C. 387, 148 S.E.2d 233 (1966).
200. Adams v. North Carolina Dept. of Natural & Econ. Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d
402 (1978); City of Greensboro v. Wall, 247 N.C. 516, 101 S.E.2d 413 (1958).
201. North Carolina Monroe Constr. Co. v. Guilford County Bd. of Educ., 278 N.C. 633, 180
S.E.2d 818 (1971); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. iseley, 203 N.C. 811, 167 S.E. 56 (1933).
202. Town of Farmville v. A.C. Monk & Co., 250 N.C. 171, 108 S.E.2d 479 (1959).
203. Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 247 N.C. 666, 101 S.E.2d 679 (1958).
204. Deal v. Elon Sanitary Dist., 245 N.C. 74, 95 S.E.2d 362 (1956).
205. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955).
206. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168, 118 S.E.2d 792 (1961).
207. 214 N.C. 135, 198 S.E. 585 (1938).
208. 249 N.C. 596, 107 S.E.2d 72 (1959).
209. 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968).
210. 256 N.C. 208, 212, 123 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1962).
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an action proposed was valid. In In re Markham, the court suggested
by dictum that seeking a declaratory judgment would be an appropri-
ate procedure."2 ' The question was not resolved until 1972 in Blades v.
City of Raleigh,212 where the court specifically held that a suit to deter-
mine the validity of a zoning ordinance is a proper case for declaratory
judgment.
The form for the action is a complaint and may include a prayer for




The writ of certiorari is authorized by North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 1-269 "as heretofore in use."'214 In Russ v. Board of Educa-
lion,2 15 the court reviewed the board's action removing a school
superintendent: "It is well settled in this jurisdiction that [certiorari] is
the appropriate process to review the proceedings of inferior courts and
of bodies and officers exercising judicial or [quasi]-judicial functions in
cases where no appeal is provided by law."2z 6 The rule that certiorari
is available where the law provides no appeal has been observed in
North Carolina since 1803.217 Certiorari does not lie to review the ex-
ercise of legislative, executive, and ministerial powers.2 1 8 Thus, it is not
the proper remedy, for example, where a public official has been dis-
missed as an executive matter rather than after hearing. 1 9
The writ issues in the discretion of the court, upon petition and affi-
davit showing a prima facie case on the merits, when a "substantial
wrong" has been committed in a lower tribunal. 22° The court may re-
view errors of law appearing on the face of the record, errors of proce-
dure, and "all questions of jurisdiction, power, and authority of the
211. 259 N.C. 566, 131 S.E.2d 329 (1963).
212. 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972). See also Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608,
620, 227 S.E.2d 576, 583 (1976).
213. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Charlotte, 268 N.C. 345, 150 S.E.2d 493 (1966) (complainant
sought to have ordinances declared unconstitutional and asked for a perpetual injunction against
their enforcement). The plaintiff in Campbell Y. First Baptist Church sought both declaratory and
injunctive relief. Record at 17. The complaint need not make specific reference to the Declara-
tory Judgment Act because the facts alleged determine the nature of the relief to be granted.
Langdon v. Hurdle, 15 N.C. App. 158, 189 S.E.2d 517 (1972).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-269 (1969).
215. 232 N.C. 128, 59 S.E.2d 589 (1950).
216. Id. at 130, 59 S.E.2d at 591. See also Maines v. City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 133,
265 S.E.2d 155, 160 (1980).
217. Reardon v. Guy, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 245 (1803).
218. In re Markham, 259 N.C. 566, 569, 131 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1963).
219. Foust v. City of Greensboro, 47 N.C. App. 159, 266 S.E.2d 835 (1980); Bratcher v. Win-
ters, 269 N.C. 636, 641, 153 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1967).
220. Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 312, 22 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1942); State v. Tripp, 168 N.C. 150,
154-55, 83 S.E. 630, 632 (1914).
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inferior tribunal to do the action complained of ... ."221
The writ is not a proper remedy where another remedy is avail-
able.222
In addition to section 1-269,223 certiorari may be authorized in the
organic statute of an agency. For example, section 160A-388(e) 224 pro-
vides with respect to a board of adjustment: "Every decision of the
board shall be subject to review by the superior court by proceedings in
the nature of certiorari."
Functionally, the petition for review by certiorari is akin to the peti-
tion for review filed under the judicial review provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act: review under the Act is also limited to the
record below and no new evidence may be presented to the reviewing
court.
2 2 5
4. The Wrong Remedy Syndrome.- Mandamus, Mandatory
Injunction, Injunction
The law of North Carolina relating to the use of certiorari is reason-
ably clear, although an apparently exasperated Chief Justice Stacy, dis-
senting in Belk's Department Store, Inc. v. Gui/ford County,22 6 chided
his colleagues as follows:
There is no difference in principle between an unlawful exemption and
an excessive assessment. The one results in a discrimination in favor of
the landowner; the other in a discrimination against him. We hear the
one (Odd Fellows v. Swain, 217 N.C., 632, 9 S.E.[2d], 365) and decline
to hear the other. We told the plaintiff in Hooker P. Pitt County...
that his remedy was by application for a [certiorari]. The present peti-
tioner applies for a [certiorari] and we tell him his application will not
lie.
2 2 7
Chief Justice Stacy was referring to what is described here as the
"wrong remedy" syndrome. On rare occasions, the supreme court has
treated an improvidently chosen pleading as a petition for writ of certi-
orari, and proceeded to review the case. 22 8 But where the complainant
221. Chambers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 250 N.C. 194, 199, 108 S.E.2d 211, 214-15
(1959); Belk's Dept. Store, Inc. v. Guilford County, 222 N.C. 441, 445, 23 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1943);
Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 312-13, 22 S.E.2d 896, 898-99 (1942); State v. King, 222 N.C. 137, 140,
22 S.E.2d 241, 242-43 (1942).
222. Watson v. Shields, 67 N.C. 235 (1872); Petty v. Jones, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 408 (1841). Cf.
Sanford v. Southern Oil Co., 244 N.C. 388, 93 S.E.2d 560 (1956).
223. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-269 (1969).
224. Id. § 160A-388(e) (1976).
225. Id. § 15OA-50 (1978 & Supp. 1980). The Act lists two exceptions to this rule: (I) where
no record was made at the hearing or (2) the record is inadequate. In such cases the judge in his
discretion may hear all or part of the matter de novo.
226. 222 N.C. 441, 23 S.E.2d 897 (1943).
227. Id. at 454, 23 S.E.2d at 906.
228. See Baker v. Varser, 239 N.C. 180, 189, 79 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1954) (plaintiff brought ac-
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has sought the wrong remedy, whether by certiorari or otherwise, the
more usual and long-standing practice2" 9 is for the court to inform the
litigant why his form of action was inappropriate and leave him to try
another, if he can.
Mandamus, mandatory injunction, and injunction are remedies pe-
culiarly subject to the wrong remedy syndrome. In cases involving
challenges to official conduct or action, inconsistent opinions of the
supreme court have created an impenetrable jungle that only the most
intrepid legal explorer will dare to enter. On such a safari, he will do
well to discard his compass and maps and dismiss his bearers and
guides, for he may find them useless.
tion for mandamus, which was held not to lie under the circumstances; complaint was treated as
petition for certiorari). Cf Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 312-13, 22 S.E.2d 896, 898-99 (1942) (com-
plaint regarding the failure of defendant to issue a certificate of incorporation for a proposed bank
was dismissed on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action; on appeal, plaintiffs "argue[d] and
insist[ed]" that they sought a writ of certiorari for a review of the action; the court agreed to
"consider the appeal on their theory of the purpose and intent of the action," finally concluding
that certiorari would not lie to review action taken in accord with the statute absent a showing of
capriciousness, bad faith, or disregard of law. Id. at 315, 22 S.E.2d at 900).
229. In State v. Kirkpatrick, 179 N.C. 747, 103 S.E. 65 (1920), defendant was convicted of
selling milk without a permit in violation of an ordinance. On his appeal, the court suggested that
he was not entitled to raise the validity of the ordinance on two of the constitutional grounds he
cited (lack of a right of appeal from the decision of the licensing body and creation of a monopoly
through the municipal power to revoke a permit once granted), because he had "taken the law into
his own hands." A proper remedy, the court said, would have been to apply for a permit, and if
refused, to have sought a mandamus. Quaere, if his application for the permit had been refused,
would not the only ground for mandamus have been his clear right to the permit? How could he
have tested the validity of the ordinance in such a proceeding, where the sole issue presumably
would have been an arbitrary refusal to grant the permit? If he had applied for and had been
granted the permit, he would have been back at "Square One" as far as determining the validity
of the ordinance was involved. He would have obtained his permit, but not a resolution of the
question whether a permit could be required constitutionally. The court also recommended rais-
ing the constitutional question in defense to an indictment for selling milk following a wrongful
refusal of his application, or in an action for damages. The logic of the former and the efficacy of
the latter were subjects on which Chief Justice Clark offered no enlightenment. Inasmuch as the
matter before the court was a criminal proceeding anyway, it is difficult to see why Mr. Kirkpat-
rick would have been in any better posture under the court's second option: He would still have
"taken the law into his own hands" by selling milk without a permit. Similarly, should he have
won damages for a wrongful refusal to issue him the license, presumably he would have had the
money in hand, but again, no answer as to the constitutionality of the ordinance. Chief Justice
Clark's advice in Kirkpatrick surely must rank among the least useful ever proffered by the court.
On the court's historic penchant for turning the errant litigant away with a "pat on the back" in
the form of suggested alternative remedies for his grievance, see also, Jones v. Commissioners of
Franklin, 88 N.C. 56 (1883) (register of deeds whose claim for a fifteen-cent fee was rejected by
the county commissioners has remedy by civil action, not appeal); Cohen Co. v. Commissioners of
Goldsboro, 77 N.C. 2 (1877) (remedy for injury resulting from operation of unlawful ordinance is
action for damages, not injunction); McArthur v. McEachin, 64 N.C. 454 (1870) ( remedy against
county commissioners, acting in exercise of their authority to lay off public roads and build
bridges, is not a civil action, but appeal or certiorari; Justice Dick's opinion undoubtedly escaped
the attention of Chief Justice Pearson, for the ink was barely dry on the latter's opinion six months
earlier in Brodnax v. Groom that the courts would have no truck with such matters); Solicitor ex
rel. Marvill Mills v. Columbus Mills, 40 N.C. (5 Ired. Eq.) 244 (1848) (relief against commission-
ers appointed to lay off county seat is by quo warranto or mandamus, not injunction).
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The writ of mandamus ordinarily lies to compel the performance of
a clear legal duty (stated another way, one of a ministerial, rather than
a discretionary, character), and will be issued in behalf of one who has
a specific legal right to such performance and is without any other legal
remedy. So, in essence, we were informed in Jarrell v. Snow.23 ° Man-
damus is an exercise of original jurisdiction and may not be used as a
substitute for appeal. So we were informed in Baker v. Varser.23'
Mandamus is not a proper instrument to review or reverse an adminis-
trative board which has taken final action on a matter within its juris-
diction. Where the statute provides no appeal, the proper method of
review is by certiorari if there has been error of law prejudicial to a
party, or the board has exceeded its authority, mistaken its power, or
abused its discretion. So we were authoritatively informed in Warren v.
Maxwell,232 citing Pue v. Hood.33 In all four decisions, Justices Barn-
hill, Winborne, Devin, and Denny sat in the majority.
Along the path of the decade between Pue, Jarrell, and Warren, (all
prior to 1946) and Baker (in 1954), however, we were directed to a
sharp fork in the way-the 1952 case of Hamlet Hospital and Training
Schoolfor Nurses, Inc. v. Joint Committee on Standardization.234 There
we learned that mandamus indeed will lie to review discretionary acts
when it appears that the discretion has been abused, as where the ac-
tion complained of has been arbitrary and capricious. For this proposi-
tion we were referred to Pue v. Hood, apparently the all-purpose
administrative law citation in our jurisprudence.
Somewhat farther along the road, in the 1956 case of Wilson Realty
Co. v. City and County Planning Board,235 a guidepost pointed us back
to Pue v. Hood. In Wilson Realty Co. we were told again on the author-
ity of Pue that mandamus is not used to correct action, however errone-
ous it may be; therefore, it is not used as certiorari is, to serve the
purpose of a writ of error or appeal. Certiorari involves the review of a
performed judicial duty; mandamus compels an unperformed legal
duty.
In each of the foregoing cases, the complainant wanted something
that a governmental body had denied him-Pue, a certificate from the
Commissioner of Banks; Warren, an order from the State Board of Tax
Assessment listing certain abandoned railroad property in a manner
230. 225 N.C. 430, 432, 35 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1945).
231. 239 N.C. 180, 189, 79 S.E.2d 757, 764 (1954).
232. 223 N.C. 604, 608, 27 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1943).
233. 222 N.C. 310, 316, 22 S.E.2d 896, 900 (1942). Professor Jaffe found the Pue opinion
"ambiguous .... [Jiumbled together is language which points at the same time to the formal
procedure and to the lack of 'property' right." L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 171.
234. 234 N.C. 673, 681, 68 S.E.2d 862, 868 (1952).
235. 243 N.C. 648, 655-56, 92 S.E.2d 82, 87 (1956).
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making it subject to county taxes, instead of listing it as "scrap"; Jarrell,
a ruling from the County Commissioners rescinding their request for
his wine license; Hamlet Hospital, a-certificate of accreditation; Baker,
admission to the bar examination; Wilson Realty Company, approval
of a proposed subdivision plat. In all save the Hamlet Hospital case,
the supreme court's response was, in effect, "Sorry, wrong remedy." It
is difficult to understand why a government agency, finally denying a
benefit to which one is arguably entitled under the law, may not simul-
taneously be avoiding its legal duty to provide the benefit. In either
event, the court is usually being asked to determine whether there is an
entitlement, and in principle, the title of a complainant's pleadings
should make no difference. The practical difference is that if the word
is "certiorari," the complainant is bound by the record he has made
below, and if the word is "mandamus," he is not. 36
Such tangled lines of authority are equally evident in the relationship
between mandamus and mandatory injunction.23 7
In Harris v. Board of Education,2 38 plaintiff had been elected by a
school committee to be principal of a school, but the school board dis-
approved the election. Plaintiff brought an action for mandamus seek-
ing to compel the board to approve the election. The supreme court
(Barnhill, J.) held: "The court below will not and cannot undertake to
control the discretionary power of the defendants. . . . The allegation
that the defendants acted 'wrongfully, unlawfully, unjustly, arbitrarily
and without just cause or reason' is not sufficient to support an applica-
tion for a writ of mandamus."
239
The plaintiff's adequate (and presumably "right") remedy, the court
suggested, was an action for damages, or he may "obtain a mandatory
injunction compelling the defendants to proceed to act upon the elec-
tion," upon proper pleadings and a finding that the "action of the
236. Professors Gellhorn, Byse, and Strauss state:
The litigant who endeavors to utilize the prerogative writs may have a frustrating experience.
For whether one agrees that an "imaginary system cunningly planned for the evil purpose of
thwarting justice and maximizing fruitless litigation would copy the major features of the
extraordinary remedies," 3 K. Davis, Admin. Law Treatise 388 (1958), the fact certainly is
that the writs have come to us heavily weighted with technicalities which sometimes obstruct
the efficient and rational administration of justice.
W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAuSs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 923 (7th
ed. 1979).
237. The role of the judiciary in controlling the exercise of governmental power should not
depend upon the accident of the form or method ofjudicial review. This is not to say that the
relief sought-affirmative rather than negative or declaratory-may not be a relevant consid-
eration in determining whether, and to what extent, a court should intervene. But it should
make no difference whether the method of seeking affirmative relief is mandamus, mandatory
injunction or a statutory review proceeding.
Id. at 927.
238. 216 N.C. 147, 4 S.E.2d 328 (1939).
239. Id. at 150, 4 S.E.2d at 330.
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county authorities was in fact arbitrary and capricious and actuated by
selfish and personal motives."24 Justice Barnhill drew a clear distinc-
tion between mandamus and mandatory injunction.
Yet, in Board of Managers v. City of Wilmington,24 1 again in St.
George v. Hanson,2 4' and again in Ponder v. Joslin,2 43 the court stated:
"A mandatory injunction, when issued to compel a board or public
official to perform a duty imposed by law, is identical in its function
and purpose with that of a writ of mandamus." 244 In all three cases, the
Harris opinion, illustrating a marked difference between the two writs,
was cited as authority for the rule that they are identical! In Fremont
City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of Education,245 the
court spoke of the remedies of mandamus and injunction:
Whether defendant should be required by the legal writ of mandamus
to terminate the enrollment of the named children in the schools ad-
ministered by it or prohibited by the equitable writ of injunction from
continuing to admit to its schools residents of another school adminis-
trative area need not now be decided. The same result can be accom-
plished by either writ .... The [sluperior [clourt has authority to issue
either writ. An injured party is not now compelled to ponder whether
he should apply to a court of law or a court of equity for relief.
246
This dictum undoubtedly compelled counsel for the plaintiff in Baker
v. Varser2 47 to ponder the vagaries of fate, because in that case the
assumed distinction between mAndamus and injunction had been of
crucial significance.
Baker was denied the opportunity to sit for the 1953 North Carolina
Bar Examination on the ground that he was not a bona fide resident of
the state. On the eve of the examination, he obtained a mandamus
compelling the Board of Law Examiners to admit him to the examina-
tion. The issue before the court on appeal was whether the trial judge
was within his jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus while vaca-
tioning outside his district. The court held that he had no such jurisdic-
tion. It was clear, however, that the trial judge did have jurisdiction to
240. Id. at 151, 4 S.E.2d at 331.
241. 235 N.C. 597, 601, 70 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1952).
242. 239 N.C. 259, 263, 7 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1954).
243. 262 N.C. 496, 504, 138 S.E.2d 143, 149 (1964).
244. To the same effect is Sutton v. Figgatt, 280 N.C. 89, 92, 185 S.E.2d 97, 99 (1971), holding
that "there is no practical difference" between the two. The court stated: "In a case involving the
exercise of discretion, mandamus lies to compel action by a public official but not to dictate his
decision unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." 280 N.C. at 93, 185 S.E.2d at 99 (em-
phasis added). This, of course, is plainly at variance with what the court was saying (most of the
time) in the period between 1942 and 1954. See text accompanying notes 230-34 supra.
245. 259 N.C. 280, 130 S.E.2d 408 (1963).
246. Id. at 282, 130 S.E.2d at 409-10 (emphasis added).
247. 239 N.C. 180, 79 S.E.2d 757 (1954).
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grant an injunction-wherever he was.248 Justice Winborne wrote: "It
is contended, however, that under the provisions of G.S. 1-493 judges
of the [s]uperior [c]ourt have jurisdiction to grant injunctions and re-
straining orders in all civil actions and proceedings. True enough! But
we are here dealing with mandamus, and not with injunctions or re-
straining orders.
249
In the absence of specific statutory forms of review, injunction ap-
pears to be the action used most often to test the validity of governmen-
tal action. This is possibly because of the limitations of declaratory
judgment, certiorari, and mandamus, as described; or because an ap-
pellate court, on review of the granting or denial of a preliminary in-
junction, is entitled to review the evidence and make its own findings of
fact.25 ° This offers a significant advantage to the appellant because
otherwise, findings of the lower tribunal that are supported by any
competent evidence are binding on appeal .2 1 The traditional equity
requirements-a showing of irreparable injury and inadequacy of the
remedies at law-apply in injunction suits involving public acts no less
than in private disputes. 2
But for the unwary there are pitfalls in seeking the remedy of injunc-
tion against a public body or officer. From well-established rules about
the scope of such injunctive power in North Carolina, there are some-
times substantial deviations in the supreme court decisions and some-
times even opinions in direct conflict with each other. While this may
be merely frustrating to the attorney seeking to cast an action in proper
form, it places the party himself at the risk of becoming yet another
victim of the wrong remedy syndrome. The attorney may make what
appears to be an informed judgment in this regard, only to find that
when the case is decided by the supreme court, this was merely a bad
guess, or, as Chief Justice Stacy tactfully described it, an "infelicitous
. . . selection of remedy.
253
a. Restraining the enforcement of an ordinance on grounds of uncon-
stitutionality. Through Chief Justice Clark in Turner v. City of New
Bern, the supreme court said:
248. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-493 (1969).
249. Baker v. Varser, 239 N.C. at 188, 79 S.E.2d at 763.
250. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
251. See note 90 supra.
252. See Fox v. Board of Comm'rs, 244 N.C. 497, 94 S.E.2d 482 (1956). In cases of adminis-
trative bodies subject to the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act or
some other statute, the complainant seeking a; injunction would be required to overcome the
possible objection that his remedy at law is adequate. See Elmore v. Lanier, 270 N.C. 674. 678,
155 S.E.2d 114, 116-17 (1967). One may not enjoin a condemnation proceeding by the Highway
Commission because the grounds for the injunction could be raised as a defense in the condemna-
tion. State Highway Comm'n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248 (1967).
253. Watkins v. Iseley, 209 N.C. 256, 258, 183 S.E. 365, 366 (1936).
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It has been so often and fully settled that an injunction will not lie
against the enforcement of an ordinance that we might well have been
content to rest the decision in this case entirely upon that proposition,
which has always been asserted and never denied by any decision in this
stale.
254
Justice Hoke, without any citation to North Carolina cases, stated in
a concurring opinion:
I concur in the decision upholding the validity of the ordinance in
question, and for reasons so well stated in the principal opinion; but I
do not assent to the position that the validity of a municipal ordinance
may never be tested by injunction proceedings. On the contrary, the
authoritative cases are to the effect that when it appears that a law or
ordinance is unconstitutional, and that an injunction against its en-
forcement is required for the adequate protection of property rights or
the rights of persons against injuries otherwise irremediable, the writ is
available in the equitable powers of the court.
255
Within fifteen months, the supreme court in Dixie Poster Advertising
Co. v. City ofAsheville 56 specifically adopted the rule proposed in Jus-
tice Hoke's above concurring opinion. The case involved an ordinance
imposing a privilege tax on the use of billboards, which allegedly was
oppressive, prohibitive, confiscatory, and, therefore, invalid. The court
remanded the case for findings necessary to determine whether the
plaintiff brought himself within the exception stated.
The exception that invasions of personal or property rights will af-
ford an opportunity to use injunction to test the validity of an ordi-
nance has been reaffirmed many times by the supreme court,257
although it insists upon a showing that the rights be directly and immi-
nently affected by the ordinance in question,258 and that the injury be
irreparable.259 In Loose- Wiles Biscuit Co. v. Town of Sanford,26° which
involved a license tax on sellers of bakery products, the court recog-
nized the principle of Dixie Poster, but said that the plaintiff had an
254. 187 N.C. 541, 549, 122 S.E. 469, 474 (1924) (emphasis added).
255. Id.
256. 189 N.C. 737, 128 S.E. 149 (1925).
257. Undoubtedly it is the well established general rule that the constitutionality of an Act
cannot be challenged in a suit to enjoin its enforcement. . . . However, the exception to the
rule is as well established as the rule itself . . . An Act will be declared unconstitutional and its
enforcement will be enjoined when it clearly appears that property or fundamental human rights
are denied in violation of constitutional guarantees. (Emphasis added).
Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 518, 96 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1957). See also S.S. Kresge Co. v. Tomlin-
son, 275 N.C. 1, 8, 165 S.E.2d 236, 240 (1969); Orange Speedway, Inc. v. Clayton, 247 N.C. 528,
530, 101 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1957).
258. Nicholson v. State Educ. Assistance Auth., 275 N.C. 439, 447, 168 S.E.2d 401,406 (1969);
Charles Stores Co. v. Tucker, 263 N.C. 710, 717, 140 S.E.2d 370, 375 (1965); Fox v. Board of
Comm'rs, 244 N.C. 497, 501, 94 S.E.2d 482, 486 (1956).
259. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. v. Town of Sanford, 200 N.C. 467, 157 S.E. 432 (1931).
260. Id.
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adequate remedy at law-suing to recover the tax. Paying the tax with
a subsequent right to recover could hardly be regarded as an irrepara-
ble injury to the business. Inasmuch as paying the tax and suing to
recover was also an option in Dixie Poster, the only way to reconcile
the two cases is to conclude that the injury possibly to be suffered in the
billboard tax case was far greater than in the bakery products tax case.
Under the Dixie Poster rule, even criminal ?rosecutions may be en-
joined to protect personal and property rights, 61 as well as ordinances
violative of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion."' These decisions were made in the fall term of 1939, some
fifteen years after Dixie Poster. The following term, the court held that
enforcement of an ordinance imposing a privilege or license tax for use
of a city street by motor trucks could be restrained.263
Such was the state of the law when Justice Barnhill wrote opinions
for the court in Suddreth v. City of Charlotte2" and Jarrell v. Snow.265
Suddreth involved an injunction to restrain enforcement of an ordi-
nance requiring taxicab owners to provide a depot for their vehicles
rather than parking them on the street. Jarrell was an action for a
"mandatory order" to compel the Surry County Commissioners to re-
scind an order for surrender of the plaintiffs "Off Premises" wine li-
cense. In the former, the court's opinion said: "But the appellee insists
that injunctive relief is not the proper remedy. We agree. Ordinarily,
injunction does not lie to restrain the enforcement of an alleged invalid
ordinance." '266 In Jarrell, however, the opinion stated:
Ordinarily equity will not interfere with the enforcement of a munici-
pal ordinance, since, if valid, plaintiff cannot complain, and, if not, its
invalidity may be attacked in an action at law ....
Nor will equity interfere to test the validity of an allegedly unlawful
or invalid ordinance enforceable only by indictment ....
The constitutionality of an Act or ordinance will not be determined in a
suit to enjoin its enforcement. Nor will we decide the question of its
unconstitutionality prior to an attempt to enforce it.
26 7
The italicized statement in Jarrell was unequivocal, and both the
Suddreth and Jarrell opinions totally ignored the exception engrafted
by Dixie Poster. To this extent, the rule of the two cases is far out of
line with opinions of the court issued long before and after them.268
261. McCormick v. Proctor, 217 N.C. 23, 6 S.E.2d 870 (1940).
262. Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1940) (involving a racially
segregated zoning ordinance).
263. Kenny Co. v. Town of Brevard, 217 N.C. 269, 7 S.E.2d 542 (1940).
264. 223 N.C. 630, 27 S.E.2d 650 (1943).
265. 225 N.C. 430, 35 S.E.2d 273 (1945).
266. 223 N.C. at 634, 27 S.E.2d at 654.
267. 225 N.C. at 432-33, 35 S.E.2d at 274 (emphasis added).
268. See cases cited in notes 256-57, 261-63 supra.
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Jarrell v. Snow has nevertheless been cited occasionally269 without any
direct reference to the explicit qualification approved in Dixie Poster
Advertising Co. v. City of Asheville27 ° and the cases following it.
In view of such judicial imprecision, it is small wonder that there is,
all too often, an "infelicitous"27' choice of remedy, as Chief Justice
Stacy put it. He was less polite, but more to the point, when he dis-
sented in Green v. Kitchin:
If this court is not going to follow its own established precedents, or
the law as it is written . . . how is the practitioner to know what he can
safely advise in legal matters, or the disquietude necessarily engendered
thereby to be allayed? Confidence as well as logic must buttress the
[c]ourt's decisions.
b. Restraining allegedly ultra vires acts of a governmental body. At
least since 1906 it has been clear under the rule of Merrimon v. Paving
Co. 273 that a citizen in his own behalf and on behalf of all other tax-
payers may maintain an action to enjoin the governing body of a mu-
nicipal corporation from "transcending their lawful powers or violating
their legal duties in any mode which will injuriously affect the taxpay-
ers-such as making an unauthorized appropriation of the corporate
funds, or an illegal or wrongful disposition of the corporate property
.. *274 Thus, taxpayers' suits have been used to enjoin the sale of a
-municipal building without complying with statutory requirements for
notice and voter approval;275 the award of a paving contract where it
was alleged that municipal authorities, as a personal favor, accepted a
bid for street paving higher than that submitted by another responsible
bidder;276 the purchase of additional land and the issuance of bonds for
school purposes without legislative authority;277 the payment of illegal
disbursements through salaries to unauthorized persons;278  the
purchase of machinery for a town's water and sewer system without
competitive bidding after notice and advertisement; 279 and abandon-
ment of a public park and its conversion to a parking lot, an allegedly
269. See, e.g., D & W., Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 268 N.C. 577, 584, 151 S.E.2d 241, 246 (1966);
Hyde County v. Bridgman, 238 N.C. 247, 249, 77 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1953); Homer v. Chamber of
Commerce, 231 N.C. 440, 446, 57 S.E.2d 789, 793 (1950).
270. 189 N.C. 737, 128 S.E. 149 (1925).
271. Watkins v. Iseley, 209 N.C. 256, 258, 183 S.E. 365, 366 (1936).
272. 229 N.C. 450, 462, 50 S.E.2d 545, 553 (1948).
273. 142 N.C. 539, 55 S.E. 366 (1906). The case of Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 39 N.C.
App. 117, 250 S.E.2d 68 (1978), aff'd, 298 N.C. 476, 259 S.E.2d 558 (1979) was brought under the
Merrimon rule. Bagwell v. Town of Brevard, 267 N.C. 604, 148 S.E.2d 635 (1966), on which both
appellate courts relied in Campbell, also involved an ultra vires disposition of municipal property.
274. 142 N.C. at 545, 55 S.E. at 367.
275. Carstarphen v. Town of Plymouth, 180 N.C. 26, 103 S.E. 899 (1920).
276. Murphy v. City of Greensboro, 190 N.C. 268, 129 S.E. 614 (1925).
277. Robertson v. Board of Educ., 192 N.C. 765, 135 S.E. 863 (1926).
278. Freeman v. Commissioners of Madison, 217 N.C. 209, 7 S.E.2d 354 (1940).
279. Raynor v. Commissioners for the Town of Louisburg, 220 N.C. 348, 17 S.E.2d 495 (1941).
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unauthorized use.28 A plaintiff as a taxpayer has standing, for exam-
ple, to bring an action of injunction to test the authority of a city and
county to issue proposed bonds allegedly in excess of constitutional au-
thority,2 1' and to challenge the constitutionality of a contract between a
county and a municipality to contribute funds for the construction of
an airport without submitting the question to a vote of the people.282
In view of the line of authority both preceding and following it, one
has difficulty discovering any basis for the decision in Turner v. City of
Reidsville,283 holding in part that the taxpayers had no standing to
challenge on constitutional grounds the validity of a statute enlarging
the power of a city to condemn lands, because they did not own an
interest in any of the land sought to be condemned. For that reason
they could not restrain the city from proceeding with condemnation.
There is no apparent distinction between Turner, where the city was
purchasing property allegedly without constitutional authority, and
Robertson v. Board of Education,2"4 where the board was restrained
from purchasing additional land for schools without "legislative au-
thority." As taxpayers, both plaintiffs should have been permitted to
challenge the invalid expenditure of public funds.
C. The Wrong Remedy Syndrome: In re Markham285 As a Practical
Example
In re Markham (in which the author served as co-counsel for peti-
tioner) offers insight into the difficulties a practitioner may encounter
wandering through the maze of North Carolina statutory and case law
in search of an appropriate means of obtaining judicial review of an
apparently invalid municipal act-in that case, a zoning ordinance. Al-
though the supreme court has refined at least one of the options286 since
280. Wishart v. City of Lumberton, 254 N.C. 94, 118 S.E.2d 35 (1961). Wishart was relied on
to support taxpayer standing in Shaw v. City of Asheville, 269 N.C. 90, 152 S.E.2d 139 (1967), a
suit to enjoin performance of a cablevision contract. See also Kornegay v. City of Raleigh, 269
N.C. 155, 152 S.E.2d 186 (1967) (suit to enjoin performance of obligations under a cablevision
license which allegedly would damage the taxpayers through repairs made necessary to streets by
construction work); Kloster v. Council of Gov'ts, 36 N.C. App. 421, 245 S.E.2d 180 (1978) (tax-
payer standing upheld in suit to contest ultra vires construction of office building by areawide
planning body).
281. Wilson v. City of High Point, 238 N.C. 14, 76 S.E.2d 546 (1953).
282. Yokley v. Clark, 262 N.C. 218, 136 S.E.2d 564 (1964).
283. 224 N.C. 42, 29 S.E.2d 211 (1944).
284. 192 N.C. 765, 766, 135 S.E. 863, 864 (1926).
285. 259 N.C. 566, 131 S.E.2d 329 (1963). Discussion in the text regarding In re Markham
which is not documented by footnotes is based on the author's personal knowledge as co-counsel
for petitioner.
286. Use of declaratory judgment as a means of challenging the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance. See Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1972).
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it decided In re Markham, the case is analyzed here, not in an effort to
reargue the matter, but to illustrate some of the problems under study.
In 1960, Markham owned land in the City of Durham that was
zoned for residential use. There was evidence that the land had no
value for such purposes because it was surrounded on three sides by
commercial development, including a shopping center. The United
States Supreme Court had ruled in Nectow v. City of Cambridge287 that
a similar residential zone was unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment because it was confiscatory.
A real estate agent, representing an undisclosed principal, ap-
proached Markham expressing a possible interest in a long-term lease.
The principal wanted to construct and operate a bowling alley on the
property. The offer to rent, if such it was, was subject to Markham's
obtaining an amendment to the zoning ordinance permitting such use.
She applied to the City Planning and Zoning Commission for such an
amendment, but the Commission voted to recommend to the City
Council that her request be denied. She asked for and was granted a
rehearing. In the meantime, the question arose: In light of the "all
fours" opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Nectow seem-
ingly entitling her to the zoning change, what was petitioner's remedy
under the circumstances?
Using declaratory judgment to test the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance was a risky approach because the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina had not yet specified that such was an appropriate form of relief.
As noted, that question was not settled until twelve years later, and
even while In re Markham was pending, a court opinion seemed to
indicate the question remained open.288 In any event, in view of the
conditional nature of the offer to rent, there was room for doubt
whether there was an "actual controversy."
Under Spur Distributing Co. v. City of Burlington,289 it would have
been an idle effort to apply to the building inspector for a permit to
construct a bowling alley on the property, even if petitioner had known
who the prospective developer was and had been prepared to meet the
developer's specifications. In Spur, it was held that mandamus would
not lie to compel issuance of a permit to construct a building which the
applicant knew would be a direct violation of the municipal zoning
ordinance; one cannot compel an administrative officer to violate the
law. Appeal from the building inspector's denial of a permit to the
Board of Adjustment would have been fruitless because under In re
287. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
288. Eastern Carolina Tastee-Freez, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 256 N.C. 208, 212, 123 S.E.2d 632,
635 (1962).
289. 216 N.C. 32, 3 S.E.2d 427 (1939).
57
Markham: A Powerless Judiciary - The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980
78 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
O'Neal,2 9 ° and cases cited therein, the power to amend a zoning ordi-
nance may not be delegated to the Board of Adjustment.
Even if it were practical for the petitioner to build a bowling alley in
violation of the ordinance and to await criminal prosecution, State v.
Roberson291 suggested that an attack on the constitutionality of the or-
dinance could not have been made in defense to the criminal prosecu-
tion.
In view of the emphatic language of the opinion in Turner v. City of
New Bern292 and the equally persuasive observations of Justice Barn-
hill in Jarrell,293 an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance
apparently would not have been granted. Even under the exception in
Dixie Poster and the line of cases following,294 it might have been diffi-
cult for the petitioner to show imminent or irreparable injury because
she had no binding agreement with the prospective tenant.
Under the circumstances, with no means of appeal provided by law,
counsel concluded that certiorari was the appropriate remedy, on the
theory that in such circumstances the City Council, which would make
the ultimate decision, would be acting in a quasi-judicial, rather than a
legislative, capacity. There was authority from other jurisdictions to
support this view.295 Further, in Board of Commissioners v. Smith,296
the North Carolina Supreme Court had held-in a case where the Or-
ange County Commissioners had granted a license to sell liquor to one
Smith-that a writ of certiorari from the lower court was the proper
method of reviewing the County Commissioners' action. A board of
county commissioners appeared no more, no less, a legislative body
than a city council.
Accordingly, the petitioner "built a record" before the Planning and
Zoning Commission and before the City Council. After the Council
denied the requested zoning change, she obtained a writ of certiorari
from the superior court. On appeal by the City of Durham, the
supreme court held, in essence, that the City Council was a legislative
body and that certiorari did not lie as a means of obtaining review of its
290. 243 N.C. 714, 92 S.E.2d 189 (1956).
291. 198 N.C. 70, 150 S.E. 674 (1929).
292. 187 N.C. 541, 549, 122 S.E. 469, 474 (1924).
293. 225 N.C. 430, 433, 35 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1945). See text accompanying note 267 supra.
294. See notes 257, 259 supra.
295. 10 AM. JUR. Certiorari§ 10 n.4 (1937), citing Jarman v. Board of Review, 345 In. 248, 178
N.E. 91 (1931); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 112 (1949 & Supp. 1980); Gates v. Bloomfield,
243 Iowa 1, 50 N.W.2d 578 (1951). The theory that a city council decision on a rezoning request,
as distinguished from original enactment of the ordinance, is administrative (i.e. quasi-judicial)
rather than legislative, was advanced in Brough, Flexibility Without Arbitrariness in the Zoning
System. Observations on North Carolina Special Exception and Zoning Amendment Cases, 53
N.C.L. REV. 925, 946 (1975). The petitioner in In re Markham had unsuccessfully presented this
argument to the court.
296. 110 N.C. 417, 14 S.E. 972 (1892).
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decision. The court never reached the merits of the case, and at the
conclusion of its opinion offered this none-too-helpful advice: "The
real controversy would seem to be whether the zoning ordinance now
in effect is invalid as to petitioner's property. Appropriate procedures
are available for a judicial determination thereof." '297
The court cited cases suggesting that either injunction or declaratory
judgment would have been a "felicitous" choice of a remedy; but the
matter had become moot. The prospective bowling alley entrepreneur
had long since departed the field of battle.
D. The Wrong Remedy Syndrome-Is There a Cure?
From the foregoing analysis and from personal experience as de-
scribed, my conclusion is that statutory changes are urgently needed to
bring to the citizens and to the Bar of North Carolina one reliable,
clear, and systematic form of judicial review of decisions and actions of
local government bodies. 98 Litigants and advocates alike have
wandered too long in a procedural wilderness.
The simplest way to dispense with the uncertainty regarding the
297. In re Markham, 259 N.C. at 573, 131 S.E.2d at 335. The court's opinion in In reMark-
ham was written by Justice Bobbitt. Four years later, Justice Bobbitt wrote: "[W]e are of the
opinion, and so decide that upon the facts alleged, plaintiff may not institute and maintain an
action to enjoin Guilford County from enforcement of zoning regulations on the ground that, as
applied to plaintiffs property, they are unreasonable and arbitrary." Michael v. Guilford County,
269 N.C. 515, 520, 153 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1967). Justice Bobbitt's reasoning in Michael was that by
proceeding before the Board of Adjustment, the landowner would have had an adequate remedy
at law (certiorari). Since Michael seems squarely inconsistent with In re Markham, the law on the
availability of injunction to challenge a zoning ordinance is just as confusing as it was 20 years ago
when the writer first had occasion to consider the problem. In light of In re Markham one won-
ders whether counsel for plaintiff in Michael was equally mystified. There seems to be no practi-
cal difference between an action attacking the validity of a zoning ordinance and one to restrain its
enforcement. For discussion of the use of certiorari in zoning matters, see L. JAFFE, supra note 25,
at 169-70.
298. For discussion of the approaches of other states (e.g., New York, Illinois, California), see
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 188, at 538-48; L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 159-64. Professor
Schwartz points out that state reforms of nonstatutory review have centered on the review provi-
sions of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act, which, however, does not accom-
plish full reform. It leaves local agencies untouched, does not abolish the prerogative writs of
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, and limits the review provision to review of contested
cases. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 636-37 (1977). As suggested in the
text, these are deficiencies in the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act as well.
An ideal system of nonstatutory review would abolish the prerogative writs, in both their
common law and statutory form and provide for review of all reviewable administrative ac-
tion by a simple petition for review filed in the appropriate court of general jurisdiction.
There is, as an English judge notes, an "urgent need to sweep away the technical differences
in the procedures for applying for the various kinds of prerogative orders of certiorari, man-
damus or prohibition. . . . It is our failure to do so which chiefly bedevils the further devel-
opment of a rational system ofjudicial review .. " There is no valid reason why there should
not be one remedyfor review of all administrative acts.
Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
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proper form of action would be to make appropriate amendments to
the Administrative Procedure Act as follows:
An additional third paragraph of North Carolina General Statutes
section 150A-l(a) (Scope and [P]olicy)29 9 would read:
Article 4 of this Chapter, governing judicial review of local agency
decisions, shall apply to counties, towns, villages, other municipal cor-
porations or political subdivisions of the State and any agencies of such
subdivisions, including the legislative bodies thereof; county or city
boards of education; and other local public districts, units, or bodies of
any kind; and private corporations created by act of the General As-
sembly, but the same are specifically exempted from the remaining pro-
visions of this Chapter.
Two additional definitions in section 150A-2 (Definitions) 3" (with
appropriate renumbering of the remaining subsections) would read:
(2) "Local agency" means counties, cities, towns, villages, other mu-
nicipal corporations or political subdivisions of the State and
agencies of such subdivisions, including the legislative bodies
thereof; county or city boards of education; other local public dis-
tricts, units or bodies of any kind; and private corporations cre-
ated by act of the General Assembly.
(3) "Local agency decision" means any action taken by a local
agency, by whatever name, which affects or determines the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of any person, firm, corporation, or
group of persons of common interest.
The following change should be made in section 150A-2(6):3 ° '
"Person aggrieved" means any person, firm, corporation, or group of
persons of common interest who are directly or indirectly affected sub-
stantially in their person, property, or public office or employment by
an agency or local agency decision.
North Carolina General Statutes section 150A-433 °2 would be
amended to read as follows:
Any person who is aggrieved by a final agency decision in a contested
case or by a local agency decision, and who has exhausted all adminis-
trative remedies made available to him by statute or agency or local
agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of such decision under this
Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by
some other statute, in which case the review shall be under such other
statute. Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any person from invok-
ing any judicial remedy available to him under the law to test the valid-
ity of any action not made reviewable under this Article.
The addition of the words "or local agency" after the word "agency"
299. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-I(a) (1978).
300. Id. § 150A-2.
301. Id. § 150A-2(6).
302. Id. § 150A-43.
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in section 150A-443 °3 and sections 150A-46 through 150A-52, 3° would
be required to conform these sections to the changes described above.
Section 150A-453 °5 would be amended as follows:
In order to obtain judicial review of a final agency decision under this
Chapter, the person seeking review must file a petition in the Superior
Court of Wake County; except that where the original determination in
the matter was made by a local agency or local board and appealed to
the State board, the petition may be filed in the superior court of the
county where the original determination was made. In order to obtain
judicial review of a local agency decision under this Chapter, the person
seeking review mustfile apetition in the superior court of the county where
the decision was made. Such petition may be filed at any time after
final decision ....
The proposed statutory amendments take into account the fact that
most local governmental bodies and the decisionmaking processes they
employ do not lend themselves to formal rulemaking and administra-
tive hearing procedures. Thus, they would be exempt from Articles
2306 and 3307 of the Act, just as the University of North Carolina is
exempt.3 °8
It is also recognized that local agency actions of the kind likely to be
judicially challenged are not often taken upon a formal record-for
example, proceedings leading to an action of a city council. Under sec-
tion 150A-50 as it presently appears, the judge "in his discretion may
hear all or part of the matter de novo" in those cases where "no record
was made of the administrative proceeding or the record is inade-
quate. ' ' 309 In view of section 150A-50, if the petition contained suffi-
cient allegations to suggest that the complaining person had stated a
cause of action entitling him to the relief sought, the absence of a for-
mal record would present no problem to a judge who was persuaded
that justice required a trial de novo. Issues of standing to sue would be
resolved by reference to the statutory requirement of an "aggrieved"
person. 3 " The statutory definition itself limits this category to those
"directly or indirectly affected substantially" and one can assume that
frivolous or trivial claims would be summarily dismissed by the court.
Section 150A-46 reads: "The petition shall explicitly state what ex-
303. Id. § 150A-44.
304. Id. §§ 150A-46 to -52.
305. Id. § 15OA-45.
306. Id. §§ 150A-9 to -17 (rulemaking).
307. Id. §§ 150A-23 to -37 (administrative hearings).
308. Id. § 150A-l(a).
309. Id. § 150A-50.
310. Id. § 150A-43. See text accompanying note 301 supra. See also Orange County v. North
Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 360-61, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980), for a discussion of the
meaning of "aggrieved person" under the Administrative Procedure Act.
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ceptions are taken to the decision or procedure of the agency and what
relief the petitioner seeks."' I The relief sought under the procedure
proposed here would take the form of relief presently sought by declar-
atory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, mandatory injunction, or in-
junction, or some combination thereof, but no longer would the drafter
of the complainant's pleadings be required to indulge in sheer guess-
work as to whether the label on his pleadings and his theory of the case
were apt.312 Prolonged controversies over whether certiorari or manda-
mus should lie, or whether injunction is available or not, would be at
an end. The complaining party could achieve what justice demands
and what he has too often in this state been denied-a prompt adjudi-
cation of his claim on its merits.
V. SCOPE OF REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Criticisms have often been made of the phenomenon which permits an
administrative body to serve in the triple capacity of complainant, pros-
ecutor, and judge . . . . As a result of this combination of roles, its
final adjudication often lacks that stamp of impartiality and of disinter-
ested justice which alone can give it weight and authority. This anom-
aly in procedure makes it vitally necessary that in reviewing
administrative decisions courts zealously examine the record with a
view to protecting the fundamental rights of the parties, lest the rule
against arbitrariness and oppressiveness become a mere shibboleth. An
appeal being denied, a review by certiorari or other prerogative writ
must not be permitted to degenerate into a mock ceremony. The least
that the courts can do is to hold high the torch of "fair play" which the
highest court of our land has made the guiding light to administrative
justice. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 999, 82 L. Ed.
1129.
Ervin, J. in Russ v. Board of Educa-
/ion,3 13 quoting State v. Board of
Education.
3 14
The discussion in Parts II and III above forms the basis for the con-
clusion that the North Carolina Supreme Court should frame a "rule of
reason" 3 15 that would significantly affect the common law scope ofjudi-
311. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-46 (1978).
312. Justice Seawell's words (in another context) are of significance here.
Doctrinal distinctions may not be pressed too far. To be helpful in administration and to
lend themselves in aid of justice, they must be kept close to the realities. After all, it is the
factual situation out of which the legal consequencesflow, not the formal aspect of the technical
label which we conveniently apply.
Butler v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 218 N.C. 116, 121, 10 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1940) (emphasis
added).
313. 232 N.C. 128, 131-32, 59 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1950).
314. 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942).
315. See text accompanying notes 133-138 supra.
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cial review on questions of law. Such a rule would permit the courts
greater flexibility in deciding challenges to discretionary actions by ad-
ministrative bodies-including the governing bodies of counties, cities,
towns, and other agencies not subject to the provisions of judicial re-
view in the Administrative Procedure Act.
31 6
Part IV included the recommendation that by statute such local
agencies be brought under Article 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (Judicial Review).
3 17
If the "rule of reason" recommendation should take effect, consis-
tency would require the amendment of section 150A-51318 as follows:
§ 150A-5 1. Scope of review; power of court in disposing of case.-The
court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the sub-
stantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
agency findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;
or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S.
150A-29(a) or G.S. 150A-30 in view of the entire record as sub-
mitted; or
(6) Unreasonable and are substantially injurious to the public good, or
constitute a deprivation of the legal rights of any person,- or
(7) Made in badfaith.
If both recommendations were accepted, section 150A-51 should be
further amended as follows:
§ 150A-5 1. Scope of review; power of court in disposing of case.-The
court may affirm the decision of the agency or local agency or remand
the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the deci-
sion if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
prejudiced because the agency or local agency findings, inferences, con-
clusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency
or local agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S.
316. See text accompanying notes 188-90, 192-93 supra.
317. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 to -52 (1978).
318. Id. § 150A-51.
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150A-29(a) or G.S. 150A-30 in view of the entire record as sub-
mitted; or
(6) Unreasonable and are substantially injurious to the public
good, or constitute a deprivation of the legal rights of any per-
son; or
(7) Made in bad faith.
If the court reverses or modifies the decision of the agency, the judge
shall set out in writing, which writing shall become a part of the record,
the reasons for such reversal or modification.
Part V is primarily concerned, however, with the scope ofjudicial re-
view offacts3 19 in North Carolina cases involving challenges to admin-
istrative actions.
More than 100 years ago, Justice Rodman commented on the code
provision 320 requiring a judge sitting without a jury to make findings of
facts and conclusions of law and to state them separately: "It is difficult
to conceive that the law of North Carolina ever intended to confer on a
single judge the vast and dangerous power of deciding all questions of
fact so arising without responsibility and liability to review or correc-
tion, even in cases of plain and evident mistake."32'
Nevertheless, a court reviewing the decision of a lower court sitting
without a jury is bound by the findings of fact of the lower court if
there is any evidence to support them, unless the reviewing court is
considering appeal from a ruling on a preliminary injunction.322
Otherwise, the appellate court is confined to consideration of errors of
law.3 23 If no findings of fact are made, the case should be remanded
because the court cannot perform its appellate function in such a situa-
tion. 24 If there is no evidence to support the findings below, the deci-
319. This question of scope of review is of crucial importance. Upon it hinges both the
efficiency of the administrative process and the judicial ability to protect individuals against
agency abuses of power.
If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than media for the
transmission of cases to the courts. That would destroy the values of agencies created to
secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in com-
plicated fields. At the same time, the scope of judicial inquiry must not be so restricted that it
prevents full inquiry into the question of legality. If that question cannot be properly ex-
plored by the judge the right to review becomes meaningless.
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 204, at 579 (citations omitted).
320. This section is now included in Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a)(1), N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ IA-I (1969).
321. Foushee v. Pattershall, 67 N.C. 453, 455 (1872).
322. See note 90 supra.
323. Id. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 209, at 589, indicating that in early cases review-
ing agency action, the United States Supreme Court accepted administrative findings of fact as
conclusive.
324. See Morehead v. Harris, 255 N.C. 130, 120 S.E.2d 425 (1961); Jamison v. City of Char-
lotte, 239 N.C. 423, 79 S.E.2d 797 (1954); Jones v. Murdock, 20 N.C. App. 746, 203 S.E.2d 102
(1974).
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sion will be set aside.3 25 These general principles apply when the
administrative action involved is that of a local governing body not
traditionally thought of as an administrative body, and where the va-
lidity of such action is raised in a court in the first instance (for exam-
ple, attack on a municipal ordinance by declaratory judgment).
In a true administrative law setting where an administrative body
has made findings of fact and has stated conclusions in reaching its
decision, it may generally be said that a court's scope of review of the
facts found may range from scrutiny of the record (1) to determine
whether there is "any competent evidence" to support the facts found,
in which case the court is bound by the administrative findings; (2) to a
determination whether there is "substantial evidence in the record as a
whole" to support the administrative findings, in which case the find-
ings are also conclusive on the court; and (3) to a determination that
the administrative findings are "clearly erroneous," in which case the
court will reverse or modify the decision, notwithstanding that the ad-
ministrative findings of fact may have support in the evidence.3 26 The
325. See cases collected in I STRONG'S N.C. INDEX Appeal and Error § 57.5 (3d ed. 1976).
"Findings not so supported [by evidence] are arbitrary and unauthorized." B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 23 § 209, at 591, citing REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE 88 (1941). When
it was contended that an enforcement order of the Interstate Commerce Commission "was ren-
dered without any evidence whatever to support it, the consideration of such a question involves
not an issue of fact, but one of law which it is the duty of the courts to examine and decide."
Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 167, 185 (1914).
326. The range referred to, from "narrow" to "broad" review, and the court's powers under
the various circumstances described, are well recognized in federal and state administrative law
although there are differences of opinion as to whether the "clearly erroneous" standard is distinct
from the "substantial evidence-whole record" test. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23
§ 210, at 593-95, § 213, at 599-600, § 214, at 601-03; 2 F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 707-10, 725-27;
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 79-80 (6th ed. 1977); S. BREYER &
R. STEWART, supra note 21, at 184-85.
For the three standards generally employed in North Carolina judicial review of the sufficiency
of evidence supporting administrative decisions, see the discussion in In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48,
60, 253 S.E.2d 912, 920 (1979).
Following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), there has been great confusion in federal court opinions
and much debate among commentators about the interrelationship under the Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06
(1976)), between the "arbitrary ind capricious" standard and the "clearly erroneous" standard for
scope of review of informal rulemaking, and where they fit into the spectrum with relation to the
statutory "substantial evidence" standard for determinations made on a record. S. BREYER & R.
STEWART, supra note 21, at 195-96, 282 n.77; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES
§§ 29.00, 29.01 (1976 and Supp. 1980). No effort is made here to enter, let alone resolve this
controversy because, mercifully, there is no North Carolina counterpart to this particular seamless
web.
The statement in the text is the writer's preference as the most logical progression of possible
judicial options in "fact" review, taking into account his view, described in text, that arbitrary and
capricious (i.e. unreasonable) conduct is unlawful per se.
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is one distinct from that involved in review of the facts,
and of the evidence on which the administrative agency based its findings of fact, to determine
whether the evidence supports the findings. In all events a reviewing court should search the
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Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act adopts the "clearly
erroneous" standard.3"7 Complicating any analysis of scope of review
is the determination of the appropriate role of the court where there are
involved "mixed questions of fact and law."
328
Where there is no statutory provision for scope of review of adminis-
trative action, the "any competent evidence" rule applies in North Car-
olina.329 The Administrative Procedure Act set out above specifically
adopts the "substantial evidence" or "whole record" standard.33 ° Some
agencies specifically exempted from the Administrative Procedure Act
are subject to scope of review provisions in their organic statutes.33'
record to discover whether the administrative conduct was arbitrary or whether there were other
infirmities in the decision as a matter of law (unconstitutional, violative of statute, irregular proce-
dure, ultra vires. etc.). See Kaufman, supra note 162, at 208. All are "salient aspects" of the
court's review of agency decisions. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The Greater Boston opinion is
said to have initiated, at least in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a
new era of "hard look" and reasoned decisionmaking in review of administrative action. See W.
GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAUSS, supra note 236, at 343-44; S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra
note 21, at 291-92, 303-06.
The Leventhal opinion in Greater Boston is one of classic dimensions in its field. It is recom-
mended reading for all members of the North Carolina judiciary who continue to cite and to
follow Burton v. City of Reidsville. See also Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in Ethyl Corp.
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
327. Section 15(g) of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961) provides:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the
case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial
rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are.
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the
whole record ....
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, App. B, at 688.
328. The so-called law-fact distinction, and judicial review of "constitutional" and "jurisdic-
tional" facts are subjects beyond the scope of this article. This omission is certainly not attributa-
ble to a lack ofjudicial or scholarly comment upon these subjects; the literature abounds with such
discussions. The writer believes these matters to be of relatively little significance in North Caro-
lina administrative law. For discussion ofjurisdictional fact and constitutional fact in North Car-
olina, see Hanft, supra note 9, at 677-80, and for discussion of the law-fact distinction, see Daye,
supra note 12, at 915.
329. Maines v. City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 133, 265 S.E.2d 155 (1980); Eakley v. City of
Raleigh, 252 N.C. 683, 687, 114 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1960). Cf In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 253 S.E.2d
912 (1979).
330. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51(5) (1978). See text accompanying note 317 supra.
331. E.g., Employment Security Commission (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-15(i) (Supp. 1979)
("[T]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if there is evidence to support it [sic], and in the
absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of [the] court shall be confined to ques-
tions of law."); Department of Corrections, (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-113 (1978)) (The court's re-
view is limited to a determination of whether there was a substantial basis to support the action or
ruling of the Secretary, and whether there was violation of an inmate's federal or state constitu-
tional rights).
Although a "standard for review" is not set out therein, the Workers' Compensation Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (1979) provides: "The award of the Industrial Commission. . . shall be con-
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Many organic statutes covering agencies, activities, or programs that
are not excluded from the Administrative Procedure Act include scope
of review provisions, and if the scope is broader than that afforded by
the Act, the organic statute displaces the Act's scope of review provi-
sion.33 2 On the other hand, if the scope of review provision of the Act
is broader than that in an organic statute, the scope in the organic stat-
ute is not deemed an "adequate procedure for judicial review" and the
"substantial evidence" or "whole record" test applies. 333
A. Campbell v. First Baptist Church (Revisted)
The deficiencies of the "any competent evidence" standard in an ad-
ministrative law setting are demonstrable by further reference to Camp-
bell. The trial court found as a fact that the "agreed value of the land
conveyed to the Church was reasonable" and was based on "the reports
of apparently competent appraisers." There was "competent" evidence
to support a thirty-five cent per square foot value-the direct testimony
of the appraiser (mistaken though he was). Appellate courts reviewing
such a land valuation issue might consider themselves under no duty to
"zealously examine the record," and theoretically could let the transac-
tion stand because they are "bound" by the trial court's finding. Ap-
plying the "whole record" test, however, they could easily reach the
opposite result because the entire record would reveal the deficiencies
in the appraiser's judgment.
The fact that such disparate consequences could ensue illustrates the
importance of the statutory changes proposed here. These changes would
bring actions of all local government entities under a "'substantial evi-
dence" standard ofjudicial review.
Under the 1970 North Carolina Constitution, the General Assembly
has the authority 334 to institute such a reform, and our changing society
would seem to demand it. Our law of at least 100 years standing3 35 is
that an appellate court is bound by the trial court's findings of fact if
those facts are supported by any competent evidence. Other than the
clusive and binding as to all questions of fact .. " This has become, in some respects, a mean-
ingless provision. If the reviewing court does not agree with the Industrial Commission's award,
apparently it simply labels the question, usually whether an injury "arose out of and in the course
of' employment, a mixed question of law and fact, and asserts its judicial prerogative to find
errors in the determination of fact that was supposedly binding. See, e.g., Perry v. Bakeries Co.,
262 N.C. 272, 136 S.E.2d 643 (1964); Vause v. Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951);
Perley v. Paving Co., 228 N.C. 479, 46 S.E.2d 298 (1948).
332. Blackwell v. Granville County Dep't of Social Servs., 39 N.C. App. 437, 439, 250 S.E.2d
695, 697 (1979).
333. Accord, Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963). See discus-
sion accompanying notes 339-48 infra.
334. N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. IV, § 12.
335. Simonton v. Chipley, 64 N.C. 152 (1870); Branton v. O'Briant, 93 N.C. 99, 103 (1885).
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presumed "expertise" of an administrative body or agency-a pre-
sumption in which we should not be as eager to indulge if the case
involves local governmental bodies as we are, say, if the case involves
the Utilities Commission336-no rational basis exists for continued ap-
plication of a standard developed in ordinary civil litigation to the re-
view of a governmental decision. The "any competent evidence" rule
developed in a constitutional 337 and case law context in which no one
even had good reason to know what an "administrative agency" was,
or to foresee that a host of public officers would emerge who know no
practical limitation on their powers but those a court may choose to
impose.
B. The Sleeping Giant Awakens
Supreme court decisions arising under the statutory scope of review
provisions reflect increasingly liberal interpretations of the "substantial
evidence" standard. There is room for optimism that lower courts, in
time, will be encouraged to fulfill their duty to subject the record before
them to the thorough scrutiny that alone can make possible "fair play"
and "administrative justice.
' 338
In Jarrell v. Board ofAdjustment,33 9 the supreme court markedly ex-
panded the standard of statutory scope of review now found in North
Carolina General Statutes section 150A-5 1.34 In a display of judicial
insight and flexibility unusual in a court that had historically looked
with jaundiced eye upon litigation as a means of curbing bureaucratic
336. While it is doubtless true that in many areas involving a high decree of technical com-
petence in dealing with extremely complicated factual situations, conscientious agency offi-
cials develop an expertise which deserves (and receives) the highest respect of the courts, yet
there are other areas-and this is probably more true in state than in federal agencies-where
the problem of ascertaining facts is little more than that of resolving conflicts in testimony
concerning an easily understood factual situation, and where the true facts could be ascer-
tained more accurately by experienced judges than by administrative officials without the
benefit of legal education or of the professional discipline that strengthens and fortifies the
bench and bar.
2 F. COOPER, supra note 12, at 723-24. It is well recognized that deference to administrative
"expertise" is a major justification for a narrow scope ofjudicial review just as it is for administra-
tive, rather than judicial, fact-finding, as Cooper suggests. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 204,
at 579-80, § 208, at 588; L. JAFFE, supra note 25, at 576-85. "It is, as a federal judge once put it
. ..much easier to abdicate than analyze. Agency expertise is not enough to justify abdication of
review power over facts." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23 § 209, at 589. "Expertness has been over-
sold in this country." Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 471 (1954). The author calls for a re-
examination of the "administrative expertise" slogan and for greater reliance on the judiciary's
"expertise" in synthesis and in social perspectives. Id. at 471-75.
337. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 10.
338. Russ v. Board of Educ., 232 N.C. 128, 132, 59 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1950). See text accompa-
nying note 313 supra.
339. 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).
340. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (1978).
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excesses, the Jarrell opinion significantly advanced the obvious legisla-
tive purpose-to rescue the citizenry from the thrall of discretionary
administrative decisions that were supported only by scintillae of evi-
dence, but nonetheless had been permitted to stand.
In order to rent her house as a two-family residence, Mrs. Jarrell
applied for a permit to make certain alterations and to add a bathroom
to her house in High Point. She claimed that it had been rented as a
two-family residence almost continuously for 25 years. The building
inspector granted the permit, but upon receipt of affidavits contending
that the house had been occupied as a one-family residence in recent
years, he withdrew his approval on the ground that when a non-con-
forming use has been discontinued, it may not be re-established. He
contended, therefore, that the permit could not be issued under the
zoning ordinance. Mrs. Jarrell appealed to the Board of Adjustment
which, both on the basis of affidavits containing hearsay and on the
basis of unsworn statements made at the hearing, found that at the time
of the enactment of the zoning ordinance the building was used as a
one-family home. The Board concluded that it was therefore without
power to grant a non-conforming use. The superior court, reviewing
the record, found the evidence "sufficient to support"34' the Board's
findings, and sustained them. Even though the Board could have
found the facts either way because of the conflicting evidence, the court
reasoned that the Board's findihgs were not arbitrary, oppressive, or
abusive of its discretion, and therefore were conclusive.
The supreme court ruled that the organic statute providing for re-
view of a board of adjustment decision "by proceedings in the nature of
certiorari"34 was an "adequate procedure for judicial review" only if
the organic statute provided a scope of review equal to that required by
the judicial review statute. 34 3 (Both section 150A-43 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act344 and the corresponding provision of the predeces-
sor statute considered in Jarrell indicate that judicial review may be
afforded thereunder unless the review procedure provided in an or-
ganic statute is adequate.) Because the findings of fact in Jarrell were
based on hearsay in affidavits and unsworn testimony-and thus on
evidence neither competent nor substantial-the court vacated the su-
perior court judgment and remanded the case for "a determination, on
competent and substantial evidence, of petitioner's asserted rights.
345
Under Jarrell, it appears that the scope of review applicable in any
case where judicial review is provided by statute must be at least as
341. 258 N.C. 476, 479, 128 S.E.2d 879, 882 (1963).
342. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-178 (1964), repealed, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 698, § 2.
343. Id. § 150A-51(5) (1978) (then § 143-315).
344. Id. § 150A-43 (formerly § 143-307).
345. 258 N.C. 476, 481, 128 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1963).
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extensive as that now provided by section 150A-51, and on review of
facts, the decision is subject to the reach of the courts if substantial
rights have been prejudiced because agency findings, inferences, con-
clusions or decisions are "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence admis-
sible under G.S. 150A-29(a)34 6 or G.S. 150A-303 47 in view of the entire
record as submitted. 34 s
In Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen,3 49 the court,
interpreting the same statute as that considered in Jarrell, extended the
principle of Jarrell to the governing boards of municipalities when act-
ing in a quasi-judicial capacity.
Recently the court has taken the rule of Jarrell and Humble one step
farther. In Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. v. Board of Commis-
sioners,3 5 ° the court stated that even though the decision of the Nags
Head Commissioners "or any town board is exempted from the scope
of review posited by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure
Act" by virtue of the exemption for local government bodies found in
Section 150A-2(l), 35'
[W]e cannot believe that our legislature intended that persons subject
to [a] zoning decision of a town board would be denied judicial review
of the standard and scope we have come to expect under the North
Carolina APA. Such a position would ignore a very long tradition in
this State of significant judicial review of town zoning ordinances...
and would contravene the sound logic of Jarrell. . . and Humble Oil
and Refining ....
Thus, while the specific review provision of the North Carolina APA
is not directly applicable, the principles that provision embodies are
highly pertinent. Indeed, even Humble Oil & Refining, . . . the case
which extended the then effective administrative review statutes to mu-
nicipal zoning decisions, did so not by express reference to statutory
provisions but by derivation of certain general princiles of judicial re-
view.3 52
The court proceeded to hold that both the superior court and the
court of appeals had "erred in failing to apply appropriate judicial re-
346. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-29(a) (1978) provides that "irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly
repetitious evidence" is to be excluded. For a discussion of the rules of evidence in adjudications
under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, see Daye, supra note 12, at 879-83, 916-
21.
347. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-30 (1978) provides that "[o]fficial notice may be taken of all
facts of which judicial notice may be taken and of other facts within the specialized knowledge of
the agency."
348. Id. § 150A-51(5).
349. 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974). See Note, Administrative Law-Due Process Stan-
dardsfor Quasi-Judicial Proceedings of Municipal and County Agencies, 54 N.C.L. REV. 83 (1975).
350. 299 N.C. 620, 265 S.E.2d 379 (1980).
351. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-2(l) (1978). See text accompanying note 193 supra.
352. 299 N.C. 620, 624-25, 265 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1980) (emphasis added).
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view standards, ' 353 among other reasons because they failed to insure
in this type of case that "decisions of town boards are supported by
competent, material and substantial evidence in the whole record ....
Both the superior court and the appellate courts are bound by all the
standards of review noted above.
354
It appears that in Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete the court imposed a
common law standard of review in local zoning cases that goes even
beyond the Administrative Procedure Act standard, because the words
"competent" and "material" do not appear in North Carolina General
Statutes section 150A-51(5).
The landmark case interpreting the "substantial evidence" or "whole
record" standard in North Carolina is Thompson v. Wake County Board
of Education.355 Thompson, a career teacher, was dismissed by the
school board for neglect of duty. Supporting the board's conclusion
that he had allowed his students to fight with each other (which consti-
tuted neglect of duty) was the testimony of a witness who saw two
students fighting with each other: "Mr. Thompson saw the fight. He
did not stop it. Mike and Eddie were fighting and Mr. Thompson
called to Mike and as he turned around he said 'beat the hell out of
Eddie' and Eddie hit and Mike turned around and bashed the mess out
of Eddie." '3 56 Here is a classic situation where even a scintilla of evi-
dence ("any competent evidence")-testimony that the teacher en-
couraged students to "beat the hell" out of each other-might be found
by an inattentive or lackadaisical court to support an administrative
determination of neglect of duty.357
On the other hand, Thompson testified that he had said: "This is
supposedly a class of exceptional students. Ifyou cannot act like gentle-
men-we are animals of the highest calibre-if you can't settle your
differences by using your brains, just beat the hell out of each other."3 '
This, of course, casts the remark in an entirely different light. Thomp-
son testified that after he made that remark, the boys exchanged no
more blows. Also in the record was the testimony of an experienced
353. Id. at 626, 265 S.E.2d at 383.
354. Id. at 627, 265 S.E.2d at 383.
355. 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977).
356. Id. at 411, 233 S.E.2d at 541-42.
357. It is not often that an astute administrator is unable to find somewhere in the evidence
a bit of testimony on which to hang a finding, however greatly the evidence may preponder-
ate against it. In a workmen's compensation case, for instance, if half a dozen physicians of
high standing, supported by X-ray and laboratory findings, testify positively that a worker is
not afflicted with an occupational disease, and a single physician of shady reputation and no
scientific attainment ventures the opinion that the man does have such disease, the Commis-
sion's finding of the existence of the disease cannot be disturbed; yet we all know it ought to
be reversed.
Hoyt, supra note 5, at 6-7.
358. 292 N.C. 406, 412, 233 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1977) (emphasis added).
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teacher who stated that from her observation Thompson had main-
tained good discipline.
The reviewing court, the Superior Court of Wake County, reversed
the board's order and ordered that Thompson be reinstated as a career
teacher, with back pay. The court of appeals reversed, reinstating the
dismissal order.359
The court of appeals reasoned 360 that the applicable rules of evidence
were those set forth in a statute governing teacher dismissal proceed-
ings. 36 ' Because the local board had adopted no rules under that stat-
ute, those adopted by the State Board of Education governed, and
those rules permitted the local board in its discretion to admit "any
evidence and . . .give probative effect to evidence that is of a kind
commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of seri-
ous affairs. 362 In its discretion, the board was authorized to exclude
"incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious evi-
dence.
' 363
The court of appeals examined the board resolution and the lower
court order in light of the court of appeals' conclusion that the review-
ing court could not exclude testimony from its consideration merely
because it would otherwise violate a rule of evidence. Thus, the re-
viewing court was not limited to "substantial evidence in the record as
a whole which is competent and material. 3 64 On the issue of neglect of
duty arising from the fighting incident described (which the lower court
had found was a conclusion not supported by a finding based on com-
petent evidence), the court of appeals reviewed all the testimony and
concluded that there was competent evidence in the record viewed in
its entirety to support the conclusion of law as to neglect of duty.365
The supreme court held that a reviewing court under the whole rec-
ord rule must do more than search for evidence supporting the adminis-
trative determination. "[A] trial judge reviewing the school board
decision must not only consider the complete testimony of all the wit-
nesses," he must also consider the panel report of the Professional Re-
view Committee, which in the Thompson case had absolved the teacher
of all the charges against him, including the neglect of duty charge.36 6
Relying on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Uni-
359. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 31 N.C. App. 401, 230 S.E.2d 164 (1976).
360. Id. at 416, 230 S.E.2d at 172-73 (emphasis added).
361. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-142()(2) (1978).
362. 31 N.C. App. 401, 416, 230 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1976).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 425-26, 230 S.E.2d at 178.
366. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 414, 233 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1977).
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versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,36 7 the court said:
The "whole record" test does not allow the reviewing court to replace
the Board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views,
even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result
had the matter been before it de novo, Universal Camera Corp ....
On the other hand, the "whole record" rule requires the court, in deter-
mining the substantiality of evidence supporting the Board's decision,
to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the
weight of the Board's evidence. Under the whole evidence rule, the
court may not consider the evidence which in and of itself justifies the
Board's result, without taking into account contradictory evidence or
evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn. Universal
Camera Corp.....368
Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court upheld the supe-
rior court's judgment for the plaintiff Thompson, and ordered rein-
statement and an award of back pay.
The supreme court concluded:
When the whole record is viewed, the evidence shows that Mr.
Thompson ordinarily maintained good order and discipline at school
activities. One may disagree strenuously with the methods he em-
ployed but on the whole they were designed to and did result in good
order and effective discipline. All the evidence indicates that only one
fighting outbreak occurred in Mr. Thompson's classroom during the
1973-74 school year. According to Mr. Thompson's testimony, he tried
by his words to end the fight and was successful. Neither of the two
students who testified directly contradict Mr. Thompson's complete
statement on the occasion of the fight.
If a career teacher's ability to maintain good order and discipline at
school is to be judged solely by one incident, the evidence of that inci-
dent should be clear. We hold the evidence that Mr. Thompson ne-
glected his duty to maintain order and discipline was insubstantial in
view of the entire record. While the [clourt of [aippeals laid down the
correct standard of judicial review, that court failed to apply it, as
Judge Clark in his dissent correctly noted.36 9
Very recently the court reached a similar result in a case 370 involving
revocation by the Department of Motor Vehicles of an epileptic's
driver's license, holding that the entire record considered as a whole
did not support the conclusion of the Department's Medical Review
Board that the petitioner was afflicted with an uncontrollable seizure
disorder which prevented him from exercising reasonable and ordinary
control over a motor vehicle. The only evidence supporting the ad-
367. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
368. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977).
369. Id. at 415, 233 S.E.2d at 544.
370. Chesnutt v. Peters, 300 N.C. 359, 266 S.E.2d 623 (1980).
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ministrative findings was that he had experienced a seizure once or
twice a year and the seizures, with one exception, had occurred during
his sleep. On this one occasion, petitioner had "blacked out" while
driving and the car ran off the road. All other evidence showed that his
seizures were controlled by medication, that he was able to lead a nor-
mal life, and that he was able to exercise reasonable and ordinary con-
trol over his automobile while driving. The court ruled that the
Department had no power to deny or withhold the license.
In a case of extreme importance to applicants for admission to the
North Carolina Bar, in the 1979 case of In re Rogers,3 7 1 the supreme
court held that the "whole record" test rather than the "any competent
evidence" test is the proper scope of review standard for findings of the
North Carolina Board of Law Examiners. Moreover, when a decision
of the Board rests on specific contested facts, the Board must resolve
the factual dispute by making specific findings. A mere recitation of
the testimony heard by the Board will not suffice. Presumably the
Board, in light of Rogers, has amended, or will amend, its apparent
practice of informing applicants to whom it has denied admission to
the examination, or admission by comity, merely that they have failed
to satisfy the Board's requirements in some particular without ever re-
vealing the facts supporting such a conclusion.3 7 2
Indeed, one of the salutary effects of the recent activist trend of the
supreme court may be to force administrative bodies to improve their
own procedures in order to assure fundamental fairness. That is no less
worthy a goal, and no less useful a result of the recent cases, than af-
fording supreme court guidance to the lower courts who may not yet
fully recognize the broad scope of their power to review the factual
record in many situations.
Such a trend, if it continues, and if it is accompanied by legislative
action to extend the "substantial evidence" standard to administrative
determinations at all levels of the bureaucracy in North Carolina,
would mark a significant step toward imposing on the judiciary major
responsibility for keeping "the government off the backs of the peo-
ple. '3 73 At such a step Chief Justice Barnhill would undoubtedly re-
coil, were he with us, but it has been said that there is nothing more
powerful than an idea whose time has come.
371. 297 N.C. 48, 253 S.E.2d 912 (1979).
372. See, e.g., Record at 11, 12, Markham v. Swails, 29 N.C. App. 205, 223 S.E.2d 920 (1976),
pet.for disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 309, 225 S.E.2d 829, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d 510,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
373. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS ix (1980).
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Enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1974, and recent
interpretations of its judicial review provisions by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, have brought us a new (and welcome) approach to
judicial review in the administrative law of the state-one through
which our citizens will be afforded, more than ever before, substantial
protections against the invasions of their rights, individually and as
members of the public, by an ever-expanding bureaucracy. These ad-
vances, however, are merely a beginning. The old common law re-
quirements that government officials must have engaged in "arbitrary"
and "capricious" conduct or in "oppressive and manifest abuse of dis-
cretion"-before a court will intervene to restrain them-are, in Lin-
coln's phrase, "dogmas of a quiet past." They are inadequate for a
"stormy present" and an uncertain future, and must be abandoned.
Government officers must no longer feel that there is no significant
threat of judicial intervention through litigation brought by persons ad-
versely affected by unreasonable conduct, however unintentional. They
have no "right to err." Where no statutory form of review of govern-
mental action is provided, the law as to remedies available remains in a
state of utter confusion, to the bewilderment of the Bar and to the frus-
tration of citizens whose grievances cannot be resolved promptly be-
cause of judicial emphasis on procedural technicalities. Local
government bodies must no longer be immune from the statutory pro-
cedures for judicial review applicable to state agencies. The General
Assembly and the Supreme Court of North Carolina should diligently
address themselves to these issues in the years ahead.
75
Markham: A Powerless Judiciary - The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980
